



Article History

Submitted:

30-04-2024

Reviewed:

02-06-2024

Aproved:

27-10-2024



Post-Truth And Qur'an: Hacking Through The Qur'anic The Truth Decay Epistemological-Ethical Vision

Fakhri Afif

Fakbriafif22@gmail.com

UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Indonesia

M. Rodinal Khair Khasri

m.rodinal.k@mail.ugm.ac.id

Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia

M. Ilham Ulul Azmi Khasri

justilham25@gmail.com

Universiti Islam Selangor, Malaysia

Abstract

Post-truth terminology has increasingly enlivened public discussion since it was named as the Word of the Year by The Oxford English Dictionaries in 2016. After giving rise to various discussions, debates, and researches, this terminology was then identified as a serious threat to religious, social, dan political structure of global citizen. The case of alleged religious blasphemy by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama in 2017 and the strengthening of patron-based knowledge authority in the 2019 and 2024 Presidential Election are concrete events which indicate that post-truth and its destructive impacts have spread and reached Indonesia. The strengthening of knowledge patrons implies a condition of unfair construction and distribution of knowledge (epistemic injustice) which includes the testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Both then lead to the marginalization of a group at a theoretical and practical level. Therefore, post truth urges to be understood as a phenomenon that moves in two spaces, epistemological and ethical, at once. The moral configuration, especially in the context of scriptural morality, which is the reference for life needs to be placed as a part of what is determined by the hermeneutical mode in a broader scope. This article then intends to explore the epistemological-ethical content of the Qur'an by proposing a new reading of the Al-Nur (24):11-20 to deal with the post-truth phenomenon. This study is a qualitative research that based on the literature research and using al-ta'wil al-'ilmi as a theoretical framework in analyzing research data. The main point that this article wants to emphasize is to show the position, significance, and relevance of the Qur'an in the truth decay era. Through a circular hermeneutical movement that critically integrates the epistemologies of bayānī, 'urfānī, and burhānī, this article then shows the epistemological-ethical offer of the Qur'an in fighting the post-truth epidemic, namely reaffirmation of the existence of reality along with the essence of universal truth in human knowledge; emphasis on the importance of realizing the complexity of reality, prioritizing rationality, and highlight public virtue; and encouragement to create a relaxed attitude in front of smartphones so that technology can become a vehicle for the actualization of human spirituality. The interconnection of the three epistemological categories above will also be justified by referring to the tension of

realism and antirealism in the context of meta-ethics. The implication is that this article also clears up the ambiguity regarding the relationality between the interpreter and the interpretandum (text).

Keywords: *Post-Truth, Qur'an's Epistemological-Ethical Vision, Philosophy, al-Ta'wil al-'Ilmi*

URL: <http://e-journal.uingusdur.ac.id/index.php/Religia/article/view/8562>

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.28918/religia.v27i2.8562>

INTRODUCTION

In 2017, Indonesia was rattled by seires disasters resulting from the strengthening of a political model which based on sentiment and provocation. In order to defeat Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) in the political contestation of the Regional Head Election (PILKADA), Islamists explicitly politicised religion by hijacking Q. al-Mā'idah (5): 51—which they interpret textually as an explicit and strict prohibition to elect non-Muslim leaders in a predominantly Muslim society.(Hamdi, 2017, pp. 248–249) This simplistic and distorted view was then massively disseminated through sermons, public campaigns, and demonstration movements, and surprisingly succeeded in exerting significant influence on many people. The public uproar was then further intensified when Ahok's public speech attempting to criticise the phenomenon of al-Mā'idah politicisation—delivered in Pulau Seribu on 27 September 2016—was uploaded to the Youtube platform after undergoing a process of cutting and re-editing,(Lim, 2017, p. 6) causing various controversies and triggering ongoing demonstrations.(Fealy, 2016) Ultimately, the use and misuse of Qur'anic verses, the politicisation of religious identity, and the dissamination of misinformation through video framing resulted in the conviction of Ahok for “blasphemy” and his imprisonment for a period of two years

The chaos of Indonesia's political contestation continued during the 2019 presidential election. During the campaign, religious narratives had coloured much of the political persuasion of supporters of both presidential candidates, Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin and Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno, in order to increase their popularity and electability in the public sphere. In the aftermath of the 2017 regional elections, the “2019 *Ganti Presiden* (2019 Change of President)”, “*Partai Setan vs Partai Allah* (Satan's party vs Allah's party)”, and “People Power” movements were emerged with the aim of maintaining the polarisation of the “Islamic vis-à-vis anti-Islamic camp”.(Ardipandanto, 2020, pp. 43–44) Supporters of both camps engaged in ridicule and denigration of each other, as reflected in the shouts of “*cebong* (tadpole)” and “*kampret* (bat)”. After the election process took place, followed by the quick count agency's announcement regarding Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin's victory, the party elites, who did not accept their defeat, then made various accusations regarding the veracity of the quick count data and election fraud. These unsubstantiated claims were then repeated and disseminated massively via internet and social media, leading to widespread belief that Prabowo's victory had been stolen and that the quick count institutions had misrepresented the election results.(Wibowo, 2022, pp. 291–292) At this juncture, the

creation and dissemination of *alternative facts* through various propaganda and disinformation was intended to mislead the public,(McIntyre, 2018, pp. 7–8) so that the demarcation line between subjective beliefs and objective facts becomes blurred, and the public cannot distinguish between the two.

The phenomenon of Ahok case and the 2019 presidential election are two precise examples of a post-truth situation; an atmosphere in which the synergy of religious identity politicisation, right-wing populism, and electoral political pragmatism is on display. All three elements merge in the neglect of the truth and the dissemination of lies, misinformation, and disinformation to shape, influence, and direct public perception. Post-truth, as explained by Ignas Kalpokas and Michael Sawyer, is the erosion and blurring of the boundaries between truth and falsehood; namely, a condition in which various truth claims are based on self-referentiality, detached from verifiable facts, and accompanied by the emergence of alternative criteria wick superior of verifiable criteria to justify these claims.(Kalpokas, 2019, p. 5; Sawyer, 2018, p. 56) In the first case, the post-truth situation is evident in the obfuscation of facts related to the complexity of Q. 5: 51 and the plurality of interpretations of it(See for examples Pink, 2010; Syamsuddin, 2017; Shihab, 2019) as well as the editing of Ahok’s public speech video. Meanwhile, in the second case, the post-truth situation can be observed in the various claims that have been made, such as the lies of the quick count institutions, election fraud, and the robbery of Prabowo’s victory. Since the emergence of these two phenomena marks a turning point of conservatism and the decline of Indonesian democracy,(Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019; Hadiz, 2017) a critical response is needed to prevent the continuation of their destructive impact.

In recent years, the discourse of Islam and post-truth has enlivened scholarly conversations, as the post-truth phenomenon is closely linked to a number of implications for the religious structure of society. To date, a number of studies on Islam and post-truth have been devoted to explaining the phenomenon and the effect of post-truth, as well as critical responses to it. Among these studies are those that discuss the post-truth phenomenon and its role and impact on people’s religious life, both in terms of religious discourse,(Chair & Adzfar, 2021) the dynamics of religious leaders’ preaching activities,(Naqqiyah & Nurdin, 2019) and the rise of Islamophobic political narratives.(Syarif et al., 2020) Furthermore, several studies attempt to examine Islamic ethical principles in responding to post-truth challenges, such as the need to trace the primary source of any information to verify its truth(Septiyadi et al., 2021) and to improve the quality of public literacy to combat various hoaxes.(Prasanti, 2020) As far as the author can trace, there is only one extensive study that seeks to elaborate ethical principles from the Qur’an in dealing with the post-truth phenomenon, namely thematic exegesis study that promoted by one of the Indonesian *‘ulama-cum-philosopher*, Ach Dhofir Zuhry.(Afif & Isnaini, 2023) These studies show that the existence of the Qur’an as a guide for Muslims whose interpretation is expected to be able to provide an ethical guide, especially in the post-truth era, has not received sufficient attention.

This study is then aims to complement previous studies on Islam and post-truth by offering a reading of Q. al-Nūr (24): 11-20 in the context of the post-truth epidemic. While the Qur'an is regarded as the supreme authority and primary source of guidance for Muslims on matters of faith, ritual, law and ethics, (Haleem, 2001, p. 8) its meaning and application have not always been clear and relevant in all contexts. (Cook, 2000, p. 31) Given that the text was revealed fourteen centuries ago and was not arranged thematically and chronologically, a literal-textual reading of the Qur'anic text will only lead to confusion and produce obscurity. Hermeneutical process therefore plays an important role in any engagement with the Qur'anic text in order to clarify its meaning and finding its relevance for the demands of the times in which it is read. (Rippin & Nickel, 2008, p. 152; Hughes, 2013, p. 88; Brown, 2017, p. 95) Given that the Qur'anic text does not explicitly address the problem of post-truth, Q. 24: 11-20—which records the incident of spreading of negative news against 'Āisyah ra. (*hadīth al-ijf*) and offers a solution to the problem—is selected as it is a series of verse that can open a conversation about post-truth from a Qur'anic perspective and it offers a solution to the problem. We will analyse these verses extensively in order to ascertain their epistemological and ethical vision, which is particularly pertinent in the context of the post-truth era. In other words, through contextual-progressive reading of Q. 24: 11-20, the epistemological-ethical vision presented by the Qur'an can be seen to offer a critical response for life in the post-truth era.

The correlation between epistemic moment, ethical event, and post-truth phenomenon can be traced through a meta-philosophical framework. Consequently, this article is also concerned with exploring the ontological status of knowledge and morality, as well as outlining the ethical status of knowledge. Regarding the ontological status of knowledge, the main problem is closely related to the issue of the object of knowledge. Therefore, before arriving at the justification of right or wrong, it is necessary to elucidate the ontological status of the object that is intensionalised by the subject in the epistemic process. This ontological status can be traced by referring to the tension between realism with antirealism in viewing reality. This tension essentially seeks to address the issue of subject-object relationality, whether the object referred to, observed of, reasoned in intentionality exists independently of, or determined by the mind and consciousness of the subject.

The debate about the ontological status of the world (including objects of knowledge), whether these objects are independent of the mind and consciousness or not, is a central topic in the realism vs. anti-realism debate. (Insole, 2017; Nolt, 2004) This relationality problem then raises the question regarding the truth status of knowledge, which can be considered to fall on a spectrum between objectivity and subjectivity. The justification for the truth of knowledge will also ultimately refer to this spectrum. However, this spectrum is in sharp contrast to the binary opposition pattern that leaves no room at all for the dialectic relationship of object and subject—a pattern in which objectivity and subjectivity appear to be mutually exclusive and negating each other in one structure of knowledge justification, particularly in the context of justification of beliefs that become

knowledge. The binary relationship pattern is founded upon the Cartesian dualism tradition. With regard to the topic of Cartesian dualism, it is evident that this philosophical tradition is characterised by a clear separation between the mind and the body. This demarcation implies the separation of reason (or intellect) from the senses. (Glouberman, 1990) In contrast to the binary perspective that distinguishes subject from object, a more dialogical relationality refers to the correlative qualities of perception and the potential of the subject to quantify the object. (Bliss, 1917) With regard to the problem of morality, this subject-object relationality is ontologically and epistemologically correlated with ethical events, even in the form of causation.

The foregoing description suggests the existence of a preliminary condition that precedes the ethical moments. This preliminary condition is the hermeneutical moment that is inherent in subject-object relationality, both at the ontological and epistemological level. Subject-object relationality is about the imagination of morality which proceed by subject's reason. (McCann, 1980) The activity of understanding (*verstehen/verständlichkeit*) is of paramount importance in subject-object relationality, including in the process of understanding moral issues, ranging from causal-instrumental, pragmatic, to meta-ethical contexts that involve reasoning which often ends in deconstructionism or constructionism. Consequently, the ethical status of an action is highly dependent on, and determined by, the subject capacity to comprehend the source of reference for morality. (Cane, 2012) For the purposes of this article, the source of reference is the text in its general form, and the sacred text/scripture in its most specific form. Therefore, it can be said that the ethics discussed in this article is a scriptural ethics, or a ethics whose justification involves the relationality of the subject of interpretation (interpreter) and the reality of the text (interpretandum). It is also important to emphasise that this relationality encompasses the orientation of revealing the truth of the text as well as uncovering its meaning.

This study is classified as qualitative research, employing literature as the primary source of research data. The theoretical framework that will be employed to read, analyse, and describe the data is the theory of *al-ta'wil al-'ilmi* proposed by Amin Abdullah—a hermeneutical theory that seeks to present a holistic-critical reading of the Qur'anic text by elaborating the normative arguments of bayānī epistemology (sourced from religious texts), demonstrative arguments of burhānī epistemology (sourced from philosophical arguments), and esoteric arguments of 'irfānī epistemology (sourced from reflections on existentialist thought) through a circular movement to obtain a humanistic-transformative-emancipatory reading (*al-qirā'ah al-muntijah*). In this case, our position is that of a participant-as-observer (Knott, 2010, pp. 267–268) and critical lover. (Esack, 2007, p. 5) The stages that will be taken in this study are as follows: (1) conceptually explaining post-truth and its psychological and philosophical roots; (2) tracing the epistemological-ethical vision of Q. Al-Nūr (24): 11-20 through bayānī epistemology; (3) proposing a philosophical exposition of the existence and essence of knowledge through burhānī epistemology; (4) elaborating ontological-existential thinking regarding the relationship between humans and cell phones with 'irfānī epistemology; (5) concludes the study by dialoguing the three

epistemologies in a hermeneutical circle and showing the following contributions to the significance of the study in Islamic and post-truth discourse.

DISCUSSION

1. Understanding Post-Truth

Post-truth terminology was first employed by Steve Tesich in his writing, which aimed to critique the unquestioning acceptance of falsehoods by American civil society during the George W. Bush administration and their conscious decision to live in a world where the truth no longer held sway. (Tesich, 1992) Twelve years later, Ralph Keyes used the term to describe the prevailing state of modern society, in which lies, misinformation, and a general disregard for the truth have become the norm. (Keyes, 2004) The term subsequently became increasingly prevalent in the discussion of scholars, journalists, and media observers, who have seen and realised the existence of an epistemic crisis that hit the social-political order of the world, particularly in 2016. This was evidenced by the citizens of the world being shocked by Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election and the success of Brexit supporting politicians (Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson) in realising the British referendum. (Cosentino, 2020, p. 3) The pervasiveness of discussion surrounding the post-truth phenomenon led to the term being selected by Oxford English Dictionaries (OED) as The World of the Year in 2016. The OED defines the term as "a state in which objective facts are less influential than personal emotions and beliefs in shaping public opinion." It can be argued that 2016 marked the advent of the post-truth era, a period during which the values of rationality and scientific inquiry are openly rejected, authoritarian populist movements flourish, the credibility of mainstream media is undermined, scientific knowledge is marginalised, and alternative media emerge. (Harsin, 2015; Tallis, 2016)

The addition of the word "post" to the term "post-truth" does not imply a chronological sequence. The word "post" can also be understood as "less important, secondary, and inferior". Therefore, post-truth does not necessarily refer to something that occurs after the truth or vice versa. Rather, it suggests that the truth itself has become secondary, inferior, obsolete, and even disappeared due to the prioritisation of emotions that influence the construction of many people's judgements. (Crowley, 2017, p. 91) It is important to note that the OED definition's emphasis on subjective emotionality as the main characteristic of post-truth which can be distinguished from truth and its objectivity does not yet represent the true meaning of post-truth. Accordingly, post-truth needs to be elaborated along with lies and bullshit—two terms that are often paired with it arbitrarily—to understand the term proportionally. Lying is an act with reference to specific facts that have time and space coordinates. Lying is an act with reference to specific facts that have time and space coordinates. In his analysis of the relationship between humans and the truth, Lee McIntyre identifies three stages of lying. (McIntyre, 2018, pp. 7–8) The first stage

is the inadvertent falsehood, in which a person says something that is not true without intending to do so. The second stage is willful ignorance, in which a person conveys something that they do not fully understand, but does not feel ashamed of their lack of knowledge. The final stage is lie, in which a person conveys a false statement with the intention of deceiving another individual, knowing that what they are conveying is not true. In other words, liars implicitly recognise the truth when they deny it. (Compare it with Leith, 2017)

In contrast to liars who continue to adhere to the distinction between truth and falsehood and who deliberately lie in order to conceal the truth, bullshit is completely ignorant of such issues. Harry Frankfurt posits that bullshit has no connection with caring about the truth. (See Frankfurt, 2005) Bullshitters never care whether their statements contain the truth or not, since they are not attempting to describe reality. Consequently, bullshit can be more accurately described as a pure communication strategy. (Compare it with McComiskey, 2017, pp. 9–10) At this point, bullshit appears to be more closely aligned with post-truth. However, post-truth goes a step further and becomes particularly egregious when it intends to obscure, confuse, and even destroy the truth itself. If we consider the concept of truth as expressed by Plato, namely that it is an accurate representation of reality, then post-truth seeks to destroy this wisdom through the formulation and dissemination of a narrative that aligns with the subjective beliefs of its bearers. (Andina, 2019, p. 4) As Daniel Dennet has well described, post-truth is an era of epistemological darkness and uncertainty that humanity has not been experienced since the Middle Ages; a most frightening episode in which people no longer have respect for truth and lose the urge to understand the objective world scientifically and rationally. (Dennet, 2017)

From the above explanation, it can be asserted that the difference between post-truth and lies and bullshit resides in their respective degrees in relation to the truth. Post-truth, as the culmination point of lies and bullshit, has ambitions to destroy the truth. It is said to be a culmination point because post-truth is the worst consequence and inevitability situation of the human being political dynamics. In this context, many philosophers have identified that politics is an entity that is difficult, if not impossible, to align with honesty and truth. Hannah Arendt, for instance, asserts that honesty is a norm that will never have a place in politics. (Arendt, 2000, p. 545) According to her, politicians rely on instruments to achieve various benefits, which allows them to justify vile and heinous behaviours that pollute public morality, as long as they are able to gain those benefits. Similarly, In the same vein, George Orwell observed that political language and its variations is a means of persuasion that employs euphemistic narratives, rendering the elements of lies vague and sounding like honesty. (Orwell, 2000, p. 426) In the post-truth era, politicians and other post-truth practitioners are increasingly adept at denigrating, playing, and manipulating the truth through inflammatory rhetoric and collective sentiment in every political campaign. The post-truth phenomenon, which seeks to erode the veracity of information, is effectively camouflaged by the establishment of a structured, massive, and systematic

organisation. This allows the post-truth to present itself as a *new truth*. In short, the clear distinction between *ṣawāb* and *ḵbata'*, *ḥaq* and *batīl*, truth and post-truth, meaningful words and bullshit, honesty and lies, which was once a fundamental aspect of communication in the post-truth era, has become a mere *flatus vocis* (farting sound). (Hardiman, 2021a, p. 102)

In the context of the post-truth era, the world community is faced with a dilemma when seeking solutions from the academic sphere. This is because philosophers, who are expected to provide enlightenment on matters of truth, have in fact become one of the main causes of the emergence of post-truth, through the post-modernist school of thought. This style of philosophy, which has become the *zeitgeist* since the 1970s, offers a new way of seeing the world by rejecting all grand narratives, dismantling the establishment of various values and norms, tearing down all forms of authority, destabilising meanings, and attacking scientific enterprise. (A detailed explanation of the post-modernist philosophical style can be seen in Sim, 2001; Butler, 2002) Friedrich Nietzsche's famous assertion (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 267) that truth is merely a will-to-power, as evidenced by his various prophecies, including the idea that facts are not objective but rather the result of interpretation, served as an official invitation for subsequent philosophers to launch a relentless attack on truth. In post-modernism philosophy, the grand narrative of truth became a series of mininarratives, perceived as a form of homogenisation against heterogeneity (Georges Bataille), an expression of interest and power (Michel Foucault), logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence (Jacques Derrida), and so on. (Hardiman, 2003, pp. 158–159) Through the sermons of post-modernism, the horizon of modern epistemology pioneered by Rene Descartes' rationalism, John Locke's empiricism, G. F. W. Hegel's idealism, Immanuel Kant transcendentalism, and Auguste Comte's positivism which clearly and distinctly maintains the dividing line between truth and falsehood, fact and fiction, authenticity and fabrication, is then torn apart and destroyed. In essence, post-modernism is the *godfather* of post-truth where philosophers become its *prophets*. (D'Ancona, 2017, p. 57; McIntyre, 2018, p. 150)

We will summarise the discussion in this section by looking at post-truth through a philosophical lens—by elaborating on the formulations of A. Setyo Wibowo, (Wibowo, 2022, pp. 314–315) Y.D. Anugrahbayu, (Anugrahbayu, 2022, pp. 254–257) and F. Budi Hardiman. (Hardiman, 2021a, pp. 106–110) This will enable readers to gain a comprehensive understanding of the concept of post-truth. Ontologically, post-truth carries the doctrine of *meontology*, derived from the Greek word *meon* which means nothingness. In the context of post-truth, objective facts are not considered exist. Instead, they are perceived as something that is freely created by anyone. This can be witnessed for example from the emergence of the absurd term “*alternative facts*”. Furthermore, when modern philosophy and science formulate theories of truth—correspondential, coherential, and pragmatical truth, post-truth epistemology actually denies these theories and places truth into something that is subjective and relative, depending on one's perspective and beliefs. What a person knows, for post-truth, is solely determined by the perspective he uses, and language plays a central role in stating the truth or error of

something (language game). Surprisingly, the doubts of philosophers about the reality of the world and their calls for a perspectivist epistemology turn out to be a kind of philosophical justification for post-truth ontology and epistemology. Finally, post-truth axiology, specifically in ethics, does not concern itself with virtue (Aristotle), duty (Kant), or utility (Bentham) of deeds at all. Instead, the highest value it believes is the success of achieving goals and gaining profits by normalising all kinds of means.

2. Revealing Qur'an's Epistemological-Ethical Vision In The Post-Truth Era

2.1. *Ifk*, Post-truth, and Bayānī Epistemology

In order to ascertain the epistemological-ethical vision of the Qur'an, bayānī epistemology will examine the *hadith al-ifki* recorded in Q. al-Nūr (24): 11-20. Muslim commentators concur that these ten verses constitute a response to the phenomenon of negative rumours concerning 'Āisyah ra. (*qiṣṣah 'Āisyah*). (al-Jauzī, 1984, p. 17; Ibn Katsīr, 2000, p. 179) In terms of the context of this verse, al-Suyūṭī compiles seven distinct narrations drawn from a variety transmission routes—two of which were from 'Āisyah herself. (al-Suyūṭī, 2003, pp. 663–681) In general, the narrations indicate that following the victory over the Banu Muṣṭaliq, 'Āisyah ra., who was accompanying the Prophet, was left behind at the stop of the troops on their return to Medina due to the negligence of the soldiers responsible for guarding 'Āisyah's *bandaj* (a kind of hiking palanquin placed on the back of a camel). Shortly after resting at that stop, 'Āisyah was approached by a young man, Ṣafwān ibn Mu'attal al-Sullamī, who had also fallen behind. Ṣafwān then offered to assist 'Āisyah by allowing her to mount his camel and lead it with her until it caught up with the troops. Thereafter, the negative rumours concerning both of them spread rapidly among the people. After presenting eight narrations, al-Ṭabarī then demonstrates that 'Abdullāh ibn 'Ubay ibn Salūl was the primary instigator behind the emergence of these rumours (*allāzī tawallā kibrahū*), in collaboration with Miṣṭah, Ḥissān, and Ḥamnah who participated in dissemination of these rumours. (al-Ṭabarī, 2001, pp. 195–197) In conclusion, these verses were revealed to liberate 'Āisyah ra. from various doubts, suspicions, and accusations that had befallen her. (al-Wāḥidī, n.d., p. 239,243; Mughniyyah, n.d., p. 403) They also provide implicit lessons for believers regarding the wise and virtuous mechanism for responding the *ifk* phenomenon.

The term *ifk*, which plays a pivotal role in the narrative of 'Āisyah ra., is derived from the arabic word, *'f-k*, which signifies “to turn something around” or “to turn something from one direction to the opposite”. (Ibn Fāris, 1979a, p. 118) Fu'ād 'Abd al-Bāqī records a total of twelve forms of word derivation in the Qur'an from this root, while *ifk* itself is mentioned seven times. (al-Bāqī, 1945, p. 34) In general, Qur'ānic dictionaries tend to describe *ifk* as lie (*kizb*), given that the word is assumed to describe the reversal from truth to falsehood, as seen in the works of al-Dāmaghānī, (al-Dāmaghānī, 1980, p. 33) al-Fairuzābādī, (al-Fairuzābādī, 1996, p. 101) and al-Aṣfahānī. (al-Aṣfahānī, 2009, p. 79) Similarly, in some classical commentaries of Qur'an, scholars such as al-Māwardī, (al-

Māwardī, n.d., p. 79) al-Baiḍāwī, (al-Baiḍāwī, n.d., p. 100) and al-Andalusī (al-Andalusī, 1993, p. 400) also equate the term *ifk* with *kizb*. It is noteworthy that although Ibn ‘Aṭīyah shares a similar understanding with the aforementioned views, he adds a pertinent note in the context of the discussion that *ifk* is also the act of turning facts and truth away from reality and its essence through the use of various persuasive rhetoric. (Ibn ‘Aṭīyah, 2001, p. 168) Furthermore, al-Zamakhsyarī (al-Zamakhsyarī, 2009, p. 721) and al-Rāzī (al-Rāzī, 1981, p. 173) present a distinctive perspective on the concept of *ifk*, positioning it as the highest level of *kizb* and *iftirā’*—as *ifk* can deceive people’s consciousness and shock them when they realise it. Nevertheless, both al-Zamakhsyarī and al-Rāzī still equate *ifk* with the term *bubtān*.

The preceding paragraph indicates that four key terms, namely *ifk*, *kizb*, *iftirā’*, and *bubtān*, warrant further analysis due to their uniform understanding, interpretation, and translation as lies. However, the author contests this uniformity, noting that each term has a distinct root word, which gives rise to disparate meanings when derived. The principle of non-synonymity/*ghair al-tarāduf* of words in the Qur’an has been outlined by ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī and further developed by Syrian hermeneutician, Muhammad Syahrur. (Christmann, 2004, p. 271) Given that the various terms in the Qur’an are polysemous expressions, interpreting one word with another that is considered synonymous will only distort and confuse the meaning of the Qur’an. This is in accordance with Syahrur’s view, who states that interpreting the Qur’an in this way renders it a redundant and even useless text. (Syahrur, 2009, p. 7) It is therefore crucial to differentiate between *ifk* and the other three terms through linguistic analysis, namely by tracing the root of the word and its basic meaning, thereby affording *ifk* a more proportionate meaning.

The term “*kizb*” (*k-z-b*) is antonymous to “*ṣidq*” (*ṣ-d-q*/honesty), (Ibn Fāris, 1979c, p. 167) which signifies “everything related to denial of reality and truth”. (al-Muṣṭafawī, 1965c, pp. 34–35) Meanwhile, the term *bubtān* (*b-h-t*) is defined as “agitation and confusion.” (Ibn Fāris, 1979a, p. 307) The term *bubtān* was subsequently understood in a more expansive manner by Ḥasan Jabal, who defined it as “an act of exaggeration that causes others to be confused.” (Jabal, 2010a, p. 187) In contrast to these two, the word *iftirā’* (*f-r-y*) is defined as “to cut something off”. (Ibn Fāris, 1979b, p. 496) Al-Muṣṭafawī then elucidates that *iftirā’*, derived from the wazn *ifti’al*, signifies an “attempt to cut something.” (al-Muṣṭafawī, 1965a, p. 83) At this juncture, it is evident that *ifk*, which is more accurately translated as “turning, reversing, and changing the state of something in the opposite direction,” (Jabal, 2010b, pp. 1076–1077) is distinct from the three terms previously described. When these four words are ranked in their antagonistic relation to the truth, it can be observed that *kizb* (denial of the truth) occupies the lowest level, followed by *iftirā’* (cutting down the truth), followed by *bubtān* (fabricating something with the intention of causing confusion about the truth), and finally, at the highest and most terrible level, which is *ifk* (ambition to distort the truth and destroy it). In essence, *ifk* represents the pinnacle of *kizb*. This assertion is corroborated by numerous contemporary tafsir

works, including *Fath al-Qādir*, (al-Syaukānī, 2007, p. 1001) *al-Tahrir wa al-Tanwir*, (ibn ‘Āsyūr, 1984, p. 169) *al-Miẓān*, (Tabataba’i, 1997, p. 90) and *al-Amṣāl*. (Syīrāzī, 2000, p. 42) This linguistic analysis leads the author to conclude that the term *ifk* is the most representative term for the term “post-truth”, opening the door to a discussion of post-truth from a Qur’anic perspective.

The term *ifk* in verse 11 then requires an extensive elaboration with the verses that follow, given that Q. 24: 11-20 is a unity that is intertwined with one another. In this context, We will limit the discussion on the extrapolation of epistemological-ethical vision by referring to the axiomatic statements contained in these verses and showing their correlation with the *ifk*. It is first necessary to emphasise that *ifk* itself is an event that contains goodness (Q. 24:11) and lessons (Q. 24: 17) for the believers. The event has brought many benefits to them, including the realisation of the clear and sharp distinction between the believers and the hypocrites. (See also ibn ‘Āsyūr, 1984, p. 172; Tabataba’i, 1997, p. 91) At this point, *ifk* can be an important momentum and vehicle for those who believe in maximising their epistemological potential. When facing *ifk*, the faithful person are commanded to put forward good prejudice (*ḥusn al-zann*) towards their brothers in faith and/or in humanity, so that any information or news that has sentimental and provocative nuances is not immediately accepted, believed, let alone disseminated (Q. 24: 12). The Qur’an provides implicit support for the modern legal concept of the “presumption of innocence.” It also encourages believers to approach any information they encounter with a rational and constructive doubt. This doubt, in turn, encourages humans to explore the validity of the information and reflect on it carefully and comprehensively. (Compare it with Amrullah, 2001, p. 4904)

In the context of overwhelming information and the dissemination of *ifk*, the Qur’an provides a clear warning against willful ignorance and the propagation of information based on personal or subjective bias (Q. 24: 15). This axiom is derived from the Qur’anic insinuation for the disseminators of *ifk* who simply make things up based on their emotional beliefs, disseminate provocative information without regard for valid and reliable data, and consider such actions as trivial. (al-Syaukānī, 2007, p. 1002; Mughniyyah, n.d., p. 406) In the event of news that could potentially lead to conflict within society, the Qur’an’s command to the *ifk* disseminators is particularly strict, requiring them to present four witnesses (*syuhadā’*, sing. *shahīd*) (Q. 24: 13). This verse also implies a desire to reinvigorate the role of experts in elucidating matters. It is noteworthy that the term “*syahīd*” encompasses the notion of a witness who is intimately acquainted with the subject in question. (al-Muṣṭafawī, 1965b, pp. 155–156) Once the aforementioned protocols have been completed and any content that denies, cuts, fabricates, or even destroys the truth of information has been identified clearly, believers are then asked to be firm in their stance by stating that the information is *kizb*, *iftirā’*, *buhṭān*, or even *ifk* (Q. 24: 16). The objective is clear: to prevent the continued dissemination of *ifk* and to put an end to the destructive chaos it may cause. (See al-Qāsimī, 1957, p. 4461) Qur’an then promises a severe and

painful punishment for those who act as *ifk* pioneers and those who help to disseminate it, both in this life and in the hereafter (Q. 24: 11, 19).

The discussion of *bayānī* epistemology will be concluded by formulating a normative manual based on aformentiod explanation with the intention of demonstrating the relevance of the Qur'an in addressing the post-truth epidemic. The formulation of the normative manual consists of eight points, namely: (1) the necessity of fostering positive attitudes and good prejudice towards fellow believers and members of the humanity; (2) the importance of exercising caution when accepting and disseminating information that may contain hate speech, provocation, and emotional sentiment towards others; (3) the prohibition of willful ignorance; (4) the commitment to raising a positive, constructive, and critical doubt in the midst of a deluge of information in order to avoid complacency and to subject that information to rigorous scrutiny, particularly when its provenance and veracity are unclear. (5) the importance of involving critical attitude by seeking to trace the validity and reliability of information; (6) the commitment to speak responsibly ; (7) the necessity for rehabilitating or re-establishment of the scientific authority and experts role in the face of the death of expertise; (8) the unambiguous affirmation of the clear and unwavering distinction between *ḥaq* and *batīl*.

2.2. Burhānī Epistemology and the Affirmation of Truht

The post-truth ambition to destroy the truth is primarily caused by the ideas of post-modernist philosophers who doubt the existence of reality while rejecting the human capability to know something correctly. Indeed, the issue of the existence and essence of knowledge—that is, the possibility of knowledge about reality and the value (absoluteness and relativity) of that knowledge—has been a topic of interest for philosophers from various schools, circles, and generations.(Yazdī, 2007, pp. 135–140) In this section, the author will present a critical evaluation of post-modernist philosophy by proposing a philosophical exposition of truth and its accessibility for human rationality based on the arguments of *burhānī* epistemology. As with all philosophical thought, post-modernism is also born from a certain context that determines the figure and contours of its philosophy. These contexts are social pathologies that have emerged from modernity itself, including technocratism, bureaucratism, and capitalism. These have resulted in dehumanisation, environmental destruction, economic inequality, and other issues.(Southgate, 2003, p. 159) In response to this situation, proponents of post-modernism and its successors aim to critique the establishment of modern thought, which they believe is responsible for the emergence of these social pathologies. Post-modernism is also a philosophy that espouses an emancipatory vision, particularly in its acceptance of diversity, ambiguity, and uncertainty, as well as its high appreciation for those who are marginalised by modernity.(Ingram, 2005, p. 730) However, its critiques are not intended to evaluate modern philosophy, but to end philosophy itself. As a consequence, post-modernism has paralysed human critical power and removed the discourse of truth from the relationship between humans and reality.

This kind of crisis is referred to as *epistemological cancer*, where the sufferers are no longer able to distinguish between truth and false, thus allowing for the equation, mixing, and even exchanging of the two. (Arif, 2018, p. 43) Therefore, philosophical discourse needs to be reconfigured to offer an antidote to this kind of disease. Firstly, it is important to emphasise that objective reality exists regardless of whether one thinks about it or not. (Muṭahharī, 2011, p. 69) The objective world, including entities such as trees, mountains, and the sky, exists independently of human thoughts and beliefs. This assertion implies the existence of a mind-independent world. The fundamental question that immediately arises is, what kind of world is truly independent of mind and consciousness? In fact, the assertion that there is an objective world that is completely independent of mind and consciousness is nothing but an *intentional stance*, as Dennett terms it, that cannot be avoided. (Dennett, 1998; Harman, 1988) The *Intentional Stance* represents a significant contribution to the field of cognitive science, offering an explanatory strategy that attributes beliefs, desires, and other intensional states to a system (living and non-living) as well as a projection for future behaviour based on the rational actions of agents, with reference to that system of beliefs and desires. (Harman, 1988)

In light of the aforementioned premise, it is imperative to elucidate what precisely is the meaning of objective reality. The independence of reality postulated above is indicative of a realist metaphysical stance. (Butchvarov, 2002; Macarthur, 2020) However, this article does not promote a naive stance towards reality, such as naive nominalism/naive realism, which precludes the subject from accessing the object. The term “realism” as employed by the author in this paper is to be understood in the sense of perspectival realism. It refers to ontological commitment, not to the correspondence of the object (*noumenon*) with the phenomena captured by consciousness and perceived by the subject’s mind. (Khasri et al., 2023) Consequently, a thesis can be proposed that the relationality of the subject and object in everything related to mental states and activities, such as intending, thinking, supposing, imagining, articulating, rolls in two attitudes at once, namely metaphysical and epistemic stances. In the context of semantics, particularly in referential discourse, ontological commitment is the connection between the subject and the object. For instance, a believer must have an ontological commitment that God exists. This implies that statements about God refer to existing objects. It can also be argued that the absence of ontological commitment represents the first form of subject-object relationship, which demonstrates a realist attitude (the existence of a mind-independent world). The realist view is that reality exists independently of consciousness, in an extra-mental or trans-subjective realm. (Russell, 1898) Furthermore, this ontological commitment is not complete; it extends beyond the ontological level. The subject always has the desire to articulate this commitment into a series of explanations, which often lead to rational justification. At this advanced stage, the ongoing process has entered the epistemic realm. As it enters the epistemic realm, the subject is involved in the process of thought and consciousness, which can be described as the “determination of subjectivity.” There is a significant distinction between the object that is intuitively perceived (in terms of ontology)

and the object as the content of representation that is processed at the epistemic level. In this case, the subject never truly knows with certainty what they know. In conclusion, the object of representation is distinct from the content of representation. (Khasri, 2023)

One might inquire as to the veracity of the subject's understanding of reality. Is it purely perspectival that is inherently anti-realist? How does one's ontological commitment correlate with her epistemic stance? In subject-object relationality, the limit of the subject's capacity to comprehend objects can be observed in the aforementioned assertion that the subject is ultimately incapable of perceiving an object clearly and distinctly. This demonstrates that in subject-object relationality, there is a considerable amount of information that overlaps with one another. (Ben-Zeev, 1989) This also implies that the quantity of information indicates a condition of the subject, which is unable to fully capture or process information (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) from the object being sensitised. Consequently, humans, as beings that think and are conscious, are required to simplify the world and then use proxy information to direct their thoughts and behaviour. (Spatola & Urbanska, 2020) Proxy information is information that results from the reflexivity of the subject's consciousness, not the material or physical reflexivity of the object being sensitised. Since it is the result of the reflexivity of consciousness, proxy information is always unique, and each subject possesses it in different forms and ways. If the information is not generated from the subject's material reflexivity or external reality, then what is the ontic status of the known object? Is it a purely mind and mental construction? If so, does this imply that the subject's metaphysical stance is more inclined towards antirealism? If this statement is accepted, then the ontological commitment to objects that are believed to be independent of, and not bound to, subject's mind and consciousness will collapse. In responding to the aforementioned series of questions, it is important to bear in mind that the act of thinking, supposing, and realising (the mental state) is always directed towards, about, and represents something. (Searle, 1984) Therefore, it can be said that all mental states that presuppose subject-object relationality are always intensional. However, it is crucial to emphasise that the subject is not fully capable of constructing knowledge that fully represents the known object. In other words, knowledge does not represent the entirety of the object of knowledge. This is pertinent to the epistemological problem of nominalism. Referring to Gideon Rosen, (Rosen, 2001) the issue of nominalism—whether abstract objects exist—is a metaphysical challenge that lacks a straightforward approach. Instead of addressing this question directly, contemporary philosophy often addresses it indirectly by shifting to a related question in epistemology: rather than asking about the actual existence of abstract entities, we inquire about the justification for believing in their existence.

In light of Quine's perspective, the connection between ontological commitments and objects/entities, such as numbers, is not solely determined by the act of naming certain numbers. It is also shaped by the use of variables that position numbers as values. (Stegmüller, 1959) The variable in question is referred to as proxy information, or in the Meinongian tradition, constitutive property. As elucidated by Dale Jacquette, (Jacquette,

1995) a *beingless incomplete object* is said by Meinong to have a certain constitutive property (*konstitutorische Bestimmung*) in its implexive *Sosein*. Constitutive property is a property that is sensible, which is found in objects that can possibly exist in the reality of space and time (Khasri, 2023) For instance, objects such as the round-square, which are considered impossible objects, can still be designated as objects despite the contradiction between their properties. It is appropriate to categorise them as objects because the subject can still intensify the properties, which, within their experiential context, can be perceived as real. (Meinong, 1902, 1921) In the aforementioned example, the properties of squareness and roundness are related to thingness which can be encountered in everyday life. In summary, there are numerous tangible objects that exhibit these properties. Given the connection between the squareness and roundness property and the concrete reality that the subject is able to encounter, in addressing an object such as a “round square,” the subject must associate his supposition about the object with proxy information that he obtains from his concrete daily experience. The involvement of proxy information from the subject’s concrete daily experience has the consequence that the object that is “attempted” to be known *cannot be fully represented*. There must be one or some properties that are not represented by the subject of the knowing process. In the case of the round square above, a complete representation of the object into a schema is not possible. The subject can only perceive the object “round square” if and only if its constituent properties are separately separated, sorted out, and intensified.

If the assumption is made that true knowledge is identical to the representation of the entire object, then difficulties will be encountered when attempting to justify the knowledge in question. Is the justification of truth achieved by elucidating the entirety of the process of object representation, both genealogically and anatomically? It is clear that the answer will be very difficult and, in fact, close to impossible. Consequently, the veracity of knowledge about external reality/objects is contingent upon its epistemic domain, which is influenced by the mind and consciousness. In this context, the relevant epistemic stance is epistemically “antirealist”. However, it is important to emphasise immediately that this nomenclature is still open to debate, especially for scholars and philosophers who continue to separate the ontological from the epistemological domain exclusively. The debate between realism and antirealism with regard to knowledge can be found in the metaepistemological discourse on realism and antirealism with respect to epistemic facts. (Carter & Sosa, 2022) Building on the preceding explanation, it can be argued that human knowledge about objects (state of affairs) is never purely objective. The knowledge formed by the subject, as well as the relationality established between her and the object, will always be perspectival. This assertion correlates with realism as a metaphysical stance, specifically entity realism, and perspectivism as an epistemological stance. Referring to Mahdi Khalili, entity realism and perspectivism complement each other. Entity realism posits that it is reasonable to affirm the existence of unobservable entities when multiple experimental interactions can occur with them. Perspectivism adds that our beliefs regarding these entities are constrained by historically dependent theoretical and

instrumental perspectives.(Khalili, 2024) In essence, the correlation between the two highlights the coexistence of ontological commitments and epistemic attitudes within the same space, and their simultaneous operation.

The explanation above is also related to perspective realism. Even if there is an instrument that can bridge the noumena with the mind and consciousness of the subject, and this bridge is intended to represent the whole object, then the instrument cannot be covered by rational-empirical justification as developed in the scientific method. However, if what is meant is a mystical epistemic process that tends towards meta-empirical and meta-rational justification, then it is possible to represent the whole object. However, this is not the focus of this article. The objective of this article is to promote perspectival realism and elaborate on it with some relevant views. One perspective, espoused by al-Nasafi, holds that knowledge can be equated with the entirety of the known object. In his treatise, al-Nasafi stated that “*ḥaqāʾiq al-asyāʾi tsābitah wa al-ʿilm biha mutahāqqiq* (The nature of things is immutable and knowledge of them is correctly accessible).”(al-Nasafi, 1843, p. 1) This statement implies that humans have the potential to gain knowledge of objective reality outside themselves through the use of the instruments of knowledge at their disposal, namely five-sense perception (observation, experimentation, and verification) and rational reasoning (abstraction, reflection, and justification).(For the comprehensive explanation, see Şadr, 2009, pp. 205–209) It also suggests that humans have the possibility to obtain correct knowledge of that reality. It is crucial to stress that in the process of knowing, humans are not only capable of perceiving the external characteristics and properties of something, but also of grasping its essence. In Islamic epistemological tradition, this process of knowledge acquisition is referred to as conceptual knowledge (*al-tasawwur*). It enables the subject to comprehend the meaning of the object of knowledge (*muṣṭal al-naḥs ilā maʿna al-ṣyāʾi*) (al-Jurjānī, 2004, p. 130) and subsequently provide rational justification (*al-taṣdīq*) for it.(See also Tabatabaʾi, n.d., pp. 180–183)

In response to al-Nasafi’s argument, the essence in question is vague due to the lack of clarity surrounding the distinction between essence and substance. In the context of the metaphysical tradition that developed in Austria with the Meinongian school as its representation, and the analytical metaphysical tradition in America with Object Oriented Ontology (OOO) as one of its representations, the essence referred to by al-Nasafi is merely one of the properties that allows objects to be sensed (sensible property), and does not encompass the entirety of the object. It is important to reiterate that this subject-object relationality is discussed within the context of nominalism, which is rooted in the Kantian philosophical tradition that distinguish clearly between the noumena and the phenomenon. However, the Meinongian and OOO traditions offer distinct approaches to discourse on the noumena. In other words, both perspectives are optimistic about the relationality of subject and object in an action or intentional process.(Harman, 2005, 2011, 2023; Jacqueline, 2015; Perszyk, 1993; Sierszulka, 2005) This is in stark contrast to the principles and perspectives of naive realism, which entirely rejects subject-object relationality.

The Meinongian and OOO traditions do not espouse the view that knowledge is formed as a total correspondence and representation of the object being sensitised. Both traditions without hesitation make the room for a plurality of objects. Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) was an Austrian philosopher known for his notion of object theory (*Gegenstandstheorie*). The theory is a kind of a priori ontological account that not only introduces and systematically considers existent objects, but also non-existent objects. (Marek, 2008) According to Meinong, not all objects exist in the same way as physical entities do. Consequently, there are some objects that do not exist at all. (Priest, 2005) The mere fact that they do not exist does not imply that they are devoid of value. In other words, there is still an object that is referred and believed to exist because there is an ontological commitment from the subject that the object actually exists. However, in the Meinongian style of metaphysics, the designation of an object as such is not contingent on the object's existence status. In the context of the Meinongian tradition, the ontic status of an object is not determined by its existence. Existence is but one property, like the other properties attached to objects. It is possible to identify objects that lack the property of "existence." These objects are referred to as "impossible objects." An example of an impossible object is a round square, which has no "existence" property. However, if the existence property is intended to align with the metaphysical doctrine of realism, which asserts that only individual things exist, then the Meinongian argument will be rejected. Consequently, it is necessary to determine how the Meinongian doctrine correlates with OOO.

In his work, Graham Harman, a prominent figure in the field of object oriented philosophy, posits that OOO represents one of the paradigms based on the opposition between the real and the sensual, as well as objects and qualities (properties). (Harman, 2023) The opposition at the basis of OOO is inspired by Kant's metaphysics of the thing in itself (*das Ding an sich*) and Heidegger's notion of being (*sein*). However, the distinction between objects and qualities is explicitly drawn from the writings of Husserl, who for OOO is a hero who opposes the dogma of empiricism, which assumes that objects are merely bundles of qualities, or rather collections of sensual qualities that can be grasped by the senses. The keyword that became Husserl's starting point on objects was the idea of "intentional objects". The idea was actually initiated by Husserl in his early works. (Harman, 2023) With regard to the intentional object, in the process of knowledge construction, the subject, actively as an epistemic and mental agent, directs its intentionality towards an object, which is then articulated into a mental image. This image is then articulated into linguistic explanations through definitions, semantics, and interpretations that have a significant impact on the practice of life at both the individual and social levels.

The aforementioned philosophical principles are, of course, at odds with the presuppositions of postmodern and/or post-truth philosophies, which espouse the doctrine of meontology and promote a perspectivist epistemology. As the result, objective truth is rejected. At the epistemic level, this implies the rejection of the grand narrative, especially the scriptural morality based on hermeneutic work, according to Lyotard.

Liotard claims that grand narratives are untrustworthy, and that the context of postmodernity is this untrustworthiness. (Lyotard & Brügger, 2001) This is particularly evident in the work of structuralists, especially pre-Heideggerian hermeneutics, who claim that their interpretations are true knowledge. The truth of the text is not reduced by the subject, as the interpretation is based on a process that minimises the subject's influence on the text. The normativity of the sacralised method of interpretation allows the interpreter to reach the holistic truth of the text, justifying and legitimising the ethical implications of the interpretation as an epistemologically correct and ethically good frame of reference.

If we go further, postmodernism is in fact a continuation of the philosophical traces of ancient Greek philosophy, which raised doubts about the existence of reality, suspected the human potential to know reality, and attacked the probability of the existence of knowledge that is universal, absolute and eternal. The philosophical thinking to which the author refers is none other than scepticism and sophism. Scepticism itself is a philosophical style that insists on doubting the human potential to know the truth. (Cohen, 2005, p. 934) In contrast to doubt, which encourages one to seek the truth, doubt in scepticism—according to the teachings of Pyrrho—aims at rejecting the truth of sensory perception and rational reasoning fundamentally and even thoroughly, since for scepticism these two instruments cannot be used as valid and convincing reliance for distinguishing, measuring, or judging reality with certainty. (Svavarsson, 2010, p. 41) While scepticism denies the existence of knowledge, sophism, which is known to be good at rhetoric, justifies all human judgement by denying the possibility of universal and absolute knowledge. For the Sophists, the nature of objective reality is entirely determined by the human mind, and since the human mind is diverse, it is impossible to speak of a universal value of knowledge. Protagoras, whom Plato called a professional sophist, once said, “everything appears to me, so it is to me, and as you think, so it is to you”. (Quoted from Seligman, 1974, p. 8) Every judgement, even contradictory ones, is then considered to be true knowledge, since the existence and nature of reality is determined by and depends on standards and criteria created by the individual. (Siegel, 1987, pp. 3–4) It can be said properly that sophism is the prototype for epistemological relativism that will later metamorphose into perspectivism in the contemporary era.

This philosophical edifice is actually very fragile when analysed carefully. Apart from the fact that all conversations begin and end with questions, scepticism is incapable of arguing or judging anything, not even defending itself. (Russel, 1992, p. 159) The doubts on which scepticism bases its beliefs then become *null and void* because they are inviolable, and therefore there is no possibility of doubting them. (Grayling, 1985, pp. 92–93) A similar fragility can be found in the philosophical construction of Sophism. Claims made by sophists, relativists, or perspectivists such as “there is no objective truth” and “truth is relative, depending on interpretation, perspective, cognitive schema, and social construction” implicitly show that they believe these claims to be valid, true, and binding. (Meiland, 1980, p. 115) This then shows that they are still clinging to the notion of universals and absolutes by believing in the superiority of relativism's claims. Moreover, by

reducing all concepts, theories, rational arguments and scientific discoveries to something relative, consistent relativism should at the same time relativise its own understanding and thus lose its binding force on anything and anyone. (Gairdner, 2008, pp. 31–33) Thus, whether through tests of consistency and coherence or not, the theses of scepticism and sophism (along with their various variants and derivatives) will automatically fall away, since their absolute claims will only prey and pounce upon themselves. (Bland, 2018, p. 129)

We will conclude the review of *burhānī* epistemology by suggesting three significant wisdoms from Socrates regarding the affirmation and love of truth for living in the post-truth era. First of all, it is important to understand that perspectivism, which is the epistemological foundation of post-truth, actually wants to emphasise that human beings have eclectic and selective tendencies in assessing things and are limited by certain points of view. No doubt there is something that escapes their attention, which is that, on the one hand, people with different perspectives are not necessarily blinded by those perspectives. On the other hand, people have the potential to expand their horizons of understanding and to work together to break through the limitations of different perspectives on things. It can be said that the chaos that has erupted in the post-truth era is a logical consequence of people's failure to broaden their perspective on an increasingly complex reality. Therefore, in the post-truth era, the first thing that is needed is the ability to recognise the increasingly complex reality, especially in relation to the emergence of new technologies, social media and information overload, as well exemplified by Socrates. Armed with the wisdom that "he knows nothing", Socrates then consistently tried to find out the nature of reality through dialectics and critical questions (Socratic method) against various truth claims expressed by sophists, politicians, poets and religionists, and succeeded in exposing the fallacies, inconsistencies and contradictions of their thoughts. (Evans, 2018, pp. 44–45; Benson, 2011, pp. 180–184; Natali, 2006, pp. 4–5) In the midst of the rampant opinions and unsubstantiated truth claims that are increasingly flooding social media today, Socrates' wisdom finds its relevance where one is required to develop awareness and a critical attitude to understand various information proportionately before believing it.

Furthermore, when Socrates was convicted of "apostasy" and sentenced to death by the Athenian court, his close friend and student Crito, realising that Socrates was innocent, visited Socrates in prison and urged him to escape. Socrates refused and calmly spoke of the wisdom he had cherished in his life. (Warne, 2013, pp. 54–56) In his story, Plato describes Socrates as a calm, balanced figure who was able to control himself in all situations, even against the injustice of the judges who would lead him to the gate of death. (For the comprehensive explanation, see Plato, 1914) When post-truth makes emotions as the primary factor in shaping public opinion, the virtuous Socrates firmly rejects the dominance of emotions in guiding his beliefs. Therefore, this second Socratic wisdom is an important guide for people living in the post-truth era, so that they always strive to prioritise their intellect over their emotional-subjective tendencies. Finally, instead of pursuing career, prestige and wealth, Socrates chose to dedicate the entire episode of his life to the benefit of the Athenian people. Socrates did not just complain about abstract

problems, he took concrete steps by inviting all levels of society to make truth, goodness and beauty their perspective and purpose in life. (Brickhouse & Smith, 2004, pp. 138–148) In the post-truth era, the practice of philosophy, as exemplified by Socrates, can be done by upholding and prioritising the values of wisdom over personal desires—which in many cases are highly prioritised by the perpetrators of post-truth. The three wisdoms above are a philosophical offer to live and examine oneself in the post-truth era, because for Socrates “the unexamined life is not worth living”.

2.3. Viewing the Smartphones Ontologically-Existentially with ‘Irfānī Epistemology

Modern technological innovations have brought about tremendous changes in people's lives. The development of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), such as chatting, email, video calling, etc., has broken down old barriers to information dissemination, putting various types of information at the fingertips of anyone with a device. ICT thus marks a new chapter in the long history of human civilisation, in which human existence, previously centred on the corporeal world, on physical reality, has been divided and even completely absorbed into the digital world, the world of representation, or what Jean Baudrillard calls the “*simulacrum*”. (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 166) With a smartphone in hand, one can see, recognise, and even confirm one's own existence through tweets on Twitter, posts on Instagram, comments on Facebook pages, and statuses on WhatsApp. As if by magic, the circulation of these images, which is in fact an image, is now transformed into a new reality, namely virtual reality. The existence of devices that should be positioned as tools—ontologically distinct from human beings—to facilitate the fulfilment of human existential goals is then reversed, even turned against each other, becoming a reality that concentrates, directs, and determines their way of being in the world. In the face of such a crisis, Martin Heidegger's ontological-existential thinking on technology becomes relevant and should be elaborated in this discussion, since ‘Irfānī, as formulated by Amin Abdullah, will only find its epistemological understanding when elaborated with existentialist thinking. (Abdullah, 2012, pp. 207–208)

Before following Heidegger's ontological-existential line of thought regarding technology, it is important to first address his thoughts on Dasein in Being and Time. Heidegger deliberately chose the term Dasein instead of human (a term that floods almost every work of modern philosophers) to illustrate its uniqueness and complexity. On the one hand, Dasein—which can be interpreted as being-there-is unique because it can accommodate the concrete dimension of each individual, while human, as a universal abstract concept, will inevitably deprive it of concreteness. On the other hand, Dasein is an existence that encompasses complexity, as Dasein-different from the term human, which presupposes a rational subject—is not only capable of thinking, but also caring (*sorge*), taking care of things (*besorgen*), such as interacting with tools (*zuhandenheit*), relating to and caring for others (*fürsorge*) (*mitdasein*), appreciating time, death, and so on. In short, Dasein is unique and complex because it exists. According to Heidegger, there are two

important moments that constitute the constitutive structure for *Dasein*, namely its placement on earth (*geworfenheit*) and the daily life that can drown it.

Before following Heidegger's ontological-existential line of thought in relation to technology, it is important to first address his thoughts on *Dasein* in *Being and Time*. (Heidegger, 1962) Heidegger deliberately chose the term "*Dasein*" rather than "human"—a term that has inundated almost every work of modern philosophers—in order to illustrate its uniqueness and complexity. On the one hand, *Dasein*—which can be understood as being—is unique because it can accommodate the concrete dimension of each individual, whereas human, as a universal abstract concept, will inevitably deprive it of concreteness. On the other hand, *Dasein* is an existence that embraces complexity, since *Dasein*—unlike the term human, which presupposes exclusively a rational subject—is capable not only of thinking, but also of caring (*sorge*), of taking care of things (*besorgen*), such as interacting with tools (*zubandenheit*), of relating to and caring for (*fürsorge*) others (*mitdasein*), of reflecting upon the time, death, and so on. In short, *Dasein* is unique and complex because it exists. According to Heidegger, there are two important moments that constitute the constitutive structure for *Dasein*, namely its thrownness on earth (*geworfenheit*) and the daily life that can drown it. When *Dasein* reflects on its thrownness, existence, and projection towards death (as something primordial), it will find an acute form of anxiety (*angst*), as questions about the origin and ultimate purpose of life will arise. Existence will become authentic (*eigentlichkeit*) if it dares to think and face these questions. On the other hand, existence can shed its restlessness and calm its soul when it enters and dissolves into the practical hustle and bustle of everyday life, but this everyday life is actually a trick that makes it forget its primordial moments, so that its existence becomes inauthentic (*uneigentlichkeit*). Existence thus exists between two existential tensions, the authentic and the inauthentic.

The drama of existence described above constitutes an essential element of Heidegger's philosophical project, namely the comprehension of Being. Among all existents (*Seiendes*), only *Dasein* is capable of contemplating its existence, and it is only to her that the uncealment of Being can be revealed. (Gorner, 2007, pp. 21–23) As the foundational element of his philosophical edifice, the phenomenological description of *Dasein* will significantly influence the overall structure of Heidegger's subsequent thought, particularly in relation to technology. (Cerbone, 2010, pp. 142–143) Given that Heidegger's philosophical commitment is entirely directed towards uncovering the meaning of Being, Heidegger then positions technology, including smartphones, as a new vehicle for the revelation of Being. (Pattison, 2000, pp. 67–68) Instead of considering it as a mere device or machine, Heidegger ontologically sees technology as a modern way of revealing Being, given that the nature of technology itself is highly dependent on and determined by its relationship with *Dasein*. (Martino, 2021) It can be argued that *Dasein's* way of existence in the present era is determined by her views and interactions with smartphones. Through smartphones, ICT has become a comprehensive worldview (*weltanschauung*) that has influenced the way *Dasein* perceives the world, society, and the self. It is important to note

that the view presented by ICT is an artificial world that has eliminated all disparities in time and space.(Hardiman, 2021b, pp. 172–173) It is ironic that ICT uproots *Dasein*'s existence from its place of residence, from its concrete world and life, and even makes it an object for the artificial world.(Okoro, 2016, p. 288) The extent of the compulsion exerted upon *Dasein*, compelling it to become enmeshed in technological components, is what Heidegger refers to as *das Gestell* (enframing).(Glazebrook, 2000, pp. 242–243)

This phenomenon can also be observed in the context of post-truth, where *Dasein* becomes the object of the smartphone he is holding. The overwhelming amount of information has uprooted *Dasein*'s existence and subsequently framed it in a way that, not surprisingly, has blurred the distinction between the artificial world and the real world, making it difficult for her to distinguish between them. Interestingly, Heidegger does not advise humans to avoid or even condemn technology. Instead, he proposed that *Dasein* should engage in sober thinking (*das besinnliche denken*) in the presence of technology. That is, when interacting with a smartphone, *Dasein* should consider her existence with composure, caution, and care so that she is not wholly dependent or even enslaved by it.(Warthall, 2019, pp. 22–25) Through sober thinking, one can liberate her existence from dependence, entanglement, and attachment to smartphones. Furthermore, she is able to maintain a state of relaxation, composure, and balance in the presence of technology. Heidegger then refers to this mode of existence as *die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen* (releasement to things), a term derived from a Christian mystic, Meister Eckhart, which translates as “the spiritual experience of a person who is at peace with God after letting go of attachment to worldly objects”.(Inwood, 1999, p. 117) In Heidegger's hands, *Gelassenheit* becomes a call for the urgency of realising that technology is not the exclusive determinant of *Dasein*'s existence, but rather a means to fulfil its ends. *Gelassenheit* is understood not only as an act of “letting go”, but also includes the act of enabling—where true meaning is found not in the outcome of the action, but in the process of enabling it.(Keiling, 2019, pp. 98–100) Heidegger's concept of *Gelassenheit* offers a novel perspective and a source of authentic meaning. It encourages *Dasein* to embrace its metaphysical instinct to remain open to the Being when engaging with smartphones. Ultimately, *Gelassenheit* provides an opportunity for *Dasein* to uncover the enigmatic realm and mysterious horizon of Being.(Compare it with Rojcewicz, 2006, p. 220)

Having discussed Heidegger's thoughts on technology, we will elaborate that with *'urfāni* epistemology by revitalising the concept of *'uḏlah* and reconstructing its meaning in the post-truth era. The concept of *'uḏlah* is usually interpreted as “seclusion and withdrawal from worldly things”. (Arberry, 1950, p. 75; Renard, 2009, p. 277) Among the main purposes of such seclusion is to remember God and get closer to Him.(Arabi, 1981, p. 30) Unfortunately, some individuals conflate *'uḏlah* with asceticism, leading to the perception that it is a strict resistance to various aspects of worldly human life.(Karamustafa, 2007, p. 39) However, the act of remembering God and seeking for closer communion with Him does not necessitate a complete detachment from the world.(Nasr, 2007, p. 117) It is of the utmost importance to remain vigilant in order to prevent worldly activities from distracting

one from remembering God (Q. al-Munāfiqūn (63): 9). The concept of *'uḥlāb*, therefore, actually aims to foster an omnipresent perspective towards God, so that in all their profane activities, humans are not immersed in worldliness and forget Him. If *'uḥlāb* is elaborated with the concept of *gelassenheit*, the meaning of the term can be expanded to encompass human existential efforts to remain actively involved and related to technology, *as part of worldly affairs*, without being immersed or controlled by it. This positive activity, namely interaction with smartphones, can be a means of actualising human spirituality. (Compare it with Geoffroy, 2010, p. 2) Therefore, individuals who exist with *gelassenheit* and/or *'uḥlāb* will utilise smartphones as tools, using them sincerely and simply (in order to avoid being easily influenced and directed by post-truth information) and making them a means of realising spirituality (remembering God/unconcealment of Being).

In accordance with the Heideggerian explanation presented above, the relationship between humans and technology (machinery being) can be classified into two distinct discourses: antagonistic and reificationistic. In the antagonistic discourse, technology is understood as a medium that accelerates the alienation of humans from their selfhood. (Dusek, 2006) Furthermore, technology also results in individuals becoming trapped in a state of alienation, (Shepard, 1977) which can be understood as a form of thrownness. However, this is not a state of coexistence with others as intended by Heidegger in the concept of *Dasein*, but rather a state of being trapped in a *simulacrum*. The primary indication is the confusion between the real and the illusory. Moreover, in the context of critical theory based on Marxism, technology is understood as a market commodity created by capital owners with the intention of enriching themselves. (Shepard, 1973) Although it is the labourers who have the most direct contact with technology, the results of technological work do not directly benefit them. In contrast to this view, there is a reificationist counterpoint, a discourse that seeks to normalise the relationship between humans and technology. Technology, in this discourse, is positively viewed as an intermediary to overcome human limitations and expand the capabilities of their bodies. (Hawley, 2019)

One of the most recent technologies that has been widely suspected of supporting and accelerating post-truth is technology based on artificial intelligence (AI). What distinguishes the work of the human mind from the computational work of AI? Does AI deserve to be called an epistemic agency? Is AI work knowledge? Some of these questions are of crucial importance and have been the subject of considerable debate among scholars, particularly in relation to the ethical debate surrounding the existence of AI. The fundamental reference to answer these questions is “conceptualisation of reality”. Humans as mental agents are able to process external sensory data because they possess thoughts and consciousness. (Jackendoff, 2018) In contrast, AI does not have consciousness, and even if it has the capability of thinking, it is only a mechanistic computational process. Therefore, AI systems cannot replicate and replace human intelligence, especially the human ability to perceive, understand, and articulate reality. (Bołtuć, 2020; Mitchell, 2019) Thus, AI and other information technologies are essentially instruments of human

extension or mediators of human limitations. Consequently, neither epistemic nor hermeneutic processes should be entirely suspended to the mechanistic workings of technology. In the end, interpretive experience is only possible within the system of consciousness that the human species happens to possess.

CONCLUSION

The complexity of the post-truth phenomenon currently facing humanity will not be resolved if the interpretation of the Qur'ān is limited to a single epistemological framework. Thus, a serious effort is needed to dialogue the *bayānī*, *burhānī*, and *'irfānī* epistemologies through a circular pattern in *al-ta'wīl al-'ilmī*. The complexity of the post-truth phenomenon currently facing humanity will not be resolved if the interpretation of the Qur'ān is limited to a single epistemological framework. Therefore, it is essential to engage in a constructive dialogue between the *bayānī*, *burhānī*, and *'irfānī* epistemologies, employing a circular movement in *al-ta'wīl al-'ilmī*. The above discussion reveals that the normative manual from the Qur'ān (Q. 24: 11-20) outlined in *bayānī* epistemology has not been able to address the historical-philosophical problems underlying post-truth, namely post-modernist philosophy. The doubts about the existence of reality and the essential value of human knowledge that underlie post-modernist thought can only be criticised philosophically by exploring arguments from *burhānī* epistemology. This is because it is only through such an exploration that these doubts can be dismissed, thus reaffirming the existence of truth and the essence of the value that accompanies it. Furthermore, *burhānī* epistemology offers an alternative approach to living in the post-truth era, drawing upon the wisdom of Socrates. However, this approach, which views smartphones in a rational-calculative manner, may have unintended consequences if not accompanied by an ontological-existential reflection on the nature of the technology itself. Heidegger's insights on the concept of *gelassenheit* and the reconstruction of the *'uṣṣalāh* concept, as elucidated in *'irfānī* epistemology, can serve to bridge this gap, enabling a more proportionate approach to smartphones (which represent a significant component of the post-truth phenomenon).

This study presents a humanistic-transformative-emancipatory reading (*al-qirā'ah al-muntijah*) of Q. al-Nūr (24): 11-20, which has been uncovered through a circular dialogue between *bayānī* normative manuals, *burhānī* philosophical exposition, and *'irfānī* ontological-existential reflection. This approach has enabled the identification of the text's epistemological-ethical vision, which offers a counterpoint to the post-truth phenomenon. The Qur'anic epistemological-ethical vision in question is a reaffirmation of the existence of reality and the essence of universal truth in human knowledge. It emphasises the importance of being aware of the complexity of reality, promoting rationality, and prioritising the public good. This is done in order to prevent the immediate acceptance or dissemination of information without adequate analysis and to avoid the creation of false beliefs. This entails an adequate analysis of the phenomenon in question, the promotion of positive prejudice against others, as well as the revitalisation of the role of scientific authority in explaining and providing a solution to certain phenomena. Furthermore, it

encourages the creation of a relaxed attitude (*gelassenheit/‘uzlah*) in the presence of smartphones so that technology can become a vehicle for actualising human spirituality. Also, *al-Qirā’ah al-muntijah* obtained in this study also complements the previous studies related to Islam and post-truth discourse by revitalising the position and role of the Qur’ān in offering a critical response to post-truth.

The status of knowledge in *bayānī*, *burhānī*, and *‘irfānī* epistemology can be dialectically approached through the Object Oriented Ontology (OOO) approach and Meinongian object theory. Both theories posit that the object of knowledge is a set of objects composed of a set of properties and one core, namely the real object. This position can moderate the tension between realism and antirealism regarding the ontological status of the world (including objects of knowledge), the truth status of knowledge about the world (epistemic status), and the ethical implications of the structure of that knowledge. The ethical implication in question is that actions are determined by the subject’s knowledge and awareness of the moral status of an action.

Subject-object relationality should not be understood in binary terms, such as a naivist tension between the poles of subjectivism and objectivism. An understanding of subject-object relationality must transcend the limitations of a binary distinction. Consequently, by moving beyond binary patterns, subject-object relationality can imply a multitude of alternative truths. However, this does not imply that it leads to relativism. The assertion is that the veracity of knowledge is not solely contingent upon the correspondence of knowledge to the object of knowledge, but also involves the subject’s ontological commitment to the object. Therefore, the epistemic status of knowledge derived from subject-object relationality is inherently perspectival. Although it is perspectival, it is distinct from pure subjectivism, which is anti-realist. Nevertheless, an ontological commitment remains that confirms a realist attitude. Thus, the veracity of knowledge that is exclusively objective is untenable, given that the knowledge constructed by the subject is never wholly representative of the object. Furthermore, it is not possible to eliminate the subject’s perspective. In relation to post-truth, post-truth conditions occur not as a result of the absence of objective knowledge, but rather as a consequence of a disconnection between the ontological commitment to the object of knowledge and the subject’s epistemic attitude, which is ontologically separated from the object of knowledge. This disconnection results in the loss of context, the blurring of subjectivity, and the disconnection of knowledge from its factual reality.

Given the complexity of the phenomenon of post-truth, the Qur’anic readings resulting from this study have limited data sources, both in terms of the Qur’anic verses discussed and the literature used as a basis for constructing arguments. This provides an opportunity for further studies on post-truth from a Qur’anic perspective that can examine a range of pertinent Qur’anic verses in the context of post-truth and elaborate on them with various cutting-edge approaches, such as psychology, media, politics, and so on.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdullah, M. A. (2012). *Islamic Studies di Perguruan Tinggi: Pendekatan Integratif-Interkonektif*. Pustaka Pelajar.
- Afif, F., & Isnaini, S. N. (2023). Tafsir Al-Qur'an di Era Post-truth: Analisis Wacana Tafsir Lisan Ach Dhofir Zuhry. *Academic Journal of Islamic Principles and Philosophy*, 4(1), 1–40. <https://doi.org/10.22515/ajipp.v4i1.6466>
- al-Andalusī, A. Ḥayyān. (1993). *Tafsīr al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ: Vol. VI* (ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Maujūd & ʿAlī Muḥammad, Eds.). Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah.
- al-Aṣḥfahānī, al-R. (2009). *Mufradāt Alfāz Al-Qurʿān* (Ṣafwān A. Dāwūdī, Ed.). Dār al-Qalam.
- al-Baiḍāwī, A. al-K. ʿAbdullah ibn ʿUmar ibn M. (n.d.). *Anwār al-Tanzīl wa Asrār al-Taʿwīl: Vol. IV* (M. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, Ed.). Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāts al-ʿArabī.
- al-Bāqī, M. F. ʿAbd. (1945). *Al-Muʿjam al-Mufabras li al-Fāz Al-Qurʿān al-Karīm*. Maṭbaʾah Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah.
- al-Dāmaghānī, al-Ḥusain ibn M. (1980). *Iṣlāḥ al-Wujūb wa al-Nazāʾir fī Al-Qurʿān al-Karīm* (ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz S. al-Ahl, Ed.; III). Dār al-ʿIlm li al-Malāyīn.
- al-Fairuzābādī, M. al-D. M. ibn Y. (1996). *Baṣāʾir Zawāʾir al-Tamyīz fī Laṭāʾif al-Kitāb al-ʿAẓīz: Vol. II* (M. A. al-Najjār, Ed.; III). Lajnah Iḥyāʾ al-Turāṣ al-Islāmī.
- al-Jauzī, A. al-F. J. al-D. ʿAbd al-R. ibn ʿAlī ibn M. (1984). *Zād al-Masīr fī ʿIlm al-Tafsīr: Vol. VI* (III). al-Maktabah al-Islāmī.
- al-Jurjānī, al-S. (2004). *Muʿjam al-Taʾrīfāt* (M. S. al-Minsyāwī, Ed.). Dār al-Faḍīlah.
- al-Māwardī, A. al-Ḥasan ʿĀlī ibn M. ibn Ḥabīb. (n.d.). *Al-Nukat wa al-Uyūn: Vol. IV* (al-S. ibn ʿĀbd al-M. ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm, Ed.). Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah.
- al-Muṣṭafawī, al-ʿAllāmah. (1965a). *Al-Taḥqīq fī Kalimāt Al-Qurʿān al-Karīm: Vol. IX*. Markaz Nasyr Ātsār al-ʿAllāmah al-Muṣṭafawī.
- al-Muṣṭafawī, al-ʿAllāmah. (1965b). *Al-Taḥqīq fī Kalimāt Al-Qurʿān al-Karīm: Vol. VI*. Markaz Nasyr Ātsār al-ʿAllāmah al-Muṣṭafawī.
- al-Muṣṭafawī, al-ʿAllāmah. (1965c). *Al-Taḥqīq fī Kalimāt Al-Qurʿān al-Karīm: Vol. X*. Markaz Nasyr Ātsār al-ʿAllāmah al-Muṣṭafawī.
- al-Nasafī, A. al-B. ʿAbdullah ibn A. ibn M. (1843). *ʿUmdah ʿAqīdah Aḥl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʾah* (W. Cureton, Ed.). The Society for the Publication of Oriental Texts.
- al-Qāsimī, M. J. al-Dīn. (1957). *Mahāsīn al-Tawīl: Vol. XVII* (M. F. ʿAbd al-Bāqī, Ed.). Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyyah.
- al-Rāzī, M. F. al-Dīn. (1981). *Tafsīr al-Fakhr al-Rāzī al-Musytabir bi al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr wa Mafātīḥ al-Ghāʾib: Vol. XXIII* (I). Dār al-Fikr.

- al-Suyūṭī, J. al-Dīn. (2003). *Al-Dur al-Mantsūr fi al-Tafsīr bi al-Ma'tsūr: Vol. X* ('Abdullah ibn 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, Ed.). Markaz li al-Buhūts wa al-Dirāsāt al-'Arabiyyah al-Islāmiyyah.
- al-Syaukānī, M. 'Alī ibn M. (2007). *Faḥḥ al-Qādīr: Al-Jāmi' baina Fannai al-Rivāyah wa al-Dirāyah min 'Ilm al-Tafsīr* (Y. al-Ghūsy, Ed.). Dār al-Ma'rifah.
- al-Ṭabarī, A. J. M. ibn J. (2001). *Jāmi' al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl Āyī Al-Qur'an: Vol. XVII* ('Abdullah ibn 'Abd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, Ed.). Dār Hijr.
- al-Wāḥidī, A. al-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn A. (n.d.). *Asbāb al-Nuzūl wa bi Ḥāmisiyibi al-Nāsikh wa al-Manṣūkh*. 'Ālim al-Kutub.
- al-Zamakhsharī, A. al-Q. M. ibn 'Umar. (2009). *Al-Kasysyāf 'an Ḥaqā'i al-Tanzūl wa 'Uyūn al-Aqāwīl fi Wujuh al-Ta'wīl* (K. Ma'mūn, Ed.). Dār al-Ma'rifah.
- Amrullah, H. A. A. (2001). *Tafsīr Al-Azḥar: Vol. VII* (IV). Pustaka Nasional Pte Ltd Singapura.
- Andina, T. (2019). Truth, Lies, and Post-truth. In A. Condello & T. Andina (Eds.), *Post-truth, Philosophy, and Law* (pp. 1–13). Routledge.
- Anugrahbayu, Y. D. (2022). Jacques Derrida: Postmodernisme dan Post-truth? In A. S. Wibowo (Ed.), *Cara Kerja Ilmu Filsafat dan Filsafat Ilmu: Dari Dialektika ke Dekonstruksi* (pp. 238–260). Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia.
- 'Arabi, M. I. (1981). *Journey to the Lord of Power: A Sufi Manual on Retreat* (R. T. Harris, Ed.). Inner Traditions.
- Arberry, A. J. (1950). *Sufism: An Account of the Mystics of Islam* Routledge. Routledge.
- Ardipandanto, A. (2020). Dampak Politik Identitas Pada Pilpres 2019: Perspektif Populisme [The Impact of Identity Politics On President Election 2019: Populism Perspective]. *Jurnal Politica Dinamika Masalah Politik Dalam Negeri dan Hubungan Internasional*, 11(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.22212/jp.v11i1.1582>
- Arendt, H. (2000). Truth and Politics. In P. Baehr (Ed.), *The Portable Hannah Arendt* (pp. 545–575). Penguin Classics.
- Arif, S. (2018). *Islam dan Diabolisme Intelektual* (II). Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought and Civilizations.
- Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (2019). Indonesia's Democratic Paradox: Competitive Elections amidst Rising Illiberalism. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 55(3), 295–317. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2019.1690412>
- Baudrillard, J. (2002). Simulacra and Simulations. In M. Poster (Ed.), *Selected Writings* (pp. 166–184). Stanford University Press.
- Benson, H. H. (2011). Socratic Method. In D. R. Morrison (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Socrates* (pp. 179–200). Cambridge University Press.
- Ben-Zeev, A. (1989). Explaining the Subject-Object Relation in Perception. *Social Research*, 56(2), 511–542.

- Bland, S. (2018). *Epistemic Relativism and Skepticism: Unwinding the Braid*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bliss, H. E. (1917). The Subject-Object Relation. *The Philosophical Review*, 26(4), 395–408. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2178486>
- Boltuć, P. (2020). Conscious AI at the Edge of Chaos. *Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness*, 07(01), 25–38. <https://doi.org/10.1142/S2705078520500010>
- Brickhouse, T. C., & Smith, N. D. (2004). *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Plato and the Trial of Socrates*. Routledge.
- Brown, D. W. (2017). *A New Introduction to Islam*. Blackwell Publishing.
- Butchvarov, P. (2002). Metaphysical Realism and Logical Nonrealism. *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics*, 282–302. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470998984.ch14>
- Butler, C. (2002). *Postmodernism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press.
- Cane, P. (2012). Morality, Law, and Conflicting Reasons for Action. *The Cambridge Law Journal*, 71(1), 59–85.
- Carter, J. A., & Sosa, E. (2022). Metaepistemology. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2022). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/metaepistemology/>
- Cerbone, D. R. (2010). *Heidegger: A Guide for the Perplexed*. Continuum.
- Chair, B. M., & Adzfar, Z. (2021). Kebenaran di Era Post-Truth dan Dampaknya bagi Keilmuan Akidah. *FIKRAH*, 9(2), Article 2. <https://doi.org/10.21043/fikrah.v9i2.12596>
- Christmann, A. (2004). ‘The Form is Permanent, but the Content Moves’: The Qur’anic Text and its Interpretation(s) in Mohammad Shahrour’s al-Kitab wal-Qur’an. In S. Taji-Farouki (Ed.), *Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qur’an* (pp. 263–296). Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, S. (2005). Skepticism. In E. Craig (Ed.), *The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (pp. 934–939). Routledge.
- Cook, M. (2000). *The Koran: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press.
- Cosentino, G. (2020). The Post-truth World Order. In *Social Media and the Post-truth World Order: The Global Dynamics of Disinformation* (pp. 1–31). Macmillan Press.
- Crowley, T. (2017). Keywords: Post-truth. *Key Words: A Journal of Cultural Materialism*, 15, 91–93.
- D’Ancona, M. (2017). *Post-Truth: The New War on Truth and How to Fight Back*. Ebury Press.
- Dennet, D. (1998). *The Intentional Stance*. MIT Press.
- Dennet, D. (2017, February 12). *Interview With Daniel Dennet* (C. Cadwalladr, Interviewer) [Interview]. <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/feb/12/daniel-dennett-politics-bacteria-bach-back-dawkins-trump-interview>

- Dusek, V. (2006). *Philosophy of Technology: An Introduction*. Blackwell Publishing.
- Esack, F. (2007). *The Qur'an: A User's Guide*. Oneworld Publications.
- Evans, C. S. (2018). *A History of Western Philosophy: From the pre-Socratics to Postmodernism*. InterVarsity Press.
- Fealy, G. (2016, December 7). *Bigger than Ahok: Explaining the 2 December mass rally*. Indonesia at Melbourne. <https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/bigger-than-ahok-explaining-jakartas-2-december-mass-rally/>
- Frankfurt, H. G. (2005). *On Bullshit*. Princeton University Press.
- Gairdner, W. D. (2008). *The Book of Absolutes: A Critique of Relativism and a Defence of Universals*. McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Geoffroy, É. (2010). *Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam* (R. Gaetani, Trans.). World Wisdom.
- Glazebrook, T. (2000). *Heidegger's Philosophy of Science*. Fordham University Press.
- Glouberman, M. (1990). Certainty, the Cogito, and Cartesian Dualism. *Studia Leibnitiana*, 22(2), 123–137.
- Gorner, P. (2007). *Heidegger's Being and Time: An Introduction*. Cambridge University Press.
- Grayling, A. C. (1985). *The Refutation of Skepticism*. Open Court Publishing Company.
- Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-esteem, and stereotypes. *Psychological Review*, 102(1), 4–27. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.102.1.4>
- Hadiz, V. R. (2017). Indonesia's Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a New Phase of Deepening Illiberalism? *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 53(3), 261–278. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2017.1410311>
- Haleem, M. A. (2001). *Understanding the Qur'an: Themes and Style*. I. B. Tauris.
- Hamdi, S. (2017). Conflicting Religious Identities: Blaspheming Islam and the Future of Democracy in Indonesia. *Al-Albab*, 6(2), 247. <https://doi.org/10.24260/alalbab.v6i2.778>
- Hardiman, F. B. (2003). *Melampuni Positivisme dan Modernitas: Diskursus Filosofis tentang Metode Ilmiah dan Problem Modernitas*. PT Kanisius.
- Hardiman, F. B. (2021a). Apakah Peran Hukum Ketika Publik Dipimpin Bullshit?: Demokrasi dan Politik Pasca-Kebenaran. In Erdian (Ed.), *Aku Klik maka Aku Ada: Manusia dalam Revolusi Digital* (pp. 95–120). PT Kanisius.
- Hardiman, F. B. (2021b). Masih Manusiakah Kita Jika Berada-dalam-WWW?: Heidegger dan Telepon Cerdas. In Erdian (Ed.), *Aku Klik maka Aku Ada: Manusia dalam Revolusi Digital* (pp. 155–181). PT Kanisius.
- Harman, G. (1988). What is the intentional stance? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 11(3), 515–515. Cambridge Core. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00058714>

- Harman, G. (2005). *Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things*. Open Court Publishing Company.
- Harman, G. (2011). Realism without Materialism. *SubStance*, 40(2), 52–72.
- Harman, G. (2023). Merely Intentional Objects: A Defense. *Foundations of Science*, 28(4), 1177–1183. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-022-09862-0>
- Harsin, J. (2015). Regimes of Posttruth, Postpolitics, and Attention Economies. *Communication, Culture & Critique*, 8(2), 327–333. <https://doi.org/10.1111/cccr.12097>
- Hawley, S. H. (2019). *Challenges for an Ontology of Artificial Intelligence* (arXiv:1903.03171; Version 1). arXiv. <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1903.03171>
- Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and Time* (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Trans.). Blackwell.
- Hughes, A. W. (2013). *Muslim Identities: An Introduction to Islam*. Columbia University Press.
- ibn ‘Āsyūr, M. al-Ṭāhir. (1984). *Tafsīr al-Tahrīr wa al-Tanwīr: Vol. XIII*. al-Dār al-Tūnisīyah li al-Nasyr.
- Ibn ‘Aṭīyah, A. M. ‘Abd al-Ḥaḡ ibn G. (2001). *Al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz fī Tafsīr al-Kitāb al-‘Azīz: Vol. IV* (al-‘Azīz ‘Abd al-Salām ‘Abd al-Syāfī, Ed.; I). Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah.
- Ibn Fāris, A. al-Ḥusain A. (1979a). *Mu’jam Maqāyīs al-Lughab: Vol. I* (‘Abd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, Ed.; II). Dār al-Fikr.
- Ibn Fāris, A. al-Ḥusain A. (1979b). *Mu’jam Maqāyīs al-Lughab: Vol. IV* (‘Abd al-Salām M. Hārūn, Ed.; II). Dār al-Fikr.
- Ibn Fāris, A. al-Ḥusain A. (1979c). *Mu’jam Maqāyīs al-Lughab: Vol. V* (‘Abd al-Salām M. Hārūn, Ed.; II). Dār al-Fikr.
- Ibn Katsīr, A. al-F. I. (2000). *Tafsīr Al-Qur’ān al-‘Azīm: Vol. X* (M. al-Sayyid Muḥammad, M. al-Sayyid Rasyād, M. F. al-‘Ajamāwī, ‘Alī Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Bāqī, & Ḥasan ‘Abbās, Eds.; I). Mu’assasah Qurṭubah.
- Ingram, D. (2005). Postmodernism. In D. M. Borchert (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Vol. VII* (II, pp. 729–731). Thomson Gale.
- Insole, C. J. (2017). Realism and Anti-realism. In W. J. Abraham & F. D. Aquino (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology* (pp. 274–289). Oxford University Press.
- Inwood, M. (1999). *A Heidegger Dictionary*. Blackwell.
- Jabal, M. H. (2010a). *Al-Mu’jam al-Isyitiqāqī al-Mu’aṣṣal li Alfāz Al-Qur’ān al-Karīm: Vol. I*. Maktabah al-Ādāb.
- Jabal, M. H. (2010b). *Al-Mu’jam al-Isyitiqāqī al-Mu’aṣṣal li Alfāz Al-Qur’ān al-Karīm: Vol. III*. Maktabah al-Ādāb.

- Jackendoff, R. (2018). Representations and Rules in Language. In B. Huebner (Ed.), *The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett* (p. 0).
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0007>
- Jacquette, D. (1995). Meinong's Concept of Implexive Being and Nonbeing. *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 50(1), 233–271. <https://doi.org/10.5840/gps19955014>
- Jacquette, D. (2015). *Alexius Meinong: The Shepherd of Non-being*. Springer.
- Kalpokas, I. (2019). *A Political Theory of Post-Truth*. Springer International Publishing.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97713-3>
- Karamustafa, A. T. (2007). *Sufism: The Formative Period*. Edinburgh University Press.
- Keiling, T. (2019). Letting Things Be for Themselves: Gelassenheit as Enabling Thinking. In A. J. Wendland, C. Merwin, & C. Hadjiannou (Eds.), *Heidegger on Technology* (pp. 96–114). Routledge.
- Keyes, R. (2004). *The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life*. St. Martin's Press.
- Khalili, M. (2024). Entity Realism Meets Perspectivism. *Acta Analytica*, 39(1), 79–95.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-023-00554-3>
- Khasri, M. R. K. (2023). *Status Ontologis Objek Semantik Ketuhanan dalam Perspektif Teori Objek Alexius Meinong* [Ph.D. Dissertation]. Universitas Gadjah Mada.
- Khasri, M. R. K., Syamsuddin, M. M., & Murtiningsih, S. (2023). Ontological Commitment and Its Implication to Semantical Objects of Religious Language. *European Journal of Theology and Philosophy*, 3(2), Article 2.
<https://doi.org/10.24018/theology.2023.3.2.96>
- Knott, K. (2010). Insider/Outsider Perspectives. In J. R. Hinnells (Ed.), *The Routledge Companion to Study of Religion* (Second Edition, pp. 259–273). Routledge.
- Leith, S. (2017, August 16). Nothing like the truth. *Times Literary Supplement*.
<https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/post-truth-sam-leith/>
- Lim, M. (2017). Freedom to hate: Social media, algorithmic enclaves, and the rise of tribal nationalism in Indonesia. *Critical Asian Studies*, 49(3), 411–427.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2017.1341188>
- Liotard, J.-F., & Brügger, N. (2001). What about the Postmodern? The Concept of the Postmodern in the Work of Lyotard. *Yale French Studies*, 99, 77–92.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2903244>
- Macarthur, D. (2020). Exploding the Realism-Antirealism Debate: Putnam contra Putnam. *The Monist*, 103(4), 370–380.
- Marek, J. (2008). *Alexius Meinong*.
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/meinong/index.html>
- Martino, C. D. (2021). Heidegger and the Conception of Technology as Fate. In C. D. Martino (Ed.), *Heidegger and Contemporary Philosophy: Technology, Living, Society & Science* (pp. 53–75). Springer.

- McCann, D. P. (1980). Hermeneutics and Ethics: The Example of Reinhold Niebuhr. *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, 8(1), 27–53.
- McComiskey, B. (2017). *Post-truth Rhetoric and Composition*. University Press of Colorado.
- McIntyre, L. (2018). *Post-Truth*. The MIT Press.
- Meiland, J. W. (1980). On the Paradox of Cognitive Relativism. *Metaphilosophy*, 11(2), 115–126. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1980.tb00100.x>
- Meinong, A. (1902). 'Über Annahmen'. Verlag.
- Meinong, A. (1921). 'Selbstdarstellung'. In R. Schmidt (Ed.), *Die Deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellung* (pp. 3–62). Verlag.
- Mitchell, M. (2019). *Artificial Intelligence: A Guide for Thinking Humans*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Mughniyyah, M. J. (n.d.). *Tafsīr al-Kāsyif: Vol. V*. Dār al-Anwār.
- Muṭahharī, M. (2011). *Al-Falsafah* (Ḥasan 'Alī al-Hāsyimī, Ed.; II). Dār al-Walā' li al-Ṭibā'ah wa al-Nasyr.
- Naqqiyah, M. S., & Nurdin, A. (2019). Da'i Credibility in The Post-Truth Era: A Study of Da'i in Surabaya. *Ilmu Dakwah: Academic Journal for Homiletic Studies*, 13(2), Article 2. <https://doi.org/10.15575/idajhs.v13i2.6725>
- Nasr, S. H. (2007). *The Garden of Truth: The Vision and Promise of Sufism, Islam's Mystical Tradition*. HarperCollins Publisher.
- Natali, C. (2006). Socrates' Dialectic in Xenophon's Memorabilia. In L. Judson & V. Karasmanis (Eds.), *Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays* (pp. 3–19). Clarendon Press.
- Nietzsche, F. (1968). *The Will to Power* (W. Kaufmann, Ed.; W. Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Random House.
- Nolt, J. (2004). An Argument For Metaphysical Realism. *Journal for General Philosophy of Science*, 35(1), 71–90. <https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JGPS.0000035149.31235.79>
- Okoro, T. D. (2016). *Modernity and Destining of Technological Being: Beyond Heidegger's Critique of Technology to Responsible and Reflexive Technology*. Peter Lang.
- Orwell, G. (2000). Politics and the English Language. In B. Crick (Ed.), *George Orwell Essays* (pp. 414–426). Penguin Classics.
- Pattison, G. (2000). *Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to The Later Heidegger*. Routledge.
- Perszyk, K. J. (1993). *Nonexistent Objects: Meinong and Contemporary Philosophy* (Vol. 49). Springer Netherlands. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8214-8>
- Pink, J. (2010). Tradition and Ideology in Contemporary Sunnite Qur'ānic Exegesis: Qur'ānic Commentaries from the Arab World, Turkey and Indonesia and their Interpretation of Q 5:51. *Die Welt Des Islams*, 50(1), 3–59.

- Plato. (1914). Crito. In H. N. Fowler (Trans.), *Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus* (pp. 147–191). Harvard University Press.
- Prasanti, D. (2020). Internalisasi Nilai Islam di era Post-truth: Instagram dr@zaidulakbar sebagai Media Literasi Informasi Kesehatan. *Al-Izzah: Jurnal Hasil-Hasil Penelitian*, 0, Article 0. <https://doi.org/10.31332/ai.v0i0.1790>
- Priest, G. (2005). *Towards Non-Being*. Clarendon Press.
- Renard, J. (2009). *The A to ZA Sufism*. The Scarecrow Press.
- Rippin, A., & Nickel, G. (2008). The Qur’ān. In A. Rippin (Ed.), *The Islamic World* (pp. 145–156). Routledge.
- Rojcewicz, R. (2006). *The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger*. State University of New York Press.
- Rosen, G. (2001). Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism. *Noûs*, 35(s15), 69–91. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.35.s15.4>
- Russel, B. (1992). *Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript* (E. R. Eames & K. Blackwell, Eds.). Routledge.
- Russell, J. E. (1898). Epistemology and Mental States. *The Philosophical Review*, 7(4), 394–396. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2177133>
- Şadr, M. B. (2009). *Falsafatunā. Dār al-Ta’āruf li al-Maṭbū’āt*.
- Sawyer, M. E. (2018). Post-Truth, Social Media, and the “Real” as Phantasm. In M. Stenmark, S. Fuller, & U. Zackariasson (Eds.), *Relativism and Post-Truth in Contemporary Society: Possibilities and Challenges* (pp. 55–68). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Searle, J. R. (1984). Intentionality and Its Place in Nature. *Dialectica*, 38(2/3), 87–99.
- Seligman, P. (1974). *Being and Not-Being: An Introduction to Plato’s Sophist*. Martinus Nijhoff.
- Septiyadi, C. A., Khafifah, Z., Khumairoh, A. S., & Hidayatullah, A. F. (2021). Truth dan Post-Truth dalam Perspektif Al-Kindi Pada Era Milenial (Media Sosial). *Jurnal Penelitian Humaniora*, 22(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.23917/humaniora.v22i1.9344>
- Shepard, J. M. (1973). Technology, Division of Labor, and Alienation. *Pacific Sociological Review*. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1388654>
- Shepard, J. M. (1977). Technology, Alienation, and Job Satisfaction. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 3, 1–21.
- Shihab, M. Q. (2019). *Al-Maidah 51: Satu Firman Beragam Penafsiran*. Lentera Hati Group.
- Siegel, H. (1987). *Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological Relativism*. D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- Sierszulaska, A. (2005). *Meinong on Meaning an Truth*. Ontos-Verlag.
- Sim, S. (2001). Postmodernism and Philosophy. In S. Sim (Ed.), *The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism* (pp. 3–14). Routledge.

- Southgate, B. (2003). *Postmodernism in History: Fear or Freedom*. Routledge.
- Spatola, N., & Urbanska, K. (2020). God-like Robots: The Semantic Overlap between Representation of Divine and Artificial Entities. *AI & SOCIETY*, 35(2), 329–341. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-019-00902-1>
- Stegmüller, W. (1959). Alonzo Church. Symposium: Ontological commitment. The journal of philosophy, vol. 55 (1958), pp. 1008–1014. *The Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 24(3), 266–267. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2963878>
- Svavarsson, S. H. (2010). Pyrrho and Early Pyrrhonism. In R. Bett (Ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Skepticism* (pp. 36–57). Cambridge University Press.
- Syahrur, M. (2009). Introduction. In A. Christmann (Ed. & Trans.), *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason: The Essential Mubammad Shabrur* (pp. 1–19). Brill.
- Syamsuddin, S. (2017). *Ma'na-cum-Maghza Approach to the Qur'an: Interpretation of Q. 5:51*. 131–136. <https://doi.org/10.2991/icqhs-17.2018.21>
- Syarif, Z., Mughni, S. A., & Hannan, A. (2020). Post-truth and Islamophobia narration in the contemporary Indonesian political constellation. *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, 10(2), Article 2. <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v10i2.199-225>
- Syirāzī, N. M. (2000). *Al-Amṣal fī Tafsīr Kitāb Allah al-Munẓal: Vol. XI*. Madrasah al-Imām ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib.
- Tabataba’i, M. H. (n.d.). *Bidāyah al-Hikmah*. Mu’assasah al-Ma’arif al-Islāmiyah.
- Tabataba’i, M. H. (1997). *Al-Mizān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’ān: Vol. XV*. Mu’assasah al-’Alamī li al-Maṭbū’āt.
- Tallis, B. (2016). Living in Post-truth: Power/Knowledge/Responsibility1. *New Perspectives*, 24(1), 7–18. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X1602400101>
- Tesich, S. (1992, January). A Government of Lies. *The Nation*, 6(13), 12–14.
- Warne, C. (2013). *Arguing with Socrates: An Introduction to Plato's Shorter Dialogues*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Warthall, M. A. (2019). The Task of Thinking in a Technological Age. In A. J. Wendland, C. Merwin, & C. Hadjiannou (Eds.), *Heidegger on Technology* (pp. 13–38). Routledge.
- Wibowo, A. S. (2022). Post-Truth: Neosofisme Kontemporer. In A. S. Wibowo (Ed.), *Cara Kerja Ilmu Filsafat dan Filsafat Ilmu: Dari Dialektika ke Dekonstruksi* (pp. 290–315). Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia.
- Yazdī, M. T. M. (2007). *Al-Manhaj al-Jadid fī Ta’līm al-Falsafah: Vol. I* (M. ‘Abd al-Mun’im al-Khāfānī, Trans.). Dār al-Ta’aruf li al-Maṭbū’āt.