



Article History

Submitted:

12-10-2020

Reviewed:

20-01-2021

Aproved:

22-04-2021



Indonesian Muslim Youth and the Discourse on the Caliphate System, Islamic State and Sharia-Based Regional Regulations in the Post-Reform Era

Maghfur Ahmad

maghfur@iainpekalongan.ac.id

Institut Agama Islam Negeri Pekalongan

Abstract

This study analyzes the discourse on the caliphate system, the Islamic state, and Sharia-based regional regulations among Indonesian Muslim youth. Following the reform era in Indonesia, the rise of Islamic studies and political discourse was accompanied by a significant resurgence of Islamic conservatism. Discussions on jihad, the caliphate, Sharia-based regional regulations, and efforts to establish an Islamic state became increasingly prominent. This research employs a qualitative approach, with data collected through interviews, observations, and documentation among millennial Islamic activists attending public schools in Pekalongan City, Central Java, Indonesia. The data were analyzed using an interactive analysis model developed by Miles and Huberman. The findings reveal that Muslim youth exhibit multiple, often conflicting perspectives. While they aspire to practice Islam comprehensively in all aspects of life, they also acknowledge that Pancasila (the Five Principles) remains the most suitable foundation for governance in Indonesia's pluralistic society, on the one hand. Moreover, the study highlights a widespread lack of literacy among Indonesian youth regarding the historical debates on the relationship between religion and the state during Indonesia's founding. This gap affects their understanding and contextualization of the discourse on the caliphate system, Islamic state, and Sharia regulations. On the other hand, the rise of textual interpretations and minimal awareness of nationalism and civic literacy poses a potential threat to Indonesia's future as a unified nation. This research contributes to the discourse on Islamic political thought and youth studies by examining the complex interplay between religious aspirations and national identity among Indonesian Muslim youth. It underscores the need for educational interventions to enhance understanding of the historical and contextual dimensions of religion-state relations, fostering a balanced approach to nationalism and religious values.

Keywords: Caliphate (Khilafah); Islamic State; Nationalism; Ideology; Sharia-Based Regional Regulation.

URL: <http://e-journal.iainpekalongan.ac.id/index.php/Religia/article/view/2807>

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.28918/religia.v24i1.2807>

INTRODUCTION

Discourses on religion and the state experienced a new chapter after the fall of Soeharto and the end of the power of the New Order era in politics in Indonesia. This era was marked by the birth of a reformation government that upheld freedom of opinion, association and inclusivism of the interpretation of the Pancasila ideology (Steenbrink, 1999: 280-96), in addition to the emergence of separatist movements in East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh (Aspinall & Berger, 2001: 1003-1024). The socio-political stability of the New Order era which was carried out through military power and repressive rules, as well as

the monopoly of truth in the interpretation of religious and state relations has ended. The reform era reopens sensitive discourses in the nation and state, which have been closed tightly by the government and tend to be on the contrary to the civilian forces (Feillard, 1997).

Debates over the state ideology, Pancasila, the caliphate system, the Islamic state, and the sharia state have flared up again during this period (Effendy, 2003; Salim, 2008; Baswedan, 2004: 669-690); Suharso, 2006; Berutu, 2020; Raillon, 2011: 92-113; Kersten, 2009: 971-985). The collective agreement of the "state ideology" has begun to be questioned. The reality of the diversity of ethnicities, languages, religions, and beliefs growing in harmony with one another in Indonesia is starting to be interrupted. Several groups began to appear carrying the spirit of radicalism, wanting to carry the caliphate state to replace the foundation of the state. They question again and even reject the ideology of Pancasila and ignore diversity (Maghfur & Muniroh, 2013: 181-195). At the same time, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (NIIS) caused shocks in various countries in the Middle East. The turmoil caused by ISIS even reached Indonesia.

The religious radicalism community tries to replace Pancasila ideology with a caliphate system and an Islamic state. These groups then viewed the form of government and ideology promoted by Indonesia as a wrong decision. Therefore, the system of government and ideology of Indonesia must be replaced by the caliphate's system and ideology. Thoughts and actions to change the ideology of this state have campaigned massively and systematically. Muslim youths began to be influenced by the idea of a transnational Islamic movement campaigning for the caliphate system. Psychologically, youth are in the process of searching for self-identity and the average age is around 16-35 years old (Sarwono, 2012). Textual and radical understanding of Islam will easily affect this group of adolescents because they have doubts, are disoriented, and are socially psychologically isolated from their society. The characteristics of adolescents closer to peer- groups and tend to stay away from their parents make them quickly recruited into radical groups (Pristiani, & Lestari, 2019: 108-117; Mujahid, 2014).

This study seeks to re-question the research results revealed by Qodir (2016: 429- 445) that currently there is a phenomenon of the emergence of views and actions of radicalism among Muslim youth. This phenomenon has emerged over the past five years with various events occurring. On the other hand, the study conducted by Steenbrink (1999: 280-96) regarding Pancasila as the state ideology and modern ideology for Indonesian Muslims shows the stages of acceptance, contestation and intense debate. As an ideology of state, Pancasila should be comprehend in a variety of ways (Suryadinata, 2018); it's just that the government has so far dominated and has a single authorization in interpreting Pancasila in the context of democracy and ideology (Morfit, 1981: 838-851; Ramage, 1997). Criticizing the dynamics of sharia-nuanced local regulations that are considered to threaten civil liberties, human rights and equality in the state (Ali-Fauzi & Mujani, 2009).

This study is different from previous studies. The researcher tries to explain millennial Muslim youth's thoughts and attitudes in responding to the discourse of the caliphate system, the Islamic state and the Sharia-based regional regulation, as contemporary religious and political issues in Indonesia. Through field research with a tradition of case studies on Young Islam activists in the religious field, the subjects and their data are processed in various schools in Pekalongan City. Those involved as the subject of this study are Freddy, Taufik, Khalimah, Fikri, Nadia, Rizki. The data collected was analyzed in an interactive manner, the Miles and Huberman model. This study produces a more factual representative of the relationship between Islam and the state. The state ideology that must be developed in the nation's life is an ideology that is extracted from the social, cultural, and religious values adhered to by the Indonesian people.

DISCUSSION

Understanding the Caliphate system, the Islamic State, and the Sharia-based Regional Regulation

Starting a study of Muslim youths' views and responses to the discourse on the caliphate system, the Islamic state and the sharia-based regional regulation in Indonesia, it is necessary to discuss the debate on the three concepts early. First, the Caliphate system. In general, a government system can be called a Caliphate if it implements Islam as an

ideology, sharia as a legal basis, and follows the Prophet Muhammad and Khulafaur Rasyidin (Four Caliphs) in running the government. Even though they have different names or structures, they still adhere to the same principles, namely as Muslims' leaders throughout the world.

The people raise Caliphate system through a happy process of loyalty and loyalty. A candidate for Caliph who appears based on appointment, self-nomination or other means can only become Caliph after receiving the people's loyalty. Bayat is a way of elevating someone to become Caliph. In terms of sovereignty, the appointment of the Caliph is not to make rules or laws according to his wishes, but to apply the laws of the Koran and Sunnah. Hafiduhuddin (2001) in Hirji's interpretation, Islam as a value, can be a principle, foundation, and political orientation to regulate life.

As a government system, the Caliphate system also has various weaknesses. The first weakness is that the patterns and mechanisms for making the caliphate system open opportunities for leaders who do not meet the qualifications. The mechanism and implementation of bai'at process (pledging spiritual allegiance) is done by asking someone to pledge as a caliph. Bai'at process must be done based on the willingness and freedom of choice. The principle of willingness has an impact on a person's freedom to perform bai'at or not. Willingness in bai'at process shows that there should be no enforcement on someone to do bai'at and vice versa, should not force people to take Bai'at (Fitriyono & Suhono, 2017: 43-55). This bai'at system is not a problem because according to the contract in Islam there is no force. However, don't be mistaken this is just the first process. Meanwhile, after the appointment of a bai'at, it is permissible to force a person or group of people to bail out a caliph who has previously been bai'at the appointment. This second bai'at is called bai'at obedience.

The second weakness is that the head of state in the caliphate system has extensive powers. In several statements he said: "The Khilafah is the state itself," the legal and political consequences of this statement are that a leader is a state itself which has the right to perform the functions, authority and power of the state, both legislative, executive and judicial powers. The Caliph has the right to change and repeal laws if deemed necessary. Not only that, the Caliph has the right to tabanni and issue the syara' laws which the public must obey. The Caliph is in charge of domestic and foreign politics, including determining

and appointing state officials. In this context, the caliphate system contains controversies (Jaelani & Hum, 2015).

Second, the Islamic State. Islam is both religion and state. These two things cannot be separated. Religion contains all aspects of community life, be it religion, economy, politics or others. (Kamali & Kamali, 1993: 17-40). According to Baidhawry (2015), normatively, Islam does not have a concept that refers directly and denotatively to an Islamic state or state. In Islam, only ethical principles are found in forming a country, such as the values of justice, welfare and peace (Baidhawry, 2015: 41-57).

Historically, Muslims' lives have recognized the caliphate (state) and Imamah (government) concept and practice, and both are important public institutions in Islam. The caliphate system is the mother of all institutions. The caliphate system is the implementation of Islamic law to achieve justice both individually and institutionally; Externally the caliphate system is also responsible for the welfare and peace of the people, as well as upholding a just and peaceful world order. The vision of the state found throughout the history of Islam includes: universal humanity and egalitarianism, moral totalism in all activities of the society, nation and state, upholding the independence, implementing education for all and life, pluralism that recognizes differences and diversity, and enforcing the rule of law (Al-Faruqi, 2001).

According to Osman (1983), he stated that Islam is only related to spiritual life, without any connection with society and the state. It maybe as far from the fact that Islam has provided a comprehensive and detailed social, economic and political system (Osman, 1983: 10). Discourses on concepts and practices like this can be found in the history of Islamic politics. Until now, based on that fact, the relationship between Islam and the state is still being debated, including whether there is an Islamic state or not. If there is, what is the concept, governance and succession mechanism. Despite the claims of an Islamic state, its presence is very controversial. Contemporary Islamic states, such as ISIS, which have now lost control in some areas. An Islamic state's existence depends on the conflict and its root causes (Tønnessen, 2019: 2-11). This then became a relevant discussion of whether or not an Islamic state's presence was in the nation-state's era nowadays.

Third, Sharia-based regional regulation. Sharia-based regional regulations or those with sharia nuances color the life of the nation. Sharia-based regional regulations or

regional regulation nuanced sharia is the term for regional laws in Indonesia based on Islam. Local governments set these regulations at the provincial, district and city levels. The emergence of Sharia-based regional regulations was motivated by the regional autonomy law, which allows regional governments to issue regional rules as long as they do not conflict with higher laws. Muhatada (2014) defines a sharia-based regional regulation as "any regulation issued by local governments that is directly or indirectly related, or at least considered related, to Islamic law or norms". The birth of the sharia-based regional regulations in Indonesia impacts the government's decentralization program after the fall of the New Order regime. This decentralization policy provides more space for local governments to issue perda and other local regulations, including those with Islamic nuances (Hanum, 2017: 41-67).

Pros and cons have colored the rise of sharia-based regional regulations in Indonesia. The debate over the Sharia-based regional regulation, both as a form of positivization and as a form of indigenization itself indicates that the meaning of shari'ah is obscured. Sharia, which is the law to enforce prohibitions and orders, is actually reduced by political power interests. Jati (2013) reveals that the Sharia-based regional regulation as a legal product is basically a political consensus product. This study also finds that behind the sharia-based regional regulations are political interests and only serve certain groups' interests. More than that, sharia is only used as an image tool for the government, to cover corruption cases, as well as a tool for public control. Besides, the sharia-based regional regulation also threatens community groups, such as non-Muslims, women, minorities, and other ethnic groups to become vulnerable groups who are victimized in implementing the sharia perda (Jati, 2013: 305-318).

According to Dani Muhtada, the sharia-based regional regulations in Indonesia can be categorized into seven. First, local regulations related to morality, such as those on alcoholic drinking, gambling, prohibition of alcoholic beverages, prostitution, or pornography. Second, local regulations related to philanthropic issues, such as zakat, infaq, and shadaqah policies. Third, local regulations related to Islamic education. This includes the regional regulation on madrasah diniyah and reading and writing the Koran. Fourth, local regulations related to the development of the Islamic economy. This includes local regulations on Baitul Mal wat Tamwil (BMT) and Sharia Rural Banks (BPRS). Fifth, local

regulations concerning the faith of a Muslim. This includes regulations on the prohibition of the activities of Ahmadiyah or other Muslim sects that are considered heretical. Sixth, local regulations on Muslim clothing, including the obligation to wear a headscarf for women or on the prohibition of the veil. Seventh, Islamic regulations in the other category. Regional regulations in this category, for example, regulations on grand mosques, haj services, and reception of Ramadan (Muhtada, 2014).

The Perspective of Millennial Muslim views on the Caliphate System, Islamic State and Sharia-based Regional Regulations.

This section discusses the responses of young Muslim activists to the caliphate system's widespread discourse, the Islamic state and the sharia-based regional regulation in post-reform Indonesia. Today, the discourse of implementing a caliphate system and an Islamic state has reappeared on the stage of Indonesian life. Some Muslims think that the caliphate system and the Islamic state are solutions to various problems of the Indonesian nation. The youth's response to this phenomenon shows a plural face of Islam's future and the Indonesian nation that is difficult to predict.

1. Rejecting the Caliphate System and the Islamic State

The discourse on implementing the caliphate system and the struggle for an Islamic state in Indonesia is challenged by millennial Muslims. According to Freddy, one of the Muslim youths in Pekalongan stated that in the context of Indonesia's current nationality, campaigning for the caliphate system is an outdated idea (interview with Freddy, 20 July 2019). The caliphate system is an ancient discourse that those who take advantage of religious issues are trying to bring back political interests. Due to this fact, Freddy rejected the caliphate system, an Islamic state with all its derivatives, including the sharia-based regional regulation and efforts to formalize Islam in Indonesia. The argument used by Freddy is the context of locality, culture and values adopted by the Indonesian people. Lufaei (2017) states that the caliphate system will not be enforced to be implemented in Indonesia. Text interpretation about politics and government must be based on social reality. In the history of the administration of Islamic governance and Islamic ideology as applied by the Prophet Muhammad SAW in Arabic, it is very different from the pluralistic Indonesian background (Lufaei, 2017: 73-90).

Freddy's response and thought received support from his mentor, Taufik, a spiritual coach at a high school. According to Taufik, the caliphate system was constitutionally rejected by itself. However, in the context of the sharia-based regional regulation, Taufik can still consider and accommodate the sharia-based regional regulation, as long as it is carried out through a valid mechanism. Taufik gives an example of a case in Aceh (Berutu, AG (2020). In fact, historically, Taufik has concluded that 'formalization' has been carried out in Indonesia. For example, the case of the Marriage Law, the Waqf Law and so on. For Taufik, formalization is identical to objectification. The process of absorbing Islamic teaching values that contain universal values and are mutually agreed upon through a state's formal constitutional mechanism.

Promoting the caliphate system and the Islamic state as the Indonesian state's ideology is undoubtedly a serious threat to the Indonesian nation's survival. Both of them challenged the ideology of Pancasila and the constitution that was mutually agreed upon. The Caliphate system and the Islamic state in reality also deny the fact that Indonesia is a multicultural and multi-religious country.

After the reformation, Pancasila as the state ideology faced challenges from various parties. Transnational Islamic groups are aggressively campaigning for the caliphate system and trying to make al-Qur'an as the basis of the state. However, through various channels, Islamic activists in the north coast region have strong principles related to their understanding and belief that Indonesia is a country built on diversity of beliefs, races, ethnicities and languages. The nation's founders have agreed on Pancasila as an ideology, philosophy and values in running the government. For the nation's founders, Pancasila is the most appropriate solution to overcome the debate on state ideology, in the midst of some Muslims' struggle to make Islam the state ideology (Prawiranegara, 1984: 74-83).

It is undeniable that although the caliphate system and the Islamic state are considered dangerous for the unity of Indonesia, as well as deny mutual agreement, parties always appear to try to change Pancasila as the state ideology by bringing up the issue of religion for political, economic and global trade (Rudnyckyj, 2010: 189-220).

Taufik, that millennial Muslim youth, considers that the caliphate system is the romanticism of Muslims, which does not suit a pluralistic Indonesian nation's needs. Responding to the discourse on the caliphate system, Taufik prioritized the integrity of the

nation and state. Having a commitment to keep the unity of the state is more important above else. For him, the caliphate system, Imamat and the Islamic State had no place in Indonesia, and from the beginning, this had been an agreement with the nation's founding fathers. Taufik countered the rise of the caliphate system jargon as a solution to the nation's problems, by saying:

"I personally interpret the caliphate as a " substitute ", however, if the meaning of the caliphate is interpreted as a leader that must be implemented in Indonesia, I will disagree. Because we are a country that adheres to the Pancasila constitution. Pancasila is final. Without Pancasila, the Republic of Indonesia will collapse" (Taufiq, 2019).

The responses of the mentors of religious activities in secondary schools suggest the view that the caliphate is not always appropriate. For Taufik, if the caliphate system is implemented in Indonesia it is not only unsuitable, but also denies mutual agreement. For him, Pancasila as the basis of the state requires that all state affairs must have a constitutional basis and Pancasila is the nation's highest consensus that has been mutually agreed upon. Pancasila is based on cultural, social and religious values, and serves as the unifier for Indonesia's diversity (Fitch & Webb, 1989: 44-51).

In line with Taufik's views, Freddy, a young religious activist, considers that the caliphate system is irrelevant for the Indonesian nation. Freddy vulgarly thinks that the caliphate system is an outdated issue. Freddy has the view that "from a conceptual perspective, the caliphate system is a post-Prophet government system. I think the issue of the caliphate system in government is outdated. So it would be good if the Indonesian state still has its process. It has its own history, and Pancasila is the right one. " (Interview with Freddy, 20 August 2019).

Thus, the caliphate system and the Islamic state were considered by young Islamic activists to be unsuitable for the Indonesian state's needs. Indonesia as a plural country, has a variety of cultures, social and religious values, the presence of a certain religion-based ideology will hurt the feelings of other groups.

2. Controversy over the Sharia-based Regional Regulation and the Formalization of Islam

So, what is the response of research subjects related to the widespread discourse of

Sharia-based regional regulations in Indonesia. To answer this question, Taufik said: "Sharia-based regional regulations is totally fine and that is the authority and policy of regional autonomy. As an example in Aceh. However, these regulations only apply to certain violations. So the criminal and civil government laws need to be implemented." Nadia, a young Muslim activist, argues:

"Sharia-based regional regulations are the implementation of laws in every region by using Islamic laws, such as in Aceh. Sharia-based regional regulations is more appropriate for an Islamic country. An Islamic state is a country that follows and implements the rules of Islamic law as a guideline for governance. ... If every country applies Islamic law, surely the society or the state will have peace" (Interview with Nadia, 21 August 2019).

Nadia's view indicates that the discourse on Sharia-based regional regulations in the Indonesian state system is still pros and cons. This controversial debate can be seen in the study conducted by Suharso (2006: 305-308), both the process and implementation (Abrori, 2016: 71-88). According to Abrori, matters related to sharia, although theologically a reference to the truth, but its juridical position in national law. The implementation of sharia-based regional regulation is still being debated. The existence of sharia-based regional regulations has been a dilemma both in terms of concept and implementation. It became a controversial discourse (Alim, 2010: 119-142). Many people consider that the sharia-based regional regulations are unnecessary. However, there are also those who consider that sharia-based regional regulations are important in maintaining public morals. Even so, legally formal sharia-based regional regulation does not apply constitutionally, but its existence is still maintained until now. The sharia-based regional regulations are in fact very political, not for the sake of upholding social order. The position of the sharia-based regional regulations in regional autonomy in Indonesia is only a political tool to attract public support for political parties, not the aspirations of the people (Suharso, 2006: 305- 308).

In contrast to Nadia, Freddy clearly rejected the issue of the sharia regulations. Freddy said, "yes, my opinion on the sharia regulation, if it is not implemented like in an Arab country where there is qishas and diyat, I disagree" (Interview, 20 August 2019). The variety of views of the younger generation shows the occurrence of religious polarization, especially in seeing the debate on the enforcement of Islamic law. There are several schools

of thought related to the enforcement of Islamic law in Indonesia. Responding to the issue of enforcing Islamic law, Taufik explained as follows:

“For an Islamic state to be implemented in Indonesia, I don't think it is suitable, because pluralism consists of various ethnicities, customs and religions. I think the foundation of our Indonesian state Pancasila has provided good teachings. Related to the punishment of flogging, stoning and so on, it does not have to be enforced only in Arab (Islamic countries). The existing regulation in Aceh like flogging punishment for those who are dating, I think it can be applied in Indonesia, because it will provide a very high deterrent effect. Thus, the existing laws in Indonesia can be collaborated. So it doesn't have to be an Islamic state, the law can be implemented in a country with a scheme. We see the fact that if there is no deterrent effect, the corruptors and criminals will not feel guilty” (Interview with Taufik, 20 August 2019).

Based on the explanation above, Taufik considers that the enforcement of Islamic law is not relevant to be implemented in Indonesia for constitutional reasons. However, Taufik opened up opportunities for collaboration between Islamic values and national regulations. According to him, one of the “privileges” of Islamic law is that it has a deterrent effect. Substantially, Freddy had the same view as Taufik. Here's Freddy's expression:

“Regarding the enforcement of Islamic law in Indonesia, I disagree, because Indonesia has various faiths. So we need to promote tolerance. Regarding the application of punishment, we only need to use the existing laws, namely criminal and civil laws.” (Interview with Freddy, 20 August 2019).

Taufik and Freddy's views are parallel to Nadia's thoughts. Nadia has an opinion that Islamic law is good if it is implemented to state life. Muslims should fight for Islam to become a source of regulations. Unfortunately, the legislators who are played by politicians are more politically and power oriented. In fact, in Islamic political theory, religion is a means of control. Like the study (Hafidhuddin, 2001: 181), Islamic politics is an attempt to make Islam the controller of life. ... Speaking of Islamic politics, then this is not meant as politics that merely seeks power, but an effort to make Islam the basis and control of life. According to Didin, the government is controlled by Islamic values. Education is controlled by Islamic values. Economy is controlled by Islam. Suppose a Muslim claim to be a politician but does

not carry Islamic teachings, and is not oriented towards making Islam the control of community life, then he is not a Muslim politician (Hafidhuddin, 2000: 181). Even though Islam is a constructive value in the state, Nadia emphasized that Islamic laws are not appropriate in the name of religious diversity and diversity. Nadia explained the following.

“If the Islamic law is like that, It is actually fine, because it will provide lessons and proportional punishment. Society became deterrent. But in Indonesia it is not easy to implement because the country adheres to many religions. So practice in the field becomes difficult, not to mention that the economy in Indonesia that has been controlled by non-Muslims” (Interview with Nadia, 25 July 2019).

Nadia's words above indicate that Islamic law is considered good, because it provides a learning and deterrent effect. However, although it is considered good, Islamic law in Indonesia is not acceptable and difficult to apply for the reasons of the constitution and religious pluralism. The majority of Muslims are not automatically allowed to impose the majority's tyrannical will (Nurrohman Syarif, 2012: 79-92). Muslims also need to develop a tolerant attitude towards other groups (Auliya, Abubakar & Maliki, (2019: 127- 136). Regarding the discourse on the formalization of Islam in Indonesia, Taufik expressed his view by referring to the history of several positive legal regulations. Following is Taufik's response:

“...Since 1971 there has been a formalization of law No. 1 of 1974 (Marriage Law) that regulates marriage in Indonesia, and it becomes the official state law. Including waqf law. In Indonesia, there are also religious courts that regulate such matters. So, It is probably impossible if it is implemented directly, but it will do gradually. It is because in the past, there was a history of one party that disagreed (PDI). They are worried that Indonesia will become an Islamic state. However, it has not been proven until now and instead regulates people's lives in marriage, etc.” (Interview with Taufik, 21 August 2019).

Taufik said that there are actually many state laws as a result of "formalization." Taufik gave examples of regulations on marriage, religious courts, and waqf law. For Taufik, the regulatory process is indirectly carried out through official stages by the authorities.

Meanwhile, for Nadia, formalization can be done for a country with readiness, infrastructure, and human resources. However, what is meant by “readiness”, Nadia did

not give further explanation. However, Nadia's view can be explained in the following figures. Nadia said, "If it is formalized in countries that are ready to be based on Islamic law, there is no problem. Islam is a religion that contains and is oriented towards productive and constructive practice. If Indonesia wants to be like that, there is no problem, and it will be better" (Interview with Nadia, 21 August 2019). It all depends on political decisions. Ironically, politicians only use religion as a cover to maintain power and influence. Religion is only used as an instrument to gain and maintain power. Politicians should have a strong character to create a just and civilized social order. According to Didin, Islamic politicians and politics should not only talk about power and position but also as a negotiation space for Islamic values to become the basis for managing all aspects of life and impacting the benefit of Muslims. In this context, placing Muslims as leaders becomes urgent to defend Muslims' interests (Hafidhuddin, 2001: 181).

As for Nadia, he thinks that the sharia regulation is not a problem for a country based on religion. However, in the Indonesian context, it is not suitable and difficult to implement. Based on the data above, in general, millennial Muslim activists reject the caliphate system, enforcement of Islamic sharia and the formalization of Islam. They argued that Indonesia was not a country based on Islam, but Pancasila, with a multi-religious socio-religious structure. Lufaei (2017) examines the urgency of reconstructing the thought of formalizing Islamic law and the future of Indonesia. The formalization of Islamic law offered by Islamic fundamentalist groups as a solution to various problems faced by the citizens needs to be contextualized with the reality of Indonesia as a plural country. This study reveals that the formalization of Islamic laws is not a solution (Lufaei, 2017: 73-90).

Regarding the implementation of the caliphate system, Fathan and Intan reject the caliphate system in Indonesia. According to them, the caliphate system does not have a constitutional and social basis. Fathan said that if the caliphate system is implemented in a culturally and religiously pluralistic Indonesia, it will only generate resistance from various society elements. Sharia-based regional regulations discourse also does not need to be formulated, let alone enforced in various regions. Sharia-based regional regulations are not a primary requirement for the largest Muslim nation in the world.

Fathan considered that substantially he agreed with Islam's concepts and teachings,

but if implemented in Indonesia, it seems impossible. Many parties will hurt, coerced, ignored, and marginalized if the sharia regulations and formalization of Islam are implemented in Indonesia. On the other hand, Rizki, a young Muslim from Pekalongan, can understand the formulation of sharia regulation in certain areas, such as Aceh and Banten, and even agreed to implement them. However, many Muslim activists like Fathan and Intan reject it for the reason of the country's constitution.

The above explanation indicates that most subjects, who are Intan and Fathan and others, do not agree to implement the caliphate system, regional regulations and enforcement of Islamic laws, and Islam's formalization. Especially for the formalization of Islam, Fathan made special notes that it could be applied as long as it was through existing mechanisms and only the substance side. While one other subject, such as Rizki and others, agreed, especially when it comes to being implemented in Aceh and Banten. For Rizki, Islamic laws have many advantages compared to other regulations. Thus, Intan and Fathan emphasize more on the substantial aspects, while Rizki is more textual-formalistic.

Maintaining the Ideology of the State: Faces of Millennial Muslim Youth

The perspective of Muslim youth about the caliphate, the Islamic State, and the sharia regulations shows the diversity of the ummah's understandings and ideologies. However, the view of Muslim activists above has different ideologies from the concept of Islam developed by radical-fundamentalists, who recently penetrated the Indonesian nation. It is as if the religiosity of moderate religious activists is surrounded by a flock of bearded, robed and even often carrying swords in their actions. They are organized in the Darul Arqam forum, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Laskar Jihad (JL), Hizbut Tahrir (HT), and others (Saerozi and Hasyim, 2007: 62). This group has an Islamic ideology, with the following objectives:

“Carry out Islamic life and develop Islamic preaching throughout the world means inviting Muslims to live in Islam. All life activities in it are regulated according to syara' law. The perspective that worldly life will become the center of attention is lawful and haram under the Daulah Islamiyah government, called as daulah khilafah. This government is led by a caliph appointed by the Muslims to be heard and obeyed and carry out his government based on Allah's Book and His Prophet's sunnah. Also to carry the message of Islam throughout the world with da'wah and jihad” (Anonymous, 2002: 19).

Even though national research shows an increasingly radical direction at the national level, the facts in Pekalongan show a different condition. Millennial Islamic youth still place Pancasila as the ideology that unifies the nation. This is different from the radical group. Radicals are oriented towards establishing an Islamic state, with a caliphate system and fighting through da'wah and jihad. They insist on "forcing" all over the world. Millennialist religious activists reject the "caliphate system" because a multicultural Indonesia needs a unifying ideology. The caliphate system and the Islamic State are a threat to the life of the nation.

Masdar Farid Mas'udi (2014) criticized the caliphate system fighters. According to Mas'udi's analysis, radicals think that 'khilafah' is a concept of power which on the one hand has a global claim ('alamyah), and on the other hand is sectarian (only for Muslims who adhere to certain sects), and are mistaken for certain ethnic groups (Arab Quraish) (Mas'udi, 2014: 51). Mas'udi considered the caliphate system fighters did not understand the issue of the caliphate system. He said, "If it does not contain these three elements, it is considered illegal, riotous and must be fought as kafir and bughat," concluded Mas'udi. According to Mas'udi, there are two kinds of khilafah, namely individual khilafah (fardiyah) and social khilafah (ijtima'iyah). Mas'udi rejects the 'global state' as a requirement for the khilafah ijtima'iyah siyasiyyah, as dictated by the caliphate doctrine's advocates. The concept from Mas'udi represents moderate-liberalism, which Muslim activists substantially follow in Pekalongan.

The views of the millennial Muslim generation show diversity. Even though they recognize that Islamic law and Islamic formalization are basically good, the agenda of formalizing Islam also has various problems. Unfortunately, because Indonesia is based on the principle of Pancasila, Islamic laws cannot be implemented, except for certain regions that have agreed through a constitutional mechanism. If this is forced to apply in Indonesia, besides

Based on the mapping of Muslim millennials' responses, there are at least three views, which are (1) the need to enforce Islamic law in Indonesia as Fikri views. (2) the implementation of Islamic law can be justified as long as it is through a legal mechanism. This view is represented by the Khalimah. (3) Islamic law's performance is neither necessary nor a necessity of the Indonesian, as revealed by Rikza. It's just that millennial

Muslim youth are inconsistent in the way and mechanism of determining it. This fact can be traced from their response to the discourse on the formalization of Islam. For example, Fikri and Rikza are inconsistent with their views. Fikri supports the implementation of Islamic law, but he rejects Islam's formalization process in the constitution. In contrast to Rikza, he agreed with Islam's formalization, even though he had previously rejected actions related to upholding Islamic law. In this context, Fikri and Rikza are inconsistent with their views, choices, and arguments. In a general perspective, if someone thinks it is necessary to uphold Islamic law, the formalization of Islam is also given priority. Vice versa, unlike Fikri and Rikza, Khalimah is consistent in her view that this religious activist agrees with the mechanism for the formalization of Islam. However, she is still doubtful about its implementation. Khalimah's doubts regarding the formation of the Sharia-based regional regulation and its implementation are reasonable because it has shown problems, challenges, and obstacles in several studies. Abrori (2016) in his research in Garut, West Java, confirmed the conditions that hinder the implementation of Islamic law (Abrori, 2016: 71-88). Thus, the establishment and implementation of Sharia regulation at the field level will experience its difficulties.

Thus, the majority of millennial Muslim activists reject the discourse of the sharia-based regional regulations and the formalization of Islam. Only a few support and approve the sharia-based regional regulations and the formalization of Islam. The rejection of sharia regulation is parallel to the thinking of liberals and moderates in religion. Those who agree with the idea usually have a textual 'formalist' understanding and emphasize symbols and formality in religion.

CONCLUSION

Millennial Indonesian Muslim youth have diverse perspectives on the caliphate system, Islamic state, and Sharia-based regional regulations, shaped by ideological foundations, personal experiences, and cultural values. Their views and behaviors are influenced by such factors as societal cultural norms, educational experiences, Indonesia's multicultural reality, and global political dynamics. Today Muslim youth are increasingly exposed to ideological conflicts on a national scale. Through social media, they are inundated with information, persuasion, and ideological promotion by transnational Islamic movements, significantly shaping their perceptions of these contemporary discourses.

While millennial youth demonstrate a strong sense of nationalism, as evidenced by their recognition of Pancasila as the state ideology, a minority believes that Islam or Sharia should play a more prominent role in national life. Although the majority reject the implementation of the caliphate system, Islamic state, and Sharia-based regulations, their defense of nationalism and pluralism often lacks depth and resilience. [This vulnerability is further compounded by the systematic campaigns of radical and fundamentalist groups, utilizing ideological indoctrination, literacy programs, and propaganda to erode nationalism among the younger generation.

This study highlights the urgent need to strengthen nationalism literacy, promote an understanding of moderate Islam, and foster multicultural awareness among millennial Muslim youth. It contributes to the field of youth studies and political discourse by providing insights into how education, societal engagement, and media literacy can reinforce resilience against radical ideologies.

However, this study is limited by its focus on qualitative analysis and lacks longitudinal data to measure the long-term effects of transnational ideological campaigns on youth nationalism. Additionally, the research does not fully explore regional differences in the youths' responses to these issues, which could provide a more nuanced understanding.

Future research should employ mixed-method approaches, including longitudinal studies, to assess the sustainability of nationalist values among youths in the face of ideological challenges. Comparative studies on the influence of transnational movements across different regions in Indonesia could also provide valuable insights for policymakers and educators.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrori, A. (2016). Refleksi Teori Kritis Jurgen Habermas atas Konsesus Simbolik Perda Syariah. *AHKAM: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah*, 16(1). 71-88. <http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v16i1.2897>
- Al-Faruqi, I. R. A. (2001). *Budaya: Menjelajah Khazanah Peradaban Gemilang*. (I. Hasa, Ed.). Bandung: Mizan.
- Ali-Fauzi, I., & Mujani, S. (2009). *Gerakan Kebebasan Sipil: Studi dan Advokasi Kritis Atas Perda Syariah*. Centre for the Study of Islam and Democracy.
- Alim, M. (2010). Perda Bernuansa Syariah dan Hubungannya dengan Konstitusi. *Jurnal Hukum Ins Quia Iustum*, 17(1), 119-142.
- Anonim. (2002). *Mengenal Hizbut Tahrir: Partai Islam Ideologis*. Bogor: Pustaka Tariqul Izzah.
- Aspinall, E., & Berger, M. T. (2001). The Break-up of Indonesia? Nationalisms after Decolonisation and the Limits of the Nation-state in Post-cold war Southeast Asia. *Third World Quarterly*, 22(6), 1003-1024.
- Auliya, H., Abubakar, H. S., & Maliki, N. (2019). Pesantren and Tolerance: Looking at the Faces of Santri Tolerance in Babakan Ciwaringin Cirebon. *Jurnal Penelitian*, 127-136.
- Baidhawry, Z. (2015). Negara Pancasila Negara Syariah. *maarif*, 10(1), 41-57.
- Baswedan, A. R. (2004). Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory. *Asian Survey*, 44(5), 669-690.
- Berutu, A. G. (2020). *Formalisasi Syariat Islam Aceh dalam Tatahan Politik Nasional*. Pena Persada.
- Effendy, B. (2003). *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (No. 109). Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Feillard, A. (1997). Traditionalist Islam and the State in Indonesia. *Islam in an Era of Nation States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia*.
- Fitch, R., & Webb, S. (1989). Cultural Immersion in Indonesia through Pancasila: State Ideology. *The Journal of Educational Thought (JET) / Revue De La Pensée Éducative*, 23(1), 44-51. Retrieved January 20, 2020, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23768636>
- Fitriyono, E. N., & Suhono, S. (2017). Wacana Negara Islam: Kajian Kritis Kontruksi Pemikiran Khilafah Ala Hizbut Tahrir. *Ri'ayah: Jurnal Sosial dan Keagamaan*, 2(02), 43- 55.

- Hafidhuddin, D. (2021). *Tafsir al-Hijri: Kajian Tafsir Al-Qur'an Surat an-Nisa'*. Jakarta: Logos. Hanum, C. (2017). Analisis Yuridis terhadap Asas-Asas Pembentukan dan Asas-Asas Materi Muatan Peraturan Daerah: Kajian Perda Syariah di Indonesia. *IN RIGHT: Jurnal Agama dan Hak Asasi Manusia*, 7(1). 41-67.
- Iqbal, M. M. (2014). Dinamika Wacana Formalisasi Syariat dalam Politik: Ikhtiar Menemukan Relevansi Relasi Agama dan Negara Perspektif Indonesia. *Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan*, 22(1), 83-104.
- Jaelani, J., & Hum, M. (2015). Kontroversi Khilafah: Islam, Negara, dan Pancasila. *Jurnal Sosioteknologi*, 14(2).
- Jati, W. R. (2013). Permasalahan Implementasi Perda Syariah dalam Otonomi Daerah. *Al-Manahij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam*, 7(2), 305-318.
- KAMALI, M., & KAMALI, M. (1993). Characteristics of The Islamic State. *Islamic Studies*, 32(1), 17-40. Retrieved January 31, 2021, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20840105>
- Kersten, C. (2009). Indonesia's New Muslim Intellectuals. *Religion Compass*, 3(6), 971-985.
- Lufaei, L. (2017). Rekonstruksi Jargon Formalisasi Syariat: Upaya Menjaga Persatuan dalam Bingkai Keberagaman. *Al-A'raf: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam dan Filsafat*, 14(1), 73- 90.
- Maghfur, M., & Mumun Muniroh, S. (2013). Women Behind Terrorists (Religiosity, Self Adaptation and Husband-Wife Relationship within Suspected Terrorists Family in Pekalongan). *Analisa: Journal of Social Science and Religion*, 20(2), 181-195.
- Mas'udi, M., F., (2014). Khilaf di Seputar Khilafah. *Risalah*, 49(4), 51.
- Morfit, M. (1981). Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government. *Asian Survey*, 21(8), 838-851.
- Muhtada, D. (2014). Perda Syariah di Indonesia: Penyebaran, Problem dan Tantangannya. *Sharia bylaw in Indonesia: The Spread, Problems and Challenges*), paper delivered in a scientific speech in the framework of the Anniversary VII of the Faculty of Law, Semarang State University on December, 4.
- Mujahid, D. R. (2014). Terpasung Kasih Sayang: Studi Kasus Pengaruh Ikatan Keluarga dalam Proses Deradikalisasi Mantan Teroris Remaja.
- Nurrohman Syarif, N. (2012). Formalisasi Syariat Islam di Indonesia. *Al-Risalah*, 12(1), 79- 92.
- Osman, F. (1983). Parameters of the Islamic State. *Arabia: The Islamic World Review*, (17).
- Prawiranegara, S. (1984). Pancasila as the Sole Foundation. *Indonesia*, (38), 74-83. doi:10.2307/3350846.

- Pristiani, Y. D., & Lestari, S. N. (2019). Komik Digital Sebagai Salah Satu Alternatif Pembelajaran Anti Paham Radikalisme Untuk Siswa SMP Di Kediri. *PINUS: Jurnal Penelitian Inovasi Pembelajaran*, 5(1), 108-117.
- Qodir, Z. (2016). Kaum Muda, Intoleransi, dan Radikalisme Agama. *Jurnal Studi Pemuda*, 5(1), 429-445.
- Raillon, F. (2011). The Return of Pancasila: Secular vs. Islamic Norms, Another Look at the Struggle for State Dominance in Indonesia. *The Politics of Religion in Indonesia*, 92- 113, dalam Picard, M., & Madinier, R. (Eds.). (2011). *The Politics of Religion in Indonesia: Syncretism, Orthodoxy, and Religious Contention in Java and Bali* (Vol. 33). Routledge.
- Ramage, D. E. (1997). *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance* (Vol. 8). Psychology Press.
- Rudnykyj, D. (2010). Post-Pancasila Citizenship. In *Spiritual Economies: Islam, Globalization, and the Afterlife of Development* (pp. 189-220). Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press. Retrieved January 31, 2021, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt7zhbn.9>.
- Saerozi, A & Hasyim, M., S. (2007). Konstruksi Ideologis dan Pola Jaringan Organisasi Mahasiswa Islam Fundamental di Surabaya. *Istiqra'*, 6(1), 62.
- Salim, A. (2008). *Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia*. University of Hawai Press.
- Sarwono, S. W. (2012). *Terorisme di Indonesia: Dalam Tinjauan Psikologi*. Pustaka Alvabet.
- Steenbrink, K. A. (1999). The Pancasila Ideology and an Indonesian Muslim Theology of Religions. *Muslim Perceptions of Other Religions: A Historical Survey*, 280-96.
- Suharso, P. (2006). Pro Kontra Implementasi Perda Syariah (Tinjauan Elemen Masyarakat). *Al-Mawarid Journal of Islamic Law*, 16, 566-30.
- Suharso, Pro Kontra Implementasi Perda Syariah (Tinjauan Elemen Masyarakat). *Al-Mawarid Journal of Islamic Law*, 16, 7(2) 2013: 305-318.
- Suryadinata, L. (2018). *Pancasila and the Challenge of Political Islam: Past and Present*. ISEAS- Yusof Ishak Institute.
- Tønnessen, T. (2019). The Islamic State after the Caliphate. Perspectives on Terrorism, 13(1), 2-11. Retrieved January 31, 2021, from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26590503>

Interview

Freddy, Nadia, Fikri, Rizki, Khalimah, dan Taufik.