Salafi-Jihadist Movements and Ideology in Educational Institutions: Exploring the Nexus with Religious Moderation

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Abstrak
Menguatnya aksi "jihad" global memberikan pengaruh terhadap konstelasi Islam di Indonesia. Lembaga pendidikan luput dari infiltrasi ideologi dan gerakan Salafi Jihadis. Studi ini bertujuan untuk memetakkan ideologi, karakteristik dan interpretasi keislaman Salafi Jihadis di lembaga pendidikan serta keterkaitannya dengan pengarusutamaan moderasi beragama. Pendekatan yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah pendekatan historis. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian kualitatif yang menggabungkan analisis isi dari kajian literatur dan analisis aktor untuk melihat ideologi keagamaan Salafi Jihadis dan respons terhadap infiltrasi Salafi Jihadis melalui moderasi beragama. Hasil penelitian ini mengungkap bahwa; a) ideologi dan gerakan Salafi Jihadis di lembaga pendidikan menjadi ancaman serius terhadap keberagaman dan keberagamaan; b) Ideologi Salafi Jihadis dengan karakteristik *Islam salaf* menjadi magnet untuk menarik masa; c) Pengarusutamaan moderasi beragama di lembaga pendidikan melalui kurikulum, pembentukan kultur moderat, kebijakan serta praktik baik bisa menjadi tindakan preventif infiltrasi ideologi dan gerakan Salafi Jihadis. Penelitian ini berimplikasi terhadap strategi dan intervensi yang lebih efektif dalam melawan gerakan Salafi-Jihadi dan mempromosikan pendidikan yang berlandaskan nilai-nilai Islam yang moderat dan insklusif.
Kata Kunci: *Salafi Jihadis, Moderasi Beragama, Lembaga Pendidikan*

Abstract
The increasing global actions of "jihad" significantly impact the landscape of Islam in Indonesia. Within this context, educational institutions have not been immune to the infiltration of Salafi Jihadist ideologies and movements. This study examines the ideology, characteristics, and interpretation of Salafi Jihadist Islam within educational institutions

and its relationship with the mainstreaming of religious moderation. The historical approach is employed in this study. A qualitative research design is employed to investigate these phenomena, combining content analysis from a comprehensive literature review and actor analysis. This methodology enables a thorough examination of Salafi Jihadist religious ideology and responses to the infiltration of Salafi Jihadist ideology through religious moderation. The findings of this study reveal several key insights: a) the ideology and movements of Salafi Jihadists in educational institutions pose a significant threat to religious practices and beliefs; b) the Salafi Jihadist ideology, with its distinctive Salafi Islamic characteristics, exerts a strong influence that attracts followers; and c) mainstreaming religious moderation in educational institutions through various means such as curriculum development, fostering a moderate culture, implementing policies, and promoting good practices can serve as a preventive measure against the infiltration of Salafi Jihadist ideology and movements. These research findings have important implications for developing more effective strategies and interventions to counter the Salafi-Jihadi movements and promote education that is grounded in moderate and inclusive Islamic values.

Keywords: *Salafi Jihadist, Religious Moderation, Educational Institutions*

INTRODUCTION

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Islamic movements have emerged as a significant concern for policymakers such as the government and researchers (Silke, 2008). The organization al-Qaeda, under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, was accused of being a *Mastermind* of devastating acts of terrorism *World Trade Centre* and the Pentagon, the United States that had an impact on the country and society of the United States in general (W. Roberts, 2009). The event brought about a significant shift in the global order, particularly in Islamic-Western relations. The Islamic and Western "cold wars" intensified, especially after 9/11. In Western circles, the *Image of Islam* is getting worse, identified with violence and terrorism, so that hatred against Islam or what is often referred to as *Islamophobia*. Goleen Samari noted that hatred of Islam, stigmatization, fear, and hatred of Muslims in the United States increased 5-fold compared to before the event *Nine Eleven* (Samari, 2016).

Research results in *Islamophobia Studies Center* Created a survey titled *The Islamophobia, Muslim Safety and Violence* Involving 1614 participants in North America (US and Canada). The survey found that 38.59% said that Muslim professionals felt alienated and excluded at work, while only 5.30% and 24.88% stated that they were very or somewhat supportive. 46.91% of respondents stated that they or family members who wear hijab had experienced adverse events directed at their hijab. 52.47% of respondents

stated that during the pandemic, they had experienced verbally phobic incidents of Islam (Bazian &; Awaad, 2021).

Islamophobia cannot be separated from the media and political discourse that links Islam with terrorism. Similar research reveals that terrorism in media and political discourse is almost exclusively reserved for Muslims (Bazian &; Awaad, 2021). Edward said that political frameworks and hidden interests have always influenced the image of Islam in the US media because of its portrayal of Islam "*not only patent inaccuracy but also expressions of unrestrained ethnocentrism, cultural and even racial hatred, deep yet paradoxically free-floating hostility*" (Said, 1997). Islamophobia continues to increase along with the increasing acts of extremism and terrorism committed by Muslims(Azra, 2022).

The Global Terrorism Index named the four deadliest terrorist groups of 2019 that were both affiliated with Islamic movements; Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Taliban, and the *Islamic State of Iraq and Levant* (ISIL) (Peace, 2020) because of the four *Labeling movements* in the name of Islam. These Islamic movements often use Islamic jargon as justification for their struggles, such as the purification of Islamic teachings, the establishment of the Caliphate, the Islamic state, the obligation of every Muslim to *Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar*, the obligation to wage jihad, and so on. This "*Jargon*" is used to justify all acts of intolerance, violence, radicalism, and terrorism. This group is often referred to as Salafi Jihadists or Salafi Jihadis. The term Salafi Jihadi movement (*Al-Haraka al-Jihadiyah al-Salafiyah*) was first used by Gilles Kepel and Kamil al-Tawil in 1998 to describe the Salafist movement that uses violence through the slogan jihad (Hegghammer, 2009).

The strengthening of this global "jihad" action influences the constellation of Islam in Indonesia. SM Kartosoewirjo previously championed the concept and struggled for an Islamic state. The collapse of the New Order regime and the transition to the Reform era served as an entry point for the country's global "jihad" movement. This is supported by research conducted by the Wahid Foundation, which indicates that in 2017 there was a 57.1% increase in the majority Muslim population's intolerant attitudes, compared to 51.0% in the previous year. Similar research reveals that 13.2% of respondents agreed with violent jihad (Damarjati, 2018). The LSI-Denny JA survey revealed a decline in the acceptance of Pancasila as the state ideology, which transitioned towards the establishment of a Sharia-compliant Republic of Indonesia. In 2005, the percentage of individuals supporting Pancasila was 85.2%. This figure decreased to 81.7% in 2010 and dropped to 75.3% in 2018, indicating a 10% decline in pro-Pancasila sentiment within a

13-year period (Faiq, 2018). Additionally, in the same year, a religious mapping survey conducted by Alvara Research among professionals found that 27.6% of respondents supported regional sharia regulations (Peraturan Daerah) as they were deemed suitable for accommodating the majority's religious beliefs. Among civil servants, the proportion supporting local Sharia regulations was 35.3%, while in the private sector, it was 36.6%. Regarding the state ideology, the survey revealed that 15.5% of respondents considered Islamic ideology to be more appropriate. Among civil servants, 19.4% expressed support for Islamic ideology, while in the private sector, the figure was 9.1% (Zunita Amalia, 2018). A survey conducted by the National Agency also yielded similar findings.

Educational institutions have not been immune to the infiltration of Salafi Jihadi ideology and movements. The research conducted by the Setara Institute on the religious typology of students in 10 universities revealed significant findings. In the realm of state politics, 33.5% of students were categorized as moderate, 24% as formalists, and 8.1% as very formalists. Regarding the socio-religious realm, 45.8% of students were classified as moderate and inclusive, while the remaining 53% were categorized as exclusive and very exclusive (Equivalent, 2019). It is worth noting that religious discourses and movements thrive within university environments and, to a certain extent, have the potential to foster intolerance, radicalism, and even terrorism. These religious discourses and movements directly pose a threat to the ideology of Pancasila.

According to research conducted by Novizal from a school research institute, it was found that various actors play a significant role in shaping the understanding of jihad. Around 85% of religious preachers (ustaz), 73% of Quran recitation teachers, 59% of parents, 54% of religious teachers in elementary schools, and 51% of junior high school teachers contribute to this understanding (Wendry et al., 2020). Furthermore, the Setara Institute's research in 2023 revealed that more than 56% of students agree with the implementation of Islamic law. Additionally, it was found that 83.3% of students considered Pancasila not to be a permanent state ideology and believed it could be replaced (Diko, 2023; Saputra, 2023).

Based on the provided data, it is evident that universities play a crucial role in shaping and influencing students' thinking in religious and state contexts. Given the global challenges posed by the spread of radical and extreme Salafi Jihadist ideologies, it becomes increasingly important to strengthen religious moderation within universities. This argument is supported by a survey conducted by the National Counterterrorism Agency

(Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme/BNPT) and several national research institutions, which revealed a decrease in the index of potential radicalism from 12.2% in 2020 to 10% in 2022. Additionally, the Target Dimension Index for 2022 (51.54) is lower than the stipulated figure of 54.26 in the National Medium-Term Development Plan *(Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional/RPJMN)* (Admin, 2022; Public Relations, 2022; Panrb, 2022; Sadidah, 2023). The decline in the index of potential radicalism can be attributed, in part, to the collective efforts of various segments of society, including educational institutions. The mainstreaming of moderation as a strategy to counter extreme religious interpretations has been effective in shaping inclusive understandings and attitudes. This further highlights the significance of strengthening religious moderation within educational institutions as an impactful measure against the infiltration of Salafi Jihadist ideological movements.

Based on the previously mentioned data and supported by the research conducted by Mutohirin on Salafi ideology in educational institutions (Muthohirin et al., 2022) and Suragala's study on the role of universities in combating violent and extremist ideologies (Suralaga et al., 2020), this present study aims to investigate the ideology, characteristics, and interpretation of Salafi Jihadist Islam within educational institutions and its implications for the mainstreaming of religious moderation.

METHODOLOGY

This study adopted a historical approach which is commonly employed in research related to ideologies and movements (Babbie, 2008). This approach is integral to comprehending the dynamics and evolution of ideologies and movements, as it allows for an exploration of the historical context in which they emerge. By employing the historical approach, researchers can gain insights into the causes and effects of ideologies and movements, as well as their societal impact.

This qualitative study combined content analysis from literature review and actor analysis to examine the religious ideology of Salafi Jihadists and the actors' roles in responding to the infiltration of Salafi Jihadist movements in educational institutions through mainstreaming religious moderation. The data collection techniques involved content analysis through a thorough literature review. Observations were conducted by analyzing discourses on Salafi Jihadists and religious moderation in online media platforms. Interviews were also conducted with lecturers from the Indonesian Association

of Islamic Religious Education Lecturers *(Asosiasi Dosen Pendidikan Agama Islam Indonesia/ADPISI).*

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Mapping the Ideology, Characteristics, and Genealogy of the Salafi Jihadist Islamic Movement

1. **Salafi Jihadist Islamic Terminology and Interpretation**

In the context of Islamic movements, the word *Salafi* is associated with the attitude of Muslims who emphasize the importance of clinging to first-century Islam's religious and political authority. It is based on the paradigm that it is believed that Islam is perfect and became a *role model* in Islam in the generation of the prophet Muhammad and two generations after him. The Islamic experience of the first three generations of Islam is believed to be orthodoxy, i.e., pure and unpolluted Later generations believed many deviations and contaminations resulted from influences from cultures and ideologies from outside Islam. Therefore, Salafists seek to purify Islam by cleansing it of its cultural and ideological influences, which it calls *Bid'ah* and *Khurafhat.* Not only does it believe Salafists feel obliged to invite and direct people outside their group to return to the Islam they understand, which they say is under the understanding of *Salafus Salih* (Ali, 2019)*.*

The Salafi paradigm intersects with Wahhabism because both have the spirit to return to Islamic orthodoxy as practiced by the first three generations of Islam. Wahhabism is attributed to Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhaб (1702-1792). Because they both carry the same spirit, Salafi, Salafism, and Wahhabism are often interchanged, even though they have points of similarity and differences (Ali, 2019). Four doctrines intersect between Salafism and Wahhabism. *First*, both return to the main source of Islamic teachings, the Qur'an and Hadith, so that all Islamic thought (*Al-Afkar Al-Islamiyah*) born from the device of secular disciplines, for example, were instantly rejected. *Second*, strict rules between believers and non-believers. Salafis and Wahabis have been harsh on groups and outside their ideas, often accused of heresy and infidels. In this context, the concept arises *al-wala' wa al-bara'* (loyalty and denial) and *takfir* (disbelief) of groups and thoughts outside themselves. *Third*, both Salafists and Wahhabis reject Shia because the Shia cult is against imams, and reject three *Khulafaur Rashidin* except Sayyidina Ali. *Fourth*, *hisbah* (da'wah) through *Al-Amar Bi Al-*Ma'ruf *Wa al-Nahy* 'an *Al-Munkar,* is the culmination of jihad by showing a challenging attitude (Ma'ruf, 2016).

The word "jihadi" in the phrase "Salafi Jihadi" has the same root as the word "jihad" (Shihab, 2005). The term "Salafi Jihadi" refers to one of the groups of modern Salafis. Tariq defines these Salafi Jihadis as Salafist groups that spread rebellion and violence against their enemies, as al-Qaeda does. Mohamed Ali quotes Tariq Abdelhaleem as classifying eight modern Salafist groups, one of which is the global jihadist (Ali, 2019). According to Seth G. Jones, there are 40 organizations categorized as Salafi Jihadi, of which al-Qaeda is the core organization (Jones, 2014).

2. Characteristics of Salafi Jihadist Thought and Movement

An essential characteristic of Salafi jihadis is the use of violence and terrorism, believed in jihad to combat infidel regimes and expand the Islamic state (dar al-Islam). Magnus Ranstorp wrote:

> *Salafi-Jihadists believe that every Muslim has an individual duty to fight unbeliever regimes to expand dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam). For them, Europe is considered to be dar al-harb (Abode of War). Salafi- Jihadists seek to wage perpetual armed jihad, which is considered individually obligatory, until Judgement Day. These Salafi-Jihadists have strong categorization of enemies that are considered un-Islamic and must be fought alongside specific phraseology for these enemies that serve as dehumanizing* (Ranstorp, 2020).

Emily N. Mayfield gives some characteristics related to Salafi jihadists. *First*, the concept of *tawhid*, the belief that there is only one God that every Muslim should believe in. According to Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, this tawhid has three components: *Tawhid Rububiyya, Tawhid Uluhiyya, Tawhid al-Asmaa wa al-Nature.* All three of these components must be executed and believed at once. With this concept, bin Abdul Wahhab wanted to affirm that tawhid is not only in the heart but must also manifest in action. *Second*, bid'ah refers to beliefs or actions incompatible with the Qur'an and sunnah, especially as practiced by *Salaf al-Shaleh.* For Salafis, many heresies occur due to the fusion of local culture with Islamic teachings. *Third,* Salafists maintain that there is no division or distinction among Islamic schools of thought *(madhabs)* because Islam is seen as a unified entity. According to this perspective, all Muslims are expected to adhere to the same core beliefs and practices, emphasizing the unity and universality of Islam. *Fourth*, jihad is the culmination of the practice of Islamic teachings. A Muslim cannot be perfectly categorized as a believer if he does not practice jihad. In this context, the definition of jihad in the sense of committing violence and terror can be justified as an attempt to carry out the teachings of Islam. *Fifth*, disbelief (*takfir*) to people or groups who do not share the same understanding as him. Salafis believe that Muslims are single in faith and

understanding and that true belief and understanding are in their version, so people or groups whose beliefs and understandings do not conform to them are considered infidels. This *takfir* justifies committing acts of violence and terror against people and groups convicted of infidels. *Sixth*, *Al-Wala wa al-Bara,* which linguistically means loyalty and denial. Through this concept, every Muslim should not like, let alone imitate and practice, the practices and behaviors of non-Muslims (Mayfield, 2015).

3. Genealogy of the Salafi-Jihadi Movement: From Global to Indonesian

The history of the emergence of Salafis is often associated with the thought of Ibn Taymiyyah by many scholars and researchers. Thinking Salafi can already be found in the period before Ibn Taymiyyah, in the group *Ahl al-Hadith* (Ali, 2019). This hadith emphasizes the use of hadith, rejecting the existence of *taqlid,* and limiting the existence of interpretation and contextualization in understanding the primary sources of Islamic teachings.

The focus of this study is more on what is called modern Salafiism, namely Salafism after Ibn Taymiyyah, commanded by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1989), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Rashid Rida (1865-1935). Salafists rely on Ahmad ibn Hambal (d. 855), who is known as Imam Ahlussunnah among Salafis. In addition to Ahmad ibn Hambal and Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah and Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (1702-1792) also exerted a profound influence on *manhaj* Modern Salafi. Mohamed Ali gave two forms or types of modern Salafis. First, Salafi refers to a school of thought born in the late nineteenth century in Egypt and Damascus in response to the spread of European ideas. This type of Salafism was very close to modernist reformers such as Muhammad Abduh (died 1905). Second, the Salafi group founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is widely known as the *Wahhabism* (Ali, 2019).

Starting from a thought, this Salafism believes that many religious practices deviate from Islamic teachings. Those who did not share the same understanding as Abdul Wahhab and his followers were accused of infidels, apostates, and idolatry. Infidel accusations (*takfir*) This is done when he does not have enough firepower to muzzle and finish off different groups (Wahid, 2009). In the next stage, Salafi thoughts then grew and manifested into a movement to invite people to return to the pure teachings of Islam, he resorted to violence to effect societal change. The first act of violence committed by Ibn Abdul Wahhab was the destruction of the tomb of Zaid bin al-Khattab. Ibn Abdul Wahhab's thoughts and actions grew when he received support from Muhammad bin

Sa'ud, a collaboration that would later give birth to the Saudi-Wahhabi Kingdom. In 1746, these Wahhabis declared jihad in the sense of violence and war to anyone who had a different understanding of Islam. In 1920, no less than 400,000 Muslims were killed for spreading this teaching (Wahid, 2009).

This Salafi ideology and movement continue to grow with significant financial support. The Muslim Brotherhood, which did not have much funding but had learned cadres then, became a *partner of* Salafi-Wahhabis. Then born, several hardline Islamic movements have spread throughout the world until now, including al-Qaeda (Wahid, 2009). From al-Qaeda were born several hardline Islamist movements, both local and as splinters due to internal frictions.

Al Qaeda continues to evolve and become a *trend.* Global terrorism is born out of the context of Arab societies frustrated with the modernization process that is taking place in which there are economic inequalities, consumerism, and secularization. In other words, al Qaeda is a *trend* the embodiment of the anti-globalization movement or the manifestation between "central" and "periphery" nations in the era of globalization (Prihandono, 2013). Esposito also provided a similar analysis. According to him, Osama Bin Laden can cleverly catch grievances against the regime and the state of the economy. The voices of the Arabs were then wrapped in religious texts to be voiced loudly to Western society. Islamic societies, which share concerns about economic inequality, modernization, and globalization, feel represented by bin Laden's movements (Esposito., 2002).

In the Indonesian context, Salafi thought and movement began to enter Indonesia before Indonesian independence. As a movement, the forerunner of Salafism in Indonesia began with the return of several West Sumatran youths, Haji Miskin, Haji Abdurrahman, and Haji Muhammad Arif, from Saudi Arabia in the early 19th century, who at that time were much influenced by the thoughts and renewal movements carried out by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. The young man was fascinated by the renewal movement in Saudi Arabia, so they spread this ideology. From here was born the first Salafi movement in Indonesia, known as the Padri movement, which triumphed from 1803 to 1832; one of the central figures was Tuanku Imam Bonjol (Al-Thalibi, 2006).

In the 1980s, the Salafi movement in Indonesia was represented by students and alumni of the early generation of LIPIA (Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences) and several alumni of Middle Eastern universities. Some of its central figures are Ja'far Umar

Talib, Yazid Abd al-Qadir Jawaz, Yusuf Usman Baisa, Muhammad Umar as-Sewed, Aunurrafiq Gufron, and Abu Nida, among others (Krismono, 2017). The Salafi movement in Indonesia strengthened with the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime and into the reform era. Several Islamic organizations that spread Salafiism, committed acts of violence, and even terrorism began to emerge. Since the reform era, terrorist events have occurred in the country. The series of terror events in the form of bombs became a new threat starting with the bombing of the Istiqlal mosque (1999), JSX Jakarta (2000), Medan Church Bomb (2000), Atrium Bomb (2001), Hayam Wuruk Plaza Bomb (2003) to the popular Bali bombings I and II (2002 and 2005).

Salafi Jihadists in Educational Institutions and Their Connection to the Mainstreaming of Religious Moderation

1. **Portraits of Salafi Jihadis in Educational Institutions**

    In the context of educational institutions, some data shows how Salafi Jihadi ideology has penetrated quite profoundly into schools. This discussion is obtained from various media observations related to Salafi Jihadi ideology.

    a. Research against 110 Perpetrators of Terrorism Themed "*Research on Motivation and Root Causes of Terrorism*" conducted by The Indonesian Research Team, 2012; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, INSEP and Densus 88. This study found that 47.3% of terrorism perpetrators were young people with an average age of 21-30 years. Perpetrators of terrorism are young people with a high school education level (63.6%) (Mandailing, 2016).

    b. Institute for Islamic Studies and Peace *(Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Perdamaian/LaKIP)* conducted a study involving Islamic religious teachers and high school students in the Jabodetabek area. The survey data found several findings, i.e., 62.4 percent of religious teachers refuse to have non-Muslim leaders. 68.6% of religious teachers oppose the appointment of non-Muslims to their principals. 73.1% of religious teachers reject non-Muslim houses of worship in their neighborhoods. 85.6% of religious teachers forbid their students from celebrating activities considered "Western traditions". 87% of religious teachers forbid their students from studying other religions. 61.1% reject the new sect in Islam. 67.4% of respondents feel more as Muslims than as Indonesians. 58.9% of respondents supported stoning, 47.5% of respondents supported the law of cutting off hands for

thieves, and 21.3% agreed to provide the death penalty for apostates from Islam(Sanaky &; Safitri, 2016).

c. Alvara's survey of 4,200 students in Java and several significant cities outside Java yielded as follows: 1) Almost 25% of students are 'ready to wage jihad for the establishment of an Islamic state/caliphate' 2) Less than 20% of students prefer Islamic ideology over Pancasila. 3) Almost 20% of students agree that the *Khilafah* is the ideal form of government compared to the Republic of Indonesia, 4) About 20% of students consider Sharia Regional Regulations appropriate to accommodate followers of the majority religion, 5) Almost 25% of students agree with the statement 'Islamic states need to be fought for the implementation of Islam *Kaffah* (thorough) (Sitepu, 2017).

d. Survey of the Center for Islamic and Community Studies *(Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat/PPIM)* to 2,237 Muslim teachers in 34 provinces. Several essential data stated that: 1) 57% of teachers have an intolerant view towards followers of other religions, 2) 37.77% of respondents are willing to commit intolerant acts, 3) 82.77% of teachers agree that Islam is the only solution to overcome all problems of society. 4) 62.22% of teachers agree that only a system of government based on Islamic Sharia is best for the country. 5) 75.98% of teachers agree that the government should enforce Islamic law for its adherents. 6) 79.72% of teachers agree that in choosing leaders (president, governor, regent/mayor), Muslims are obliged to elect candidates who fight for the implementation of Islamic law. 7) 23.42% of teachers agree that the Indonesian government based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is *Thaghut* for having taken away Allah's right as a lawmaker., 8) 64.23% of teachers agree that non-Muslims are not allowed to be President in Indonesia(Admin, 2018).

e. The National Counterterrorism Agency said seven prominent campuses were indicated to be exposed to radicalism. The seven campuses are the University of Indonesia (UI), Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), Bogor Agricultural University (IPB), Diponegoro University (Undip), to the November 10 Institute of Technology (ITS), Airlangga University (Unair), and Brawijaya University (UB) exposed to radicalism. Even the Minister of Research, Technology and Higher Education (Menristekdikti) for the 2014-2019 period Mohamad Nasir said exposure to radicalism on campus has been going on since 1983, when the

government's decision to implement the Normalization of Campus Life/Student Affairs Coordinating Board (NKK/BKK), so that practically political life on campus was prohibited. The void is filled with groups that spread radical ideas (Newswire, 2018).

f. Habibie Center research shows that the seeds of radicalism on campus have existed since the reform because many transnational Islamic organizations entered campuses. Not only that, the Habibie Center also mentioned that Public Universities, especially science and technology, are more vulnerable to radicalism than Religious Universities (Hadi Kuntjara et al., 2019).

The Habibie Center graphs the framework of various radicalism processes in universities in Indonesia as follows:


Figure 1. The Process of Radicalism at PT

2. Mainstreaming Religious Moderation in Educational Institutions

The interpretation of moderation in this context is not only carried out individually. However, it becomes a strategy carried out rationally and systematically to make moderate religious views, attitudes, and behaviors as a perspective and basis for thinking mutually accepted in building human resources (HR) integrated into various institutions, including education.

The infiltration of Salafi Jihadist ideology emphasizes the need to influence religious moderation in educational institutions. Through an inclusive, educative, and

dialogical approach, religious moderation can be a strong foundation against extremism. Extreme people often get caught up in religious practices in the name of God to defend His majesty while leaving aside the human aspect. People who are religious in this way are willing to kill their fellow human beings "in the name of God" when safeguarding humanity is part of the core teachings of religion (Wibisono et al., 2019). In the 21st century, extremism is often seen as one of the most dangerous threats to humanity (Manshur &; Husni, 2020). Mainstreaming religious moderation in education in Indonesia is a response to some groups' dynamics and problems of diversity and religion. Religious moderation is urgently needed to build civilization and humanitarian solidarity in this context.

Educational institutions serve as environments where inclusive, tolerant, moderate, and multicultural mindsets and attitudes are nurtured and developed. These mindsets and attitudes must be formed through perspectives and behaviors in the middle position without exaggeration in the religion (Saifudin, 2019). According to Lukman, religious moderation has become mainstream in the religious pattern of Indonesian society. Moderate religion has emerged as a distinctive feature among religious individuals in Indonesia, reflecting the country's pluralistic society. The religious model has long been practiced in the life of the Indonesian nation by placing an understanding that pays attention to religious texts, the country's constitution, local wisdom, and tolerance. A moderate, fair, and balanced mental attitude is the key to managing the diversity of the Indonesian nation.

Based on the interviews, the influence of religious moderation in educational institutions must be the leading force in implementing and strengthening religious moderation. Indeed, religious moderation is a terminology born from the Islamic spirit of *Rahmatan Lil Alamin*. Therefore, infiltration and mainstreaming strategies for religious moderation in educational institutions are carried out in various terms that are in accordance with the characteristics, goals, vision, and mission of the education system itself. Religious moderation in educational institutions can be infiltrated with various efforts through a) Curriculum; b) Culture; c) Policies; d) Good practices.

Mainstreaming religious moderation in the learning process through the curriculum can be done both in formal and non-formal education. In formal education, teaching related to religious moderation can be done by inserting material related to a tolerance that accepts and rewards differences, respect for culture, love for the homeland

and the struggle of the founding fathers, and nonviolence. In the interview session, the informant confirmed that:

> *"In every learning material, it is necessary to exemplify good deeds; this confirms that our disagreement with something can be conveyed well without anarchist speech and attitude".*

This opinion is reinforced by Dinar in his research, revealing that formal education is the right way to structure religious moderation activities systematically. Non-formal institutions are very effective in the formation of moderate attitudes, this is inseparable from the practice of community life. Religious moderation in informal educational institutions such as *taklim* assemblies, Islamic boarding schools, and religious organizations is a strategic place because the role of actors is one of the keys to providing moderate religious knowledge and attitudes (Naj'ma &; Bakri, 2021).

The establishment of a culture of religious moderation in educational institutions serves as an effective means to foster inclusive attitudes among the entire academic community. One of the efforts in bridging the formation of this culture is through the House of Religious Moderation *(Rumah Moderasi Beragama/RMB)* in religious universities and the *Griya Moderasi Beragama dan Bela Negara* (MBBN) in public universities. Through the RMB and Griya MBBN, the spirit of moderate Islam can become a shared value among all academic community members as a preventive measure against radicalism within the campus environment. In an interview, the informant revealed:

> *"Through MBBN with its various activities, it is hoped that it can produce students who become role models and agents of change in the family, campus, and community in instilling attitudes, behaviors, and characters that have a high sense of religious tolerance and can place diversity".*

The policy of religious moderation in higher education is integrated through the three pillars *(tri dharma)* of higher education. In the field of teaching, the subject of religious moderation is made a mandatory course in universities or incorporated as teaching materials from a perspective of religious moderation. In the field of research, religious moderation is regarded as a value that can be developed across various disciplines so that research outcomes can contribute to evidence-based decision-making on religious moderation policies. In terms of community service, universities are essential in promoting a moderate and tolerant attitude, rejecting violence, and preserving local traditions within society. This includes promoting moderate religious literacy as part of these efforts.

The mainstreaming of religious moderation can then be done through good practices that have been carried out by various institutions and individuals, such as the example of the Wahid Foundation with the Peace School and Peace Village programs, this can be emulated and applied in various other schools and villages to implement the same spirit with the values of tolerance, mutual respect, and cooperation between religions. Increasing the practice of different religious experiences so that cooperation between religious believers and socio-religious moderation approaches in religion and state is the main capital in creating a harmonious religious and state life amid differences.

Mainstreaming religious moderation in educational institutions provides short-term benefits and long-term impacts in shaping a society based on tolerance, harmony, and humanity. Educational institutions have a strategic role in creating a more harmonious and inclusive future through strengthening religious moderation and can be an essential step in countering radical ideological infiltration. This approach is taken in line with the ownership of social capital of the Indonesian nation, which is the sociocultural basis, including values, norms, relationships, outlook on life, and bonds of solidarity.

CONCLUSION

Religious moderation has long been a defining feature of Indonesian society. However, the infiltration of Salafi Jihadist ideology and movements into educational institutions has highlighted the importance of promoting moderate religious understanding as a means to counter various forms of extremism. Numerous studies have demonstrated that the unchecked spread of Salafi Jihadi ideology poses a significant threat to Indonesian society's religious fabric and diversity. Therefore, mainstreaming religious moderation in educational institutions serves as a crucial platform for cultivating a moderate and inclusive academic community that promotes values of humanity and peace.

This study provides evidence to support the implementation of mainstreaming and promotion of religious moderation within educational institutions through various means. These efforts include incorporating values of religious moderation into the curriculum, both through formal and informal teaching methods. Creating a culture of moderation can be achieved through initiatives such as the establishment of *Rumah Moderasi* and *Griya Moderasi* (House of Moderation). Policies implemented within educational institutions play a pivotal role in systematically integrating religious moderation, while good practices

ensure that religious moderation aligns with the compassionate and inclusive principles of Islamic teachings, such as *Rahmatan Lil Alamin*. These efforts are not merely theoretical discourses but are actively implemented in everyday life.

This study has certain limitations as it focuses primarily on the historical analysis of Salafi Jihadist ideology and its manifestation within educational institutions, specifically in relation to religious moderation. Further research is needed to comprehensively examine the role of stakeholders in responding to Salafi Jihadist infiltration in educational institutions and the preventive measures undertaken. Additionally, there is a need for an in-depth analysis of the development and impact of Salafi Jihadist ideology and movements on social media platforms. These areas warrant further investigation to enhance our understanding of the subject matter and inform more effective strategies for countering extremist ideologies within educational settings.

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