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The Credibility Of Hadith In Political Conflicts After The 2024 Presidential Election

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Abstract

The pre-election conflict became a post-presidential political dispute having not subsided, starting with Jokowi's intervention in the Constitutional Court decision number 90/PUU-XXI/2023 which qualified Gibran to be Prabowo's vice president. As a result, communication between political figures became deadlocked, and involved President Prabowo directly and even the Indonesian people through the media. No scholarly writing has attempted to break this communication deadlock through the perspective of hadith. This article seeks to reveal the credibility of hadith through its universal and specific messages, namely that hadith has the power and capability to be trusted, and can be used as a normative and practical guide to break the deadlock between the conflicting parties, by outlining the origins of the post-election conflict until the emergence of its effects specifically, because existing research has not revealed it. To analyze the communication in question, this study uses political communication theory with the content analysis method, namely analyzing the text and content of hadith and the communication of the conflicting parties and then examining the relevance of both. With the identified hadith interpretation strategy, this study shows that hadith has credibility that can normalize political disputes between political figures, among the people, and the people with the government involving the media. Some hadith credibly have universal value, and specific messages become principles and formulas needing to be implemented immediately. The hadith in question include: (1) hadith as a principle for conflicting political figures and the people; (2), specific hadith for conflicting political figures; (3) specific hadith for the people; pros and cons and especially the media; and (4), specific hadith for leaders who can soften the hearts of the people.

Keywords: Credibility Hadith, Conflict, Post-Presidential Election , Political Communication.

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INTRODUCTION

Direct presidential elections (Pilpres) began in 2004. By 2024, five presidential elections had taken place, each with a variety of ripples and colors, encompassing lobbying by political figures, party coalitions, and the issues behind each presidential and vice-presidential candidate. All of these politically charged activities contributed to the enlivening of Indonesia's democratic process. Of the five direct presidential elections during the reform era, there were at least two

tense ones, in 2019 and 2024, as grassroots involvement led to mutual insults and vilification on social media and in the real world, even triggering violence due to differing choices for presidential and vice-presidential candidates (Darmawan, 2024; Maharani & Nurafifah, 2020, pp. 393–395; Nivada & Rassanjani, 2024, pp. 37–39).

The last presidential election, held on February 14, 2024, had its own unique character. Although religious issues arose because candidate pair number 01 Anis Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar were considered to ‘represent’ the Islamist group (Bachtiar, 2023). In fact, the battle in this presidential election was not only between Islamists, but also between fellow nationalists, as candidate pair number 03 Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD also faced candidate pair number 02 Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka. After the election of candidate pair number 02 as president and vice president for 2024-2029, ripples and buzzes of political conflict between fellow nationalists emerged and have not subsided.

The post-2024 presidential election conflict is clearly visible, starting with the nomination of Gibran as Prabowo’s running mate. The Constitutional Court (MK) seems to have circumvented the rule regarding the age of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, which was originally a minimum of 40 years old, so that this age is not the minimum limit if there are certain reasons, for example, the candidate has been or is currently a state administrator (Christina Situmeang et al., 2024; Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2023; Munawaroh, 2023). This means that anyone can become a presidential and vice-presidential candidate even if they are not yet 40 years old, as long as they have been/are currently serving as a regional head, for example. In fact, candidate pair number 02 won and was inaugurated as president and vice president on October 20, 2024 (Ministry of State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 2024). After that, the existing friction did not subside but even escalated into conflict.

Based on this, the post-2024 presidential election dispute, viewed and analyzed through hadith, is interesting to study for several reasons: *first*, the rift in the relationship between the 7th Indonesian president Jokowi and the 5th Indonesian president Megawati; *second*, the arrest of PDIP secretary general Hasto Kristiyanto by the Corruption Eradication Commission on February 20, 2025; *third*, the issue of twin suns; metaphorical dualism of leadership; *fourth*, the emergence of demands from retired TNI to impeach Vice President Gibran having given rise to polemics down to the grassroots, and *fifth*, no one has yet examined the credibility of hadith to handle the dispute.

This article utilizes qualitative research based on a literature review; journals, books, verified news, and documentation related to the post-2024 presidential election conflict. The conflict is interpreted within the framework of communication between national figures influencing the people. This research will explore this issue and then contextualize the hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) by attempting to discern their substance. The hadiths will be analyzed linguistically, examined in their context at the time, and then implemented in the present day to achieve its goal, namely that the hadiths remain a reliable source capable of normalizing the conflict occurring.

To understand the communication between the aforementioned figures, this study uses political communication theory (Mc Nair, 2018, pp. 3–14, 52) as a form of communication, then analyzes the hadith and extracts its main values and messages contextually to normalize or mediate the dispute in question. This study uses content analysis on the contents of the document by systematically and objectively examining various forms of existing communication; (Satori & Komariah, 2020) both text and news. Content analysis also constructs various data in meaning (Kutha Ratna, 2016, p. 362). The contents of the document will be criticized in depth to arrive at the correct conclusion.

The problems of the presidential election have been studied by several authors. Wardhana looked at the dynamics of the election in the historical span of 1955-2019 (Wardhana, 2023). Maharani and Nuraifah examined political communication that gave birth to power and threats in the media in the 2019 election (Maharani & Nuraifah, 2020). Andar Nubowo on the explanation of the conservative political trajectory in Islam in the 2019 Presidential Election (Andar Nubowo, 2020, pp. 110–111). Bahrul Ulum emphasized the role of political elites in reconciling identity politics conflicts after the 2019 presidential election (Bahrul Ulum, 2024, p. 33). From these writings, there has been no specific research on the credibility of the hadith on the conflict after the 2024 presidential election.

Nivada and Rasanjani examined the political and security mapping of the 2024 election, focusing on the political and security risks before the 2024 election as an early warning system and its implications. Their research focuses more on the early warning system. Their study addresses the controversy surrounding Gibran's appointment as vice presidential candidate and the impeachment of President Jokowi at the time, as well as the potential polarization within the community (Nivada & Rasanjani, 2024). This article, however, more specifically examines the post-election conflict, escalating into conflict for several reasons mentioned. Specifically,

this study aims to analyze this situation so that the conflict is expected to be unsustainable through the Hadith.

Why is the above background important to study? Because the political conflict after the presidential election has not yet been studied through the study of hadith. In this study, the hadith serve as a moral guideline, and it is hoped that this social phenomenon can be normalized. This is part of the contribution of hadith specifically and Islamic studies in general to the current situation.

DISCUSSIONS

The Historical Trajectory of Presidential Elections in Indonesia

The Indonesian nation, through *its founding fathers*, has chosen the form of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as a democratic state based on Pancasila as outlined in the 1945 Constitution (Suparjo, 2022, pp. 671–672). This system resulted in the presidential succession being carried out through general elections with a five-year cycle. Despite various security and stability conditions, general elections during the Old Order era could only be held in 1955, with two elections: parliamentary elections and constituent elections. The rest of the leadership was governed by guided democracy after the issuance of the presidential decree of July 5, 1959 (Sugitanata and Abdul Majid, 2021, pp. 3–5).

The election in the early days of the New Order in 1971 was followed by 10 parties, then in subsequent elections in this era, the parties involved in the general election were limited following the diffusion of existing parties into 3 major parties, namely the United Development Party (PPP), the Party of Functional Groups (Golongan Karya or Golkar) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) (Ikrar, 2003, pp. 10–11). Elections during this period were held 6 times, and 1 time during the reform transition period in 1999. In all elections during the New Order era, Golkar was always the winner because it was supported by the regime (Masuhara Ayako, 2016). In all elections from the Old Order to the reform transition period, the Indonesian people still elected their representatives in the MPR and DPR, then these representatives elected the president (MIETZNER, 2010; Wardhana, 2023). In practice, for 59 years since Indonesia's independence from 1945 to 2004, the Indonesian people have never elected a president directly.

The realization of direct presidential and vice-presidential elections was only implemented in 2004. Until 2024, presidential elections have been held 5 times, namely in 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019 and 2024. Of these presidential elections, the 2019 one was very strong in

terms of religious issues, resulting in polarization (Tegarpandhiga Nugroho et al., 2022, p. 72). Not only that, the incumbent Jokowi finally recruited KH Ma'ruf Amin as his vice-presidential candidate to show his identity as a true Muslim (Andar Nubowo, 2020; Bahrul Ulum, 2024), even Jokowi and his family went on Umrah.

Political Conflicts before the 2024 Presidential Election

Lobbying between party leaders moved along with the escalating political pre-presidential election, and coalition changes between parties occurred at any time in determining the candidate pair. The Democratic Party initially joined the Change and Unity Coalition (KPP) with Nasdem and PKS, nominating Anis as a presidential candidate, eventually moving to the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (KIM), after the change coalition nominated Muhaimin as Anis's vice presidential candidate following PKB's joining the Change coalition after leaving KIM (Gunanto, 2024, pp. 60, 65–66). To some extent, the political battle in determining Anis's vice presidential candidate also heated up the KIM with the KPP, but it did not last long.

This situation is more due to the exchange of parties willing to form coalitions. PKB from KIM moved coalition to KPP while Democrat changed coalition from KPP to KIM. This is because the three presidential candidates aforementioned already have party coalitions supporting them, and their supporters on social media have been visible since October 2022 (Asno Azzawagama Firdaus et al., 2024, pp. 3–4). The problem of changing party coalition members in both KPP and KIM is more due to who will be nominated as a vice presidential candidate. PDIP was earlier possible to join the Gerindra coalition, but this did not happen because each had a presidential candidate, and no one wanted the vice presidential position. The gap between PDIP and Gerindra opens the opportunity for anyone to become Prabowo's vice presidential candidate.

Jokowi, as president, saw an opportunity for a vice presidential candidate to nominate a candidate he approved, and ultimately his own son, Gibran, accompanied Prabowo to ensure the continuity of his political programs and policies (Sutrisno & Linda Tunaerah, 2024, pp. 40–41, 43). Meanwhile, the PDIP coalition with the PPP determined Mahfud as the vice presidential candidate to accompany Ganjar. What is interesting is that Jokowi's process of appointing his son as vice presidential candidate became the beginning of the conflict. The realization of this idea became a polemic among members of the Constitutional Court (MK) and was then

questioned by the PDIP coalition (Editorial Team, 2023) and finally involved academics and legal practitioners led by Jimly Asshiddiqie in reporting it to the Constitutional Court's Honorary Council (MKMK). Meanwhile, the public also polemicized about the change in age qualifications considered to be politically motivated (Christina Situmeang et al., 2024; Perdana & Imam, 2023, pp. 71, 73, 83–85; Sutrisno & Linda Tunaerah, 2024).

The seeds of conflict had emerged before the age issue above, namely that Jokowi's term could be extended to 3 terms, but was stopped because it had the potential to threaten the future of the constitution, stability and legitimacy of democracy in Indonesia (Retanisa Rizqi, 2024, pp. 59, 67–68). According to Mietzner, Jokowi has people supporting him because of the majoritarianism he embraces (MIETZNER, 2025, p. 10). Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court's decision on age occurred close to the 2024 presidential election so that the people understood the decision to have political nuances involving Jokowi (Ais Shafiyah Asfar et al., 2025, pp. 1, 4–5). This context makes the conflict after the 2024 presidential election continue to become a political conflict.

Political Conflict after the 2024 Presidential Election

Prabowo-Gibran's victory with 58.59% of the vote was the entry point for conflict into a dispute between figures such as Jokowi with Megawati and her PDI-P which directly involved President Prabowo. The conflict must not have to be in the form of physical clashes but rather non-physical forms such as disputes, arguments, and verbal clashes of ideas, as well as understanding (Language Development and Fostering Agency (Language Center), 2012). Although this non-physical conflict has the potential to lead to physical conflict, it has drained the energy of the nation's children because it involves various elements of the people in an endless polemic.

The Constitutional Court's decision number 90/PUU-XXI/2023 regarding the results of the 2024 presidential election was rejected by the coalition of candidate pair 01 KPP and the coalition of candidate pair 03 Ganjar. Both candidate pairs with their respective teams jointly challenged the presidential election results and the KPU's determination of the elected president and vice president, although the lawsuits of both teams were rejected because all of them lacked convincing evidence according to the Constitutional Court (Permata Sari & Anggi Muliawati, 2023). The Constitutional Court's decision to reject the above lawsuit automatically validated

the Indonesian KPU's decision number 360 of 2024 regarding Prabowo-Gibran as the elected president and vice president in the 2024 presidential election. This does not mean that the dispute has stopped; in fact it is still continuing and even involves other national figures such as retired TNI officers regarding Gibran's position as vice president having become a polemic to this day. From the description above, there are at least four circumstances causing the dispute in question to potentially continue.

a. The Crack in Relations Between Megawati and Jokowi

The rift in their relationship in the 2024 presidential election due to the lack of alignment between the image of reform carried by Jokowi and Megawati's political legacy has created disharmony having the potential to affect the position of the PDI-P in the 2024 presidential election, and public perception of the two figures. Apart from Gibran's participation as Prabowo's vice presidential candidate, incompatibility in government programs, and the friction of authority and power between Jokowi and Megawati, (Rifat Syifa, 2024; Yeremia Tulude Ambat & Fanny Lesmana, 2024, pp. 251, 258, 262) also caused the rift in their relationship.

The rift in their relationship lies in their political communication from two aspects. The first is their positions. Megawati, the party's general chairperson, felt that Jokowi was her cadre, and a cadre should follow the direction of her leader, especially since Megawati was much more senior than Jokowi and also the 5th president of Indonesia. On the other hand, Jokowi was the active president of the Republic of Indonesia (at that time), which meant he had the prerogative to determine matters within his authority as president, without any intervention. Although in making decisions, Jokowi was very likely to ask for advice from the Presidential Advisory Council (Watimpres) or even other influential figures, although the final decision remained in the hands of the president;

The second is the continuation of programs and policies. Megawati, as the general chairperson of the PDI-P, has her own plans for the presidential candidate to succeed Jokowi for the 2024-2029 term, to continue implementing the party's programs for the advancement of the Indonesian nation. Meanwhile, Jokowi seems hesitant about the PDI-P candidate continuing the programs and policies he has implemented for two terms. This situation is what led Jokowi to support Prabowo, his political opponent in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, over Ganjar, who comes from the same womb as him, the PDI-P. Prabowo himself has learned—

according to his own admission—that (Liputan6, 2024) and supported Jokowi during his second term in power (2019-2024) by being willing to become Minister of Defense.

b. The arrest of Hasto, Secretary General of the PDI-P

The Harun Masiku bribery case against former KPU Commissioner Wahyu Setiawan after the 2019 legislative elections involved Hasto. Efforts to name Hasto as a suspect have been ongoing since 2020 (Adiyanto & Nuzuli, 2020, pp. 66, 68, 78). Adiyanto and Nuzuli revealed that Tempo (2020) assessing that Harun Masiku was not arrested because there was a powerful group, i.e. PDI-P, also involving several institutions including the president (Jokowi) as part of *the framing*, (Adiyanto & Nuzuli, 2020) is not entirely accurate when viewed from the communication pattern between President Jokowi and PDI-P at that time.

Hasto's status as a suspect in the Harun Masiku case reflects Jokowi and Prabowo's communication pattern, which resulted in the continuation of programs, policies, and decisions that existed during Jokowi's time in office. This means that President Prabowo is attempting to continue his campaign slogans. Therefore, there is no indication of an attempt to bring down the PDI-P. Therefore, the process of naming Hasto as a suspect is based on data, facts, and applicable law, even though Hasto was ultimately released under President Prabowo's amnesty.

However, in other aspects, communication between Megawati and Jokowi has been strained, making it difficult to meet after the presidential election. The effects of this fractious political communication can be seen in three aspects: *first*, Hasto's questioning as a witness in the Harun Masiku case in June 2024, while Jokowi was still president, likely stemming from Hasto's criticism of the presidential election process during the presidential and vice-presidential candidate selection process;

Second, the non-involvement of PDI-P in the Prabowo-Gibran cabinet - even though there were no problems between Prabowo and Megawati - indicates that this party will take the same opposition steps as in the Susilo Bambang Yudoyono era; 2004 and 2009 (Hasto Kristiyanto, Satya Arinanto, 2023); *third*, PDI-P firmly dismissed Jokowi and his family (Gibran and Bobby) on December 16, 2024, then Hasto was named a suspect on December 24, 2024. This chronology needs to be analyzed in more detail. It appears that Jokowi's political communication with Megawati-PDI-P has reached the peak of rift.

c. The Twin Suns Issue in Prabowo's Administration

President Prabowo Subianto's leadership has received the full support of President Jokowi. The transition process has become a polemic before and after the presidential election, giving rise to diverse perceptions, giving rise to the issue of twin suns, but no one has specifically researched it because this issue is relatively new. Foreign media published an opinion piece about The Straits Times in Singapore titled "*Prabowo, Jokowi and the question of the power of 'two suns': Is Indonesia returning to the politics of twin power centers?*" (Johannes Nugroho, 2025).

This assumption is based, for example, on President Prabowo and Vice President Gibran's visit to Jokowi before announcing the 2024-2029 cabinet lineup. In fact, 17 ministers from Jokowi's administration are in the current cabinet. Several Prabowo ministers' visits to Jokowi in Solo, as well as a visit by the National Police's Sespimen (Middle Leadership and Staff College), add to the growing number of issues. While these visits are understandable, they can be interpreted differently in the post-presidential reform era, often leading to various interpretations, including the aforementioned twin suns issue.

d. Retired TNI Officers Demand Gibran's Impeachment

After Eid al-Fitr on March 31, 2025, retired TNI officers demanded the impeachment of Vice President Gibran on April 17, 2025, in a *balal bi balal atmosphere*. The call received support from their senior figures, including the 6th vice president, Tri Sutrisno. Around 332 signatures were affixed by retired middle and high-ranking officers regarding the impeachment in question, following 7 other demands (Sultan Abdurrahman, 2025) which also enlivened the debate among TNI members - both retired and active -, national figures, and the people. This condition has not received specific and in-depth attention even though there have been articles from a legal perspective, (Risman Setiawan, 2025, p. 3773) while in the mass media, especially on social media, it has been filled with various opinions.

A Hadith Normalizing Political Conflict after the Presidential Election

To maintain good relations between the aforementioned figures and among the people, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) instilled several values in the hadith to normalize the conflicts having arisen. The efforts implemented in the hadith are relevant and much needed in this era of information overload, as political contestation has given rise to conflict and impacted

the lives of the Indonesian people.

The description of conditions after the 2024 presidential election above requires at least principles and formulas based on the hadith of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) to prevent ongoing conflict, which can be divided into: *first*, hadith as a principle for both figures and the people; *second*, hadith relevant to the situation of political figures; *third*, hadith relevant to the situation of the people, including the media; and *fourth*, hadith relevant for leaders and the people.

Hadith regarding the Principles for Figures and the People

Principles in this context are core values that apply universally and can be implemented to address and normalize conflicts between conflicting leaders, leaders with their subjects, and among subjects themselves. The hadith in question is worthy of being practiced by both the aforementioned figures and the subjects themselves. The principles in question are as follows:

a. Justice.

The hadith orders everyone to act fairly, starting from themselves, towards their family (al-Bukhari, 1994, p. 1, 411; II 110-111). Likewise, leaders are required to act fairly to their people by not cheating them. The holy prophet saw said:

حَدَّثَنَا شَيْبَانُ بْنُ فَرُّوخَ حَدَّثَنَا أَبُو الْأَشْهَبِ، عَنْ الْحَسَنِ قَالَ: عَادَ عَبْدُ اللَّهِ بْنُ زِيَادٍ مَعْقِلَ بْنَ يَسَارٍ الْمُرِّيَّ فِي مَرَضِهِ الَّذِي مَاتَ فِيهِ. قَالَ مَعْقِلٌ: إِنِّي مُحَدِّثُكَ حَدِيثًا سَمِعْتُهُ مِنْ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ مَا مِنْ: وَسَلَّم لَوْ عَلِمْتُ أَنَّ لِي حَيَاةً مَا حَدَّثْتُكَ. إِنِّي سَمِعْتُ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ يَقُولُ عَبْدٌ يَسْتَرْعِيهِ اللَّهُ رَعِيَّةً، يَمُوتُ يَوْمَ يَمُوتُ وَهُوَ غَاشٌّ لِرَعِيَّتِهِ، إِلَّا حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ الْجَنَّةَ (al-Darimi, 2005, II, p. 222; Ibn Hanbal, n.d., V, p. 25; Muslim, 1992, I p. 80)

Ma'qil bin Yasār (d. 50 H) said: ... "I heard the Messenger of Allah say: "There is no servant whom Allah entrusts to lead the people, then he dies while cheating/deceiving his people, unless Allah forbids heaven for him."

Fragments of *وَهُوَ غَاشٌّ لِرَعِيَّتِهِ* is a barometer for a leader whether he acts fairly to his people or not. The measure of fairness can be *debated* in political lobbying, but a leader is considered fair if his decisions do not contain elements of deception, do not take personal advantage of his position, and do not influence the determination of the law for certain interests that are not in the public interest. The dispute after the 2024 presidential election arose from Jokowi's

intervention, especially in the Constitutional Court decision number 90/PUU-XXI/2023 considered to violate justice, so there is a legal way to prove his intervention because the Constitutional Court's decision is final and binding (Christina Situmeang et al, 2024, p. 611). In this regard, another hadith emphasizes that the judge's decision on something is based on evidence and data as well as the arguments of those seeking justice (al-Bukhari, 1994, II, pp. 131–132).

Justice manifested through communication between political figures influences relationships among citizens. The 2024 presidential election has passed, and the pursuit of justice can continue because legal avenues remain open if political figures and some citizens wish to prove Jokowi's intervention during that period. The principle of justice remains in place and must be upheld at all times. The election of Prabowo-Gibran is a separate matter, as both have been officially and legitimately inaugurated by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the House of Representatives (DPR). The government's current task is to implement programs that directly benefit the people. Bringing justice into play will help normalize post-election disputes stemming from previous issues. Furthermore, the people must also be fair in assessing the government's achievements. A balance between what the current government has done and what the people perceive is a meeting point for the meaning of justice.

b. Help each other

A government will function well if all elements participate and help. The greatest responsibility lies with the government, but political figures and the people also share responsibility because each of us is a leader (al-Bukhari, 1994, II, p. 71) . For political figures and the people, there are two aspects to helping the government: *first* , helping by supporting government programs that prioritize and improve the welfare of the public interest. Helping each other, helping each other, makes Allah SWT always be with them to help them, as the hadith excerpt:

وَاللَّهُ فِي عَوْنِ الْعَبْدِ، مَا كَانَ الْعَبْدُ فِي عَوْنِ أَخِيهِ

(al-Turmuzi, 2003, III, pp. 115–116) and Allah (always) helps His servant, (as long as) the servant helps his brother.

Because helping others means removing difficulties from them, this is one of the foundations

of society;

Second, helping by providing advice, feedback, and constructive criticism can even help political figures and the people prevent the government from acting tyrannically. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) said:

حَدَّثَنَا مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ عَبْدِ الرَّحِيمِ، حَدَّثَنَا سَعِيدُ بْنُ سُلَيْمَانَ، حَدَّثَنَا هُشَيْمٌ، أَخْبَرَنَا عُبَيْدُ اللَّهِ بْنُ أَبِي بَكْرٍ
 بْنُ أَنَسٍ، عَنْ أَنَسٍ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ قَالَ: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: أَنْصُرْ أَخَاكَ ظَالِمًا أَوْ
 مَظْلُومًا فَقَالَ رَجُلٌ: يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ، أَنْصُرُهُ إِذَا كَانَ مَظْلُومًا، أَفَرَأَيْتَ إِذَا كَانَ ظَالِمًا كَيْفَ أَنْصُرُهُ؟ قَالَ:
 تَحْجُزُهُ أَوْ تَمْنَعُهُ مِنَ الظُّلْمِ فَإِنَّ ذَلِكَ نَصْرُهُ

(al-Bukhari, 1994, IV, p. 234; also narrated by al-Turmuzi, 2003, IV, pp. 112–113; Ibn Hanbal, n.d., III, p. 99; Meanwhile, Muslim, 1993, II p. 525; al-Darimi, 2005, II, 214; and one of *the sanads* of Ibn Hanbal, III, 323-324, hadith from the companion Jabir d. 78 H)

From Anas ra (d. 93 H) said: The Messenger of Allah said: “Help your brother who is unjust or who has been wronged. So someone asked: O Messenger of Allah, I will help him if he is in a state of wrongdoing. So what do you think if he (is) the one who does wrong, how (can) I help him? The Holy Prophet answered: you prevent or forbid him from (doing) wrongdoing, then that (means) help (from you) for him.”

This hadith contains two explanations: (1) unjust people are usually more powerful, so the hadith emphasizes that the way to help people doing wrong is to prevent them. **تَحْجُزُهُ**, and those preventing it are called **الْحَاجِزَةُ** namely anyone preventing some people from committing injustice against others by separating them with evidence of truth (Ibn al-Asir, 1979, I, p. 345) ; (2) preventing in the context of being a controller of the running of the government. If Megawati with PDI-P wants to be in that position then this is actually very good as long as she becomes a controller of various Prabowo government policies that are based on a sense of justice, and for the sake of public welfare, not based on sentiment because Prabowo’s deputy is Gibran.

c. Differences in Interpretation of Intervention

Constitutional Court Decision No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023 constitutes Jokowi’s intervention. The question is whether this intervention is for himself and his family, or for the public interest. The public believes the Constitutional Court’s decision strengthens Jokowi’s

dynastic politics, while Jokowi's supporters view the decision as a legally recognized procedure. This is despite everyone knowing that the Constitutional Court's decision came close to the presidential election, thus benefiting Gibran (Perdana & Imam, 2023, pp. 84–85).

Jokowi and his supporters undoubtedly see the Constitutional Court's decision not simply as smoothing Gibran's path to the vice presidential presidency, but as more important: alongside Prabowo, Gibran is overseeing and continuing Jokowi's unfinished programs, which are in the public interest. Conversely, political figures and some citizens see it as not in the public interest. These two communication patterns provide their own reasons for the Constitutional Court's decision, but the Constitutional Court's decision is final and binding. This means there are differing interpretations of the meaning of a leader's intervention.

Referring to the implementation of hadith, the Holy Prophet as a leader sometimes made decisions and caused protests from friends, for example appointing Usāmah bin Zaid (d. 54 AH) to be the leader of the troops (al-Bukhari, 1994, III, p. 95) , and replaced Khālīd (d. 21 AH) with 'Alī (d. 40 AH) which caused Buraidah (d. 63 AH) to be angry in the history of al-Bukhārī:

حَدَّثَنِي مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ بَشَّارٍ حَدَّثَنَا رَوْحُ بْنُ عُبَادَةَ حَدَّثَنَا عَلِيُّ بْنُ سُوَيْدٍ بْنِ مَنجُوفٍ، عَنْ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ بُرَيْدَةَ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ قَالَ: بَعَثَ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ عَلِيًّا إِلَى خَالِدٍ لِيُقْبِضَ الْخُمْسَ، وَكُنْتُ أَبْغِضُ عَلِيًّا، وَقَدْ اغْتَسَلْتُ، فَقُلْتُ لِحَالِدٍ: أَلَا تَرَى إِلَى هَذَا، فَلَمَّا قَدِمْنَا عَلَى النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ ذَكَرْتُ ذَلِكَ لَهُ، فَقَالَ: يَا بُرَيْدَةُ أَتُبْغِضُ عَلِيًّا، فَقُلْتُ: نَعَمْ، قَالَ: لَا تُبْغِضْهُ، فَإِنَّ لَهُ فِي الْخُمْسِ أَكْثَرَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ

(al-Bukhari, 1994, p. 72; also narrated by Ibn Hanbal, n.d., V, p. 259)

Buraidah bin Ḥuṣaib (d. 63 AH) said: The holy Prophet sent 'Alī (d. 40 AH) to (following) Khālīd (d. 21 AH) to take *khums* , and I hated 'Alī. And after I had bathed, I asked Khālīd: don't you see (opinion) about this? When we arrived (met) the holy Apostle I mentioned (complained) to him. So he said: "O Buraidah, do you hate 'Alī? I answered: yes, the Holy Messenger of Allah answered: "Don't hate him, then indeed he (his right) in *khums* is more than that."

Both Usamah and Ali were close relatives of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), and the Holy Prophet's decision was based on both of their capacities and was based on law. Buraidah was finally not angry with Ali according to Ibn Ḥajar (d. 852 AH) after he heard the Holy Prophet's explanation (Ibn Hajar, 2000, VIII, p. 393) . The pattern of leader intervention

in this hadith does not legitimize Jokowi's intervention, but what is appropriate is to understand that different interpretations such as Buraidah's will certainly arise due to a set provision/rule. For those who disagree with Jokowi's intervention for whatever reason, it is appropriate to see the context of the difference in interpretation as in the hadith above, otherwise Jokowi and his supporters no longer continue to seek justification for the intervention.


Therefore, political figures and the public should not attempt to overturn the final decision that Gibran is vice president, but rather focus on Jokowi's intervention that led to it, and the legal arena remains open to questioning it. Therefore, the issue should not be the outcome of the intervention, but rather its cause, because the appointment of the president and vice president is final, unless there are violations in the performance of their duties. Therefore, the demands of retired military personnel to impeach Gibran must be based on whether or not he committed any violations.

The Credibility of Hadith Normalizes Conflicts between Political Figures

This article cites hadith from a *reliable source*, from the main book of hadith. Therefore, the selection of hadith related to normalizing the conflict in question covers two things: *first*, related to the value of hadith in terms of *sanad*. In this case, the existing hadith citations, if they come from the books of al-Bukhari and Muslim, are considered sufficient by following the opinion of the majority of hadith scholars; *second*, the context of the credibility of hadith is based on the values contained in the text of hadith which are universal. Although these hadith were born in the past, their substance and scope can be an offer to normalize political conflict, where each hadith can be used as a moral and value guide when normalizing the conflict in question.

Post-election political communication can be divided directly between Presidents Prabowo, Jokowi, Megawati, and retired TNI personnel. The figure below is a communication chart.

(Figure I interpreted from Christina Situmeang et al, 2024; Risman Setiawan, 2025; Yeremia Tulude Ambat & Fanny Lesmana, 2024; Ais Shafiyah Asfar et al, 2025; Adiyanto & Nuzuli, 2020) :



Political communication between Prabowo and anyone in this chart is not problematic, although it is easier with Jokowi (the thickest arrow), while it continues with Megawati and retired TNI officers. Meanwhile, political communication between Megawati, retired officers, and Jokowi is still deadlocked (dotted line), while Megawati and the TNI are still possible (small blurred arrow). The relationship between figures/leaders is one element in the political communication process (M. Perloff R, 2008, p. 8; Mufti, 2019, p. 169), although it is not the only one, but the goodness of their relationship certainly affects the people directly. Therefore, in the context of the credibility of the hadith normalizing conflict, the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) has a formula that is worth paying attention to and implementing.

Based on the chart above, these four figures acted as political communicators through their statements and policies, as well as recipients of information. The channels they used were the mass media or those close to them. These four figures served as sources for the public who received the effects of their statements and policies. The Hadith, in this context, provides guidance that their communication patterns should not be based on negative feelings and suspicion, thus fostering healthy political communication. In this regard, the Hadith offers the following advice.

a. *Silaturahmi* and Mediator

Several hadiths contain the virtue of *silaturahmi* (friendship), and extend it even to those breaking it, such as in the history of al-Bukhārī:

حَدَّثَنَا مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ كَثِيرٍ أَخْبَرَنَا سُفْيَانُ، عَنِ الْأَعْمَشِ وَالْحَسَنِ بْنِ عَمْرٍو وَفَطْرٍ، عَنْ مُجَاهِدٍ، عَنْ

عَبْدُ اللَّهِ بْنُ عَمْرِو قَالَ سُفْيَانُ لَمْ يَرْفَعَهُ الْأَعْمَشُ إِلَى النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ وَرَفَعَهُ حَسَنٌ وَفَطْرٌ،
 عَنِ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قَالَ: لَيْسَ الْوَاصِلُ بِالْمُكَافِي، وَلَكِنَّ الْوَاصِلُ الَّذِي إِذَا قُطِعَتْ رَحْمَةُ
 وَصَلَهَا

(al-Bukhari, 1994, IV, p. 59; al-Sijistani, II, 2003, p. 59; al-Turmuzi, III, 2003, p. 364; Ibn Hanbal, t.th., II, p. 163)

From Abdullah bin ‘Amr (d. 65 H), the Holy Prophet said: “It is not the person who connects (silaturahmi) who reciprocates equally (because of the good he has received), but the person who connects (silaturahmi) is that when his affection is cut off, he continues it.”

Except with President Prabowo, the other three parties—Jokowi, Megawati, and retired generals—certainly find it difficult to initiate or maintain relationships. This requires a third party to act as a mediator. President Prabowo began renewing his relationship with both Megawati and Jokowi on Eid al-Fitr 2025, and attended an invitation of *halal bi halal* held by Retired TNI. Prabowo further ‘involved’ his obedient son in carrying out the mission. Didit’s visit to Jokowi and Megawati (*Didit Prabowo Visits Megawati and Jokowi, This is the Meaning*, 2025) took place in two contexts: *first*, to visit during Eid al-Fitr; *second*, to continue his father’s political communication with both parties. Didit attempted to play the role of mediator.

However, Didit’s position is still not considered a mediator, because a mediator, like a neutral person, does not take sides. In this situation, a mediator needed the one who is calming, reconciling, respected by both parties, and most importantly, neutral. This is what the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) alluded to in the narration of al-Bukhari:

حَدَّثَنَا عَبْدُ الْعَزِيزِ بْنُ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ حَدَّثَنَا إِبْرَاهِيمُ بْنُ سَعْدٍ، عَنْ صَالِحٍ، عَنْ ابْنِ شِهَابٍ أَنَّ حُمَيْدَ بْنَ
 عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ أَخْبَرَهُ أَنَّ أُمَّهُ أُمَّ كُثُومٍ بِنْتُ عُقْبَةَ أَخْبَرَتْهُ أَنَّهَا سَمِعَتْ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ
 يَقُولُ: لَيْسَ الْكَذَّابُ الَّذِي يُصْلِحُ بَيْنَ النَّاسِ، فَيَنْمِي خَيْرًا أَوْ يَقُولُ خَيْرًا

(al-Bukhari, 1994, II, p. 134–135; Ibn Hanbal, n.d., VI, p. 403; Muslim, 1993, II, p. 533)

That Umm Kulṣūm bint ‘Uqbah (d. 36-40 H) heard the Messenger of Allah say: “it is not (called) a liar someone who makes peace between people (who are at war), so he conveys kindness or speaks kindly (to the warring parties).”

In the word ينمي (*yanmi*), according to the majority of scholars, the letter *mim* is read as

kasrah intersecting with the word النميمة for example, words نميته (*nammaithu*) The first spreads the conversation in the form of problems to seek goodness while the second is in the form of damage, incitement. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalanī categorizes mediators between two people who are in conflict as having two patterns: (1) informing both parties of good things while covering up the bad things between them; (2) diplomacy in the context of goodness (Ibn Hajar, 2000, V, pp. 638–639). These two things are standard patterns for neutral mediators because what is aimed at is peace.

The political communication between the four parties mentioned above has not yet involved other national figures, such as religious, organizational, tribal, and traditional figures. These figures could act as mediators in the hadith, while ministers and political figures should be excluded to maintain neutrality and hopefully achieve the goal of reconciliation between the four parties.

b. Managing Anger and Forgiving Each Other

The demand to impeach Gibran was seemingly “responded” to the plan to transfer Tri Sutrisno’s son, Lieutenant General Kunto Arif Wibowo, but this did not materialize, indicating the twin suns issue. This means that the conflict after the 2024 presidential election still leaves anger, as it is impossible for the conflict to continue if the anger has disappeared from the parties in question. The role of mediators in reconciling the parties in question includes neutralizing so that their anger subsides, and most importantly, this begins with each of the conflicting parties. In this context, the hadith of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) regarding the prohibition of anger can be a reference.

حَدَّثَنِي يَحْيَى بْنُ يُوسُفَ حَدَّثَنِي يَحْيَى بْنُ يُوسُفَ أَخْبَرَنَا أَبُو بَكْرِ هُوَ ابْنُ عِيَّاشٍ، عَنْ أَبِي حَصِينٍ،
عَنْ أَبِي صَالِحٍ، عَنْ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ: أَنَّ رَجُلًا قَالَ لِلنَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: أَوْصِنِي،
قَالَ: لَا تَغْضَبْ، فَرَدَّدَ مَرَارًا قَالَ: لَا تَغْضَبْ

(al-Bukhari, 1994, IV, p. 79; Ibn Hanbal, n.d.)


From Abu Hurairah (d. 59 H) that someone asked the holy Prophet for advice. He answered: “Don’t be angry” so he repeatedly said: “Don’t be angry”.

Anger leads people to break off relationships, prevent gentleness, and sometimes has the potential to torture others according to Ibn al-Tīn (d. 611 H) (Ibn Hajar, 2000, XII, p. 150). In psychology, anger that is managed and can subside will make someone feel connected (Sophie
The Credibility Of Hadith...305-331 (Assagaf, Ja'far)

L. Kjærvi & Brad J. Bushman, 2024, pp. 2, 11) so that it is easy to forgive others resulting in the above deadlocked communication being resolved. Forgiving immediately is not easy, but anger having subsided is a positive thing for maintaining relationships. Between calming anger and relationships between the conflicting parties, the mediator can adjust which conditions he will take first with these figures. Repeated relationships may be prioritized because through this the anger of those in conflict will subside. It may be necessary to have several visits in a relaxed and family atmosphere.

A Hadith Normalizing Political Disputes in the Media and among the People

The conflicting figures following the 2024 presidential election have sparked a prolonged controversy among the public, particularly on social media, as each side has supporters with diverse mindsets. In addition to the public, the media, both print and electronic, play a crucial role in communicating the political messages of these figures. The media is central to political communication and a conduit for political messages (Mc Nair, 2018, pp. 15, 18) both between figures, figures and the people, and among the people. The following is an illustration of this communication in a diagram (elaborated on M. Perloff R, 2008; Mc Nair, 2018; Mufti, 2019):



The chart above shows that political communication among the people originates from the media, sourced from the four parties. All political messages from these four parties are conveyed through the media to the people. Meanwhile, the people continue to engage in polemics; the four small arrows in the box labeled “people” illustrate this. What the people say will then be conveyed to the four parties through the media. In the digital era, the people can

become media outlets through social media and express their opinions, even if their sources come from official media outlets also having social media platforms, such as YouTube channels like Tempo, Kompas, and others. If political communication among the people derives its primary source of information from the media, the hadith of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) provides a formula for normalizing conflict between them.

a. Sorting News

The people and the media must first obtain news that is verified to be true, and then *share it* with others without immediately sharing it, as not everyone will receive the same understanding. Given the current state of political communication among prominent figures, the public must carefully sort through various media sources to maintain peace and mitigate conflict. This means that not all information received should be shared with others, even if it is true. The Hadith provides this guidance:

وَحَدَّثَنَا عَبْدُ اللَّهِ بْنُ مُعَاذٍ الْعَنْبَرِيُّ حَدَّثَنَا أَبِي. ح. وَحَدَّثَنَا مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ الْمُثَنَّى حَدَّثَنَا عَبْدُ الرَّحْمَنِ بْنُ مَهْدِيٍّ قَالَا: حَدَّثَنَا شُعْبَةُ، عَنْ حُبَيْبِ بْنِ عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ، عَنْ حَفْصِ بْنِ عَاصِمٍ، عَنْ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ؛ قَالَ: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: كَفَى بِالْمَرْءِ كَذِبًا أَنْ يُحَدِّثَ بِكُلِّ مَا سَمِعَ

(al-Sijistani, 2003, IV, p. 326; Muslim, 1992, I, p. 8)

Abu Hurairah said: The Messenger of Allah said: it is enough for a person (to be judged) to be lying if he narrates everything he hears.”

Although the media plays a very important role in conveying political messages from communicators - the four parties above -, the people as communicants (Mufti, 2019, pp. 170–171) must be able to sort and share things that can exacerbate conflict, especially on social media. The Indonesian people must be mature in receiving information from the media, one of which is by not informing everything they hear and know. People who inform everything they hear, according to al-Nawawi (d. 676 H), will make many mistakes, because in general what is heard contains both truth and lies (al-Nawawi, 2000, I, pp. 1, 72), *framing*. Moreover, if he adds his own opinions and interpretations, then information bias occurs and fellow citizens continue to fight without end.

b. Speaking/Writing Good Things

All people involved in polemics, especially the media, must use positive language when

expressing opinions and writing news/information about politics after the 2024 presidential election. Failure to do so will result in disputes between supporters of prominent figures, not just verbal ones, but also physical ones. The narration of Abdullah bin ‘Amr (d. 65 AH) should serve as a common reference:

حَدَّثَنَا عَبْدَانُ عَنْ أَبِي حَمْزَةَ عَنِ الْأَعْمَشِ عَنْ أَبِي وَائِلٍ عَنْ مَسْرُوقٍ عَنْ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ عَمْرٍو رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمَا قَالَ لَمْ يَكُنِ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَاحِشًا وَلَا مُتَفَحِّشًا وَكَانَ يَقُولُ إِنَّ مِنْ خِيَارِكُمْ أَحْسَنَكُمْ أَخْلَاقًا

(al-Bukhari, 1994, II, p. 309; al-Turmuzi, 2003, III, p. 393; Ibn Hanbal, n.d., II, p. 161; Muslim, II, 1993, p. 411)

From Abdullah bin ‘Amr ra said: The Holy Prophet was not a person who was cruel (in words) and liked to do cruel things, and he said: “Indeed, the best of you is the one who has the best (state of) morals (his).”

The word *فاحش* from *الْفَحْشُ* goes beyond in words and answers (arguing), so it falls into the category of dirty and low speech. Therefore *al-fuhṣy* is considered to have gone beyond the limits. While *متفحشا* who commits *al-fuhṣy* very deliberately (Ibn al-Asir, 1979, III, p. 415; Ibn Hajar, 2000, VIII, p. 271). Both *fahṣy* and *mutafahḥisy* show that the person, when speaking having no good value at all, will always defend one of the conflicting parties with dirty words and sentences actually exacerbating the existing conflict. In speaking, writing opinions and debating, every citizen must avoid the two traits above. If they are able to avoid them, the conflict in society and social media regarding politics after the 2024 presidential election can subside.

As intermediaries, the media must package news well, both in terms of headlines and content. It is perhaps inevitable that the media will lean toward one of the conflicting parties, given that they are politically biased, but they also exert cognitive influence and play a significant role in agenda-setting in modern democracies (McNair, 2018, pp. 75-78). This should be the guiding principle for all media outlets when publishing news *headlines*, using wording that discourages people from being easily provoked and leading to negative thoughts, thereby mitigating any conflict.

Hadith to Normalize Political Disputes

The political escalation following the 2024 presidential election has left conflict among citizens, both for and against. Leaders, in this case, must act fairly because they are all Indonesian citizens, unless they commit violations. The principle of justice from leaders to the people that needs to be immediately *broken down* in the current context is creating jobs, as promised during the campaign.

Creating employment opportunities is a mandate of the 1945 Constitution, for example, Articles 27 (2), 28A; D (2-3), and 34 (1-2), all of which refer to citizens' right to a prosperous life. This obligation of state leaders is in accordance with the hadith of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him):

حَدَّثَنَا عُبَيْدُ اللَّهِ بْنُ مُعَاذٍ الْعَنْبَرِيُّ حَدَّثَنَا أَبِي حَدَّثَنَا شُعْبَةُ عَنْ عَدِيِّ أَنَّهُ سَمِعَ أَبَا حَازِمٍ عَنْ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ عَنِ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ؛ أَنَّهُ قَالَ مَنْ تَرَكَ مَالًا فَلِلْوَرَثَةِ وَمَنْ تَرَكَ كَلًّا فَلَيْنَا

(Muslim, 1993, II, p. 59. Also found in al-Sijistani, 2003, III, p. 48; Ibn Hanbal, n.d., IV, p. 131; Ibn Majah, II, 2004, p. 114, from the companion Miqdām Abī Karīmah d. 87 H)

From Abu Hurairah, the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "Whoever leaves wealth, it is for his heirs, and whoever leaves a burden (debt) then it is on us (our responsibility)."

This hadith talks about the responsibility of leaders to settle the debts of people who are unable to pay them. According to Ibn Battāl (d. 449 H), the people have the right to participate in the wealth of the state (Ibn Battal, 2003, VII, p. 428) and in modern times the country's wealth is managed by creating many jobs, will have a direct effect on minimizing public conflict. The IMF report that unemployment in Indonesia is the highest in ASEAN; April 2024 reached 5.2% or around 7.20 million people (Merlin Swantamalo Magna et al, 2025, p. 3). The many available job opportunities automatically minimize unemployment, and this will greatly influence their understanding of the leader, so that political disputes will automatically be ignored because the people are busy with the various jobs they get.

CONCLUSION

This article describes that the political dispute between figures after the presidential election began with issues that have not satisfied all parties regarding the Constitutional Court decision number 90/PUU-XXI/2023. This study reveals that political communication between the conflicting parties is not all running smoothly and well. Prabowo's communication with

others is still good, while that between Jokowi with Megawati and retired TNI officers has become deadlocked. Meanwhile, the Indonesian people are divided into pros and cons in responding to it. This study found that the hadith of the Holy Prophet Muhammad SAW, although a source of Islamic teachings, has normative content functioning as a universal ethic in the socio-political context of the Indonesian nation, the hadith is credible enough to normalize the existing political disputes with four categories: *first*, the hadith becomes a principle for conflicting political figures and the community, including: (a) the hadith of being fair to everyone; (b) the hadith of helping each other; and (c) the hadith related to differences in interpretation regarding the intervention of leaders; *second*, specific hadith among conflicting political figures, including: (a) the hadith about friendship through mediators; (b) hadith related to managing anger and forgiveness; *third*, specific hadith for all people and especially the media, including: (a) hadith to sort out circulating information and news; (b) hadith to say good words including when writing on social media; and *fourth*, specific hadith so that leaders can soften the hearts of the people by prospering them as a mandate and responsibility of leaders by creating jobs. This research indicates that if all of these hadiths are implemented properly, they will be able to normalize and handle political conflict after the 2024 presidential election. This research focuses on understanding and offering hadith to normalize existing political conflict, and has not looked at aspects of political or economic interests.

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