

Rethinking the Book of *Al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* and Indonesian Political Phenomenon

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Abstract:

This article focuses on al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi's work and its relevance. It also touches the political phenomenon in Indonesia during 2016-2019 concerning "NKRI Bersyariah (Sharia Republic of Indonesia Unitary State)" discourse supported by FPI and "khalifah" discourse supported by HTI. The research method employed was qualitative one involving library research viewed from Pierre Bourdieu's perspective on habitus, field and distinction, and helped with interactive model of data analysis encompassing data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verifying. The result shows that al-Jabiri views qabilah, ghanimah and aqidah as the habituated keywords since pre-Islam times. The temperament was manifested into the fighting for realizing the ideologies (aqidah) of "NKRI bersyariah" initiated by FPI qabilah, and "khalifah" (transnational) initiated by HTI qabilah. These ideologies basically are the capitalism movement trading Islam (ghanimah) to interest group. The incarnation of al-Jabiri's terminology can be relevant to Indonesian political phenomenon.

Key Words: *Al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi, Phenomenon, Politics, Indonesia.*

INTRODUCTION

A work entitled *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi: Muhaddidatub wa Tajalliyatub* is an intellectual project by Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri included into *Naqd al-'Aql al-'Arabi*. This trilogy work known as al-Jabiri's *magnum opus* is the continuation of two previous books entitled *Takwin al-'Aql al-'Arabi* in 1984 and *Bunyab al-'Aql al-'Arabi* in 1986. Meanwhile, the book reviewed in this article, *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* was published four years later, in 1990 (Arfan 2010; Aziz 2015). The fourth book included into *Naqd al-'Arabi* is *al-'Aql al-Akhlaiqi al-'Arabi* (Abdullah, 2013; Arfan, 2010; Aziz, 2015). Importantly, the highlight should focus on "Arab political reasoning", meaning that the locus of research focuses on Arab civilization tradition and history itself. The first book on *Takwin* concentrates more on the history either epistemologically or ideologically in the creation of *bayani*, *irfani*, and *burhani* reasoning (including interaction within it and its urgency) (Abbas 2015; al-Jabiri 2009; Juliansyahzen 2019). The second book on *Bunyab* concentrates more on internal structure existing in *bayani*, *irfani*, and *burhani* in detail along with its epistemological base (al-Jabiri 2004). Muhammad Rofiq gives a little representation, that:

"He further explained that while the first two monumental books (*Takwin* and *Bunyab*) as part the theoretical the philosophy (*al-falsafah al-nazariyah*), the third book

(*al-'Aql al-Siyasi*) is a practical philosophy (*al-falsafah al-'amaliyah*)” (Rofiq, 2017: 56-57).

A fundamental difference between *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* and the two previous books will be discussed in this article. Then, the approach and method offered will be analyzed, therefore revealing the dimension or nature of philosophical thought that can be basic values. This article also tries to compare other methods and approaches to reveal the gaps of perspective in Islamic studies. Furthermore, this article sees the relevance of items produced by the work entitled *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi: Mubaddidatuh wa Tajalliyatuh* by Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri. The fundamental matter gotten from the book included into *Naqd al-'Aql al-'Arabi* is consistent with the meaning of theme, “Arab reasoning critique”, the spectrum of which starts with explaining reasoning formation, structure, and operational praxis in politics (relative to mastering and maintaining power) (Arfan, 2010: 96).

Operational praxis in politics in *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* focuses more on its reason than on what is aforementioned in this article. It also touches the political phenomenon in Indonesia during 2016-2019. The dynamic of political constellation between the representative of group fighting for Indonesia to be Islamic state legally-symbolically and the one fighting for Republic of Indonesia Unitary State (NKRI) has long been connected, borrowing Haedar Nashir’s terminology, to be theological and ideological continuation from pre-independence history to post-reform period today (Nashir, 2013: 452). Entering into the period 2016-2019 (the time border is a climax dynamics, considered as demonstration action of “Islam community in Indonesia” that could get many classes of sympathizers post-reform.), “NKRI Bersyariah” discourse began to down to earth again in Indonesia. Demonstration action was introduced by M. Rizieq Syihab in *Aksi Bela Islam III* (3rd Islam Defending Action) on December 2, 2016 (212 action and reconfirmed with 212 Reunion on December 2, 2017 (Arismunandar, 2019: 1). The confirmation to realize NKRI *Bersyariah* in living within religion, nation, and state was reemphasized during FPI’s 21st *milad* (21st anniversary) by M. Rizieq Syihab in his mandate concerning “NKI Bersyariah” concept (FPI 2019). . Rizieq Syihab emphasized that:

“I, as the Great Imam of *Front Pembela Islam* (Islam Defending Front), mandate all FPI leaders, activists, and cadres from all fighting wings throughout Indonesia to solidify our struggling steps, in this 21st anniversary, to establish fraternity and to safeguard our nation and state with *dakwah*, *biżbah* and constitutional *jihad*, to realize NKRI *Bersyariah* in living within religion, nation, and state (FPI 2019).

In the fifth paragraph of presidential Decree on July 15, 1959, in Syafii Maarif, Soekarno stated that:

“We believe that Jakarta Charter dated on June 22, 1945 inspired the 1945 Constitution and is an integral part of the Constitution” (Maarif 1985:177).

M. Rizieq Syihab assumed that Indonesia is a *Tauhid* (unity of God) state (FPI 2019), corresponding to Article 29 clause (1) of the 1945 Constitution mentioning that “*The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God*”. Behind it, there is another political phenomenon like HTI (ex-HTI) wanting to fight for “*khilafah*” (a transnational form of governmental system) (Osman, 2020: 604); it, of course, is very contradictory with Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) (Rosyid, 2015: 224) and Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah, 2015: 12) remaining to defend Indonesia as the Collective Consensus State.

This information is interesting to be put onto this article to indicate that *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* in al-Jabiri’s work should be studied thoroughly. The reason is that national

political phenomenon occurring around 2016-2019 contains some keywords that can be taken from the previous explanation, such as: *NKRI Bersyariah, Khilafah, Aksi Bela Islam*, and contestation (competition for power).

A previous study has been conducted on al-Jabiri by Ahmad Zohdi; this research addressed the main current of Islam epistemology divided into three typologies: *Bayani, Irfani*, and *Burbani* (Zohdi 2017: 26–35). The research studied two previous books: *Takwin al-'Aql al-'Arabi* and *Bunyah al-'Aql al-'Arabi* by al-Jabiri, the discussion of which was around knowledge epistemology issue. However, the study did not lead to the contextualization of Muslim community, particularly in this context in Indonesia. The study relevant to al-Jabiri's thought in Indonesia is the one conducted by Carool Kersten concerning *Turatsiyun* contributing to the transformation of *abl sunnah wa al-jama'ah*, from merely a doctrine (*madzhab*) to thinking method (*manhaj*). Furthermore, al-Jabiri's thinking is relevant in its discussion on discourse analysis and ideological critique conducted by traditionalist Muslim (NU) and helping create educational philosophy developed by modernist Islam thinker (Muhammadiyah) in Indonesia (Zaid Eyadat. et al 2018:149–67). But, Carool Kersten's research did not touch at all the reality of Muslim political reasoning in Indonesia.

Another study was conducted by Muhamad Rofiq analyzing in-depth the *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* work reviewing Arab political situation in the continuity of Islam history (Rofiq 2017:55–76). Rofiq's study has context similar to this study's, but it did not discuss at all the relevance of *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* to political phenomenon occurring in Indonesia factually. Considering this, there has been no research studying *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* Book Binoculars and touching the political phenomenon in Indonesia around 2016-2019 all at once, so that this research contributes to complement al-Jabiri thought's vocabularies. This reason is then summarized with the focus on *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* book binoculars and Indonesian political phenomenon around 2016-2019. The author's basic argumentation is that the phenomenon occurring in Indonesia is inseparable from Indonesian independence history and Arabis Islam political reasoning originally. The questions proposed in this article are, among others: firstly, what is offered by *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* Book?; secondly, how is it related to Indonesian political phenomenon in 2016-2019?

This article is included into a qualitative research type involving library research approach, as it not only reviews *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* but also sees its relevance to and reflection on political phenomenon occurring in Indonesia around 2016-2019 helped with interactive data analysis encompassing data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verifying (Matthew B Miles, A.M. Huberman, 2014; Nasution, 1996: 129-130).

Therefore, a number of theories is needed up to that correlation point through Pierre Bourdieu's *habitus, field*, and *distinction* theory. *Habitus* theory is a praxis (not always conscious) skill and seems to be an individual's natural skill in answering his environmental challenge, so that as the contemplated structure, *habitus* becomes *doxa* as the driver of action, thinking, and representation (Bourdieu, 1977: 8). *Habitus* theory is inseparable from the struggle field, as the objective structures (social field) suppose the structures integrated into actor, individual, and group each others (Haryatmoko, 2016: 43). Through distinction theory application and implication, individuals can classifies objects, so that in its process, individual and group can classify themselves (Bourdieu, 1984: 243).

DISCUSSION

Al-'Aql Al-Siyasi Al-'Arabi Book Dimension

Approach and method used by al-Jabiri's work concerning *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* emphasize on distance and contextualization (Arfan, 2010: 96). Indeed al-Jabiri's intellectual project included into *Naqd al-'Aql al-'Arabi* has deconstructive pattern because the reading of Islam Arab civilization tradition particularly uses historicity, objectivity, and continuity approaches (Al-Jabiri, 2000; Aziz, 2015: 116-117). Historicity and objectivity approaches are related to author and research object (*fashl al-babitsu 'an maudhu'u babsibi*) as the form of distance and continuity approach, meaning connecting the author to research object (*washl al-babitsu 'an maudu'u babsibi*). It is then reconstructed and deconstructed as contextualization approach.

Research approach conducted by al-Jabiri substantively seems to be similar to "double movement" approach formulated by Fazlur Rahman as hermeneutic theory in Quran interpretation. Hermeneutics derives from Greek words: *hermeneia* (noun) and *hermeneuiein* (verb), meaning interpreting (Palmer, 1969: 13). Terminologically, hermeneutics means a science reflecting how a word or an event in tradition or culture and the past to be interpreted and to be meaningful in current situation (Braaten, n.d.: 131).

The approach conducted by Rahman leads to the history of present context. It is stated more clearly as follows:

"The process of interpretation proposed here consists of a double movement, from the present situation to Quranic times, then back to the present. The Quran is the divine response, through the prophet's mind, to the moral social situation of the prophet's Arabia, particularly to the problems of the commercial Meccan Society of his day" (Rahman, 1982: 5).

In line with "*ma'na-cum-maghza*" formulated by Sahiron Syamsudin in Quran interpretation is conducted by understanding history and developing its significance for the recent situation. More clearly,

"What is meant by the term '*ma'na-cum-maghza* approach' is an exegetical approach in which someone tries to grasp the original historical meaning (*ma'na*) of a text (i.e. Qur'an) that was understood by its first audience, and to develop its significance (*maghza*) for the contemporary situation" (Sahiron Syamsuddin, 2017: 100; Syamsudin, 2017: 132).

However, the difference of al-Jabiri's approach and method lies on the locus or object of research studied. It can be explained as follows. Firstly, Fazlur Rahman used his approach to the interpretation on legal verses in Quran (*Qur'anic Legal Verses*). Secondly, Sahiron Syamsudin is expected to use his approach to entire content of Quran (Appropriate for/Applicable to the Whole Qur'an) (Sahiron Syamsuddin 2017). Thirdly, al-Jabiri focuses more on Arab tradition, particularly Islam Arab tradition.

The approach used (*al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi*) analyzes "the reasoning of Arab reality" (*'Aql al-Waqi' al-'Arabi*), while the analysis of two previous books (*Takwin al-'Aql al-'Arabi* and *Bunyab al-'Aql al-'Arabi*) is theoretical and epistemological. Amin Abdullah interprets *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* book as: the manifestation of humanities concepts and paradigm in Islamic though in the concrete domain of social-political life within Muslim community. These three books are more associated with the operation or social application of humanities concepts in Islamic thought (Abdullah, 2001: 372), the two previous books are representative in seeing fundamental structure in Islamic study in humanities field (Abdullah, 2001: 371). Thus, the word *siyasi* (politics) is related more to how Muslims have

power, master, and even maintain governmental power or authority (Arfan, 2010: 99-100). It means that instead it emphasizes on the governmental power or authority (al-Jabiri, 2000: 7). The explanation method is implemented through seeing Arab political activity, the reasoning of which starts with archetype developed (*al-muhaddidat*) in Arab community, thereby creating a political reasoning (the history of Islamic political reasoning creation is divided into three phases: *dakwah* (proselytizing), *riddah*, and *fitnah*) (al-Jabiri, 2000: 364) and it can also be incarnation (the manifestation of archetype) developing (*al-tajalliyat*) in the sense of political ideology (the explanation of second part (*Fashl Tsani*) is said to be the incarnation of political ideology, because al-Jabiri explains that archetype developed as Arab political reasoning in Islamic Arab civilization is the main topic of his research later incarnated into two types (*shafan*): theoretical (*nazariyat*) and practical (*amaliyat*) (al-Jabiri, 2000: 52-53). This functional approach is characterized with its thinking set to reveal “political unconsciousness/subconscious politics (*al-lasyu’ur al-siyasi*), Arab community tradition, according to al-Jabiri, coming from “sociology” creating politics, then ideology, and religiosity pattern. It is also helped with thinking set on “Social imagination” (*imaginaire social/al-mikhyal al-ijtima’i*) confirming that “Arab political reasoning” emphasizing on operational and ideological praxis as collective phenomenon, i.e. perception, symbolism, indication, criteria, and values belonging to “political unconsciousness/subconscious politics” structure of Arab community in certain civilization (al-Jabiri, 2000: 10-16). Therefore, *habitus* is very desirable to understand and to assess reality and to produce social-political practice (field) corresponding to objective structure, because both of them are inseparable. Thus, the creation and the function of *habitus* is taken into account from the product of behavior regularity and practical modality relying on improvisation (distinction) rather than compliance with rules (Haryatmoko, 2016: 41). So, simply there is a symbiosis between objective structure contemplated and subjective movement (e.g. perception, classification, evaluation) treating the result of contemplation usually constituting values (Haryatmoko, 2016: 41-42). *Al-‘Aql al-Siyasi al-‘Arabi* is described to contain some archetypes becoming keywords (*mafatih*) developing in Arab political civilization tradition, viewed from structuration-agency or structuralism-constructivism duality (Ritzer, 2005: 519). Thus, al-Jabiri made “political unconsciousness/subconscious political|” set and “social imagination” a procedure to connect “Arab political reasoning” to *muhaddidat* and *tajalliyat*.

Archetype (*al-Muhaddidat*) and Incarnation (*al-Tajalliyat*)

The archetypes offered in *al-‘Aql al-Siyasi al-‘Arabi* by al-Jabiri in seeing, understanding, and reading Arab political history through the effect of *qabilah*, *ghanimah*, and *aqidah* are among others: *Firstly*, *qabilah* intended is related to social or political behavior dependent on class/race (like nepotism taste) instead far from democratic side, because *qabilah* is an archetype determining political reasoning or logic. Explaining the factors affected by *qabilah*, al-Jabiri connects it to La Parente’s expression in studying primitive and modern societies, confirmed by Ibn Khaldun, concerning *Ashabiyyah* in analyzing urban people’s characteristics in Arab Islam experience at his time (al-Jabiri, 2000: 79). *Secondly*, *ghanimah* means the role played by economic factor in society based on *kharaj*, *fayya’*, and *ji’zayah*, rather than productive relationship, for example, between master and servant, and factory employees like other tax levied and *n’* (raw natural produce) (al-Jabiri, 2000: 49-50). Even, according to al-Jabiri in further explanation, the Quraisy clan’s declination against Prophet Muhammad’s teachings was not only based on *Tauhid* concept

prohibiting the worship to “idol (*berhala*), but also the idols in fact were people’s livelihood source and economic project all at once (al-Jabiri, 2000: 323). Thirdly, *aqidah* means the belief based on imaginative symbol and personification, rather than on principle, reasoning, and rationality considering that the belief is material or ideal (al-Jabiri, 2000: 49-51 and 57).

Thus, what are called *qabilah*, *ghanimah*, and *aqidah*, to al-Jabiri, are three keywords (*tsalatsatu mafatih*) still become the determinant of subconscious (*aql al-bathin*) mind in Arab political civilization until today. Even, al-Jabiri said that Arab political reasoning has been existing since Pre-Islam period, particularly *qabilah* and *ghanimah*. It should be underlined that the archetypes (*al-muhaddidat*) in the form of three keywords are overlapping during subjection, in the presence of *qabilah* role in Umayyah period and *Aqidah* in early Abasiyyah era. Furthermore, it appeared varyingly in the following periods corresponding to the policy or the ruling regime (al-Jabiri, 2000: 52). Nevertheless, the three keywords are everlasting, movable predisposition system that when connected to the past experience can function as source of perception, action, and enable the achievement of unlimited and arbitrary task achievement any time (Bourdieu, 1977: 70). *Qabilah* archetype in Arab Islam civilization to al-Jabiri symbolizes race and ethnic, misogyny, and intolerance. *Ghanimah* archetype prioritizes more individual and certain group’s interest (nepotism sentiment). Meanwhile, *aqidah* archetype is limited to imaginative symbol and fanatic and exclusive personification. It is noteworthy that the three keywords explained are inspiration and the development of an idea introduced by Ibn Khaldun to see Arab contemporary social and political realities, according to al-Jabiri, particularly concerning *al-ashabiyyah al-qabiliyah* and *al-da’wah al-diniyah*, while *amil al-iqtishadi* (although *amil al-iqtishadi* is not primary base standing alone, in highlighting economic factor Ibn Khaldun tended to use production style based on invasion or surplus extraction from war (power), called *al-iqtishadi al-ri’iy* by al-Jabiri and *al-daulah al-ri’iy*, if it is related to the State) (al-Jabiri, 2000: 46-47). To al-Jabiri, it is not given special base in Ibn Khaldun *Muqaddimah* (preamble). Al-Jabiri is highly affected by Ibn Khaldun’s thought as indicated with some of his works during completing his Master program in Philosophy College, Faculty of Letters, University of Muhammad V in 1967, with a thesis entitled “*Falsafah al-Tarikh ‘inda Ibn Khaldun* (Philosophy of *al-Tarikh ‘inda Ibn Khaldun*)” under guidance of N. Aziz Lahbabi (died in 1992), and his Philosophical Doctoral program in 1970 with a dissertation entitled “*Fikr Ibn Khaldun, al-‘Ashabiyyah wa al-Daulah: Ma’alim Nazhariyah Khalduniyah fi al-Tarikh al-Islami*” under guidance of Nazib Baladi. (As’ad, 2012: 178; Aziz, 2015: 113; Juliansyahzen, 2019: 19). Thus, *qabilah*, *ghanimah*, and *aqidah* is a dynamic scheme that can adapt to each moment faced, as it is an internal structure always in restructuring process, the practices and the representation of which are neither entirely deterministic nor entirely free (determined by habitus) (Haryatmoko, 2016: 42). Ibn Khaldun’s three keys developed by al-Jabiri in explaining Arab political reasoning can be illustrated concisely below:




Figure 1. Developed by al-Jabiri in explaining Arab Political Reasoning

It is the product of skill becoming not always conscious practical action, then incarnated into an apparently natural ability developing in certain social environment (Haryatmoko, 2016: 41).

Incarnation (*al-Tajalliyat*)

The manifestation of Arab political reasoning, according to al-Jabiri's observation, can be *daulah (mulk al-siyasi)* with its hard strike as indicated with his explanation about *mitulujjyaa al-imamah, harakah tanwiryah, al-idiulugiya al-sulthaniyah wa fiqhu al-siyasah* (al-Jabiri, 2000: 231-262).

Firstly, essentially the chapter of *daulah (mulk al-siyasi)* explains that *muawiyah* successfully create political domain (*majal al-siyasi*), the success results from the transformation into the state performing politics in *qabilah, ghanimah, and aqidah* archetypes. However, on the other hand, Islam began to develop into some forms of religious doctrines (*madzhab*s) actually serving as political parties. Thus, in dealing with *qabilah*, Umayyah instead has built his legitimacy as quraisy claim (not only limited to Umayyah's descent or group) (Yusdani, 2011: 141). Historical journey proves that eventually Umayyah imperialism could not maintain its rule, and then collapsed due to *qabilah, ghanimah, and aqidah* archetype crisis (al-Jabiri, 2000: 231-260).

Secondly, chapter of *mitulujjyaa al-imamah* is explained in an idea about al-Mahdi or *Mesiah/al-Masih* expected to go down and to be present on the earth to lead the world justly. Here, al-Jabiri criticizes this idea as not a religious argumentation but a physical failure and deterioration. Such mythology is a irrational form of weak group in dealing with reality (rationality) (al-Jabiri, 2000: 261-297).

Thirdly, chapter of *harakah tanwiryah* essentially explains that al-Jabiri sees the role played by *Qadariyah, Jahmiyah, and Mu'tazilah* in political and religious thought can be taken into account for its contribution, so that al-Jabiri gives a historical representation of Umayyah Imperialism collapse (al-Jabiri, 2000: 329-362).

Fourthly, chapter of *al-idiulugiya al-sulthaniyah wa fiqhu al-siyasah* is essentially represents that the imperialism ideology was inspired more with Persian ruling system, as indicated with nearly absolute leadership and leader position in Abbassid time. *Fiqh siyasah* initiated by al-Mawardi highly affects political ideology climate until today, so that al-Jabiri confirms the claim that critique against Arab political reasoning should start with *imamah* myth and declination against *status quo (amrul waqi')* (al-Jabiri, 2000: 329-362). Al-Jabiri said

that there is no Qur'an and Sunnah text governing the governance issue because Arab indeed does not have tradition about governance and state organization, so that the model (*amir*) appearing in Muslim community's imagination is the military commander model still dominating Arab political mindset until today (al-Jabiri, 2000: 369).

The forms of observation aforementioned is called arena (field) (Haryatmoko, 2016: 43), because what are called *daulah (muluk al-siyasi)*, *mitulujjyaa al-imamah*, *harakah tanwiryah*, *al-idinlugiya al-sulthaniyah wa fiqhu al-siyasah* in al-Jabiri book are very decisive because in all communities, particularly Arab civilization, there must be the one dominating and the one dominated (Haryatmoko, 2016: 43). Creating strategy to protect and to improve the best position in the *field* is determined by capital with the incarnated capital classification as follows: economic, social (relation), cultural (knowledge), and symbolic (respect) (Bourdieu, 1993: 72). The culture prevailing is usually the dominant class' culture, so that an attempt of distinguishing something from another is a part of rule (domination) strategy (Haryatmoko, 2016: 48). Critique claimed by al-Jabiri in the end of his work offers reform necessarily to do over Arab political mindset, so that the attempts necessarily to take are (al-Jabiri, 2000: 374): firstly, to change the tribal community (*al-qabilah*) into non-tribal one, or multi-party civil society, unions, independent organization, and constitution institution. It means building the society divided into government (executive, legislative, and judicative), and civil society. Secondly, another attempt is to change *al-ghanimah* (non-productive economy) into productive economy, cross-border economic integration and cooperation (free market) in strengthening independence. Thirdly, the next attempt is to change *al-aqidah* with fanatic sectarianism characteristic with a single truth into the openness to difference, *ijtihad* reasoning, and critic.

Relevance and Reflection on Politics in Indonesia

Qabilah, *ghanimah*, and *aqidah*, as the keywords al-Jabiri's observation, see "Arab political reasoning" in his work entitled *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* as having been habituated since Pre-Islam period, and then having criticized Arab reasoning tradition, al-Jabiri offered the reform necessarily to perform as aforementioned. On the other hand, at a glance the presence of NKRI Bersyariah", and "Khilafah" ideological discourse, "Great Imam" predicate, "Islam Defending" demonstration action, and contestation (the competition for domination space in the sense of ideology and politic) begins to be topic of serious discussion, particularly viewed from religious, political, and state organization aspects in Indonesia.

Al-Jabiri's critique against Arab political reasoning and basic values offered in observing historical or contemporary time is still relevant to Indonesian political situation. Such behavior began to appear on January 2016; the survey at that time indicates that *qabilah* and *aqidah* archetype is a dominant factor in struggling field of DKI Jakarta Local Leader Election in 2017, because Ahok at that time distinctively assumed two minority layers (Christian and Chinese) (Muhtadi, 2019: 11-12). Burhanuddin Muhtadi confirmed that:

"Longitudinal data of *Indikator Politik Indonesia* (Indonesian Politic Indicator) shows that the mean value of public's satisfaction with Ahok is 73.4%. If Jakarta citizens are actually rational, Ahok should get at least 70% votes corresponding to the proportion of citizens satisfied with his performance, but in the second round, Ahok-Djarot couple was lost absolutely and got only 42% votes. In other words,

the vote gain of candidate couple in Jakarta cannot be explained by rationality factor only” (Muhtadi, 2019: 15).

The appearance occurring in political field (contestation) in DKI Jakarta in 2017 affected significantly the political stage in the period of 2016-2019, meaning that distinctively, *qabilah* Islam of FPI and HTI habituated with religious tradition has given a distinctive difference as the part of domination strategy. Even, the effect of *qabilah* and *aqidah* Islam of FPI and HTI is integrated into irrationality that has been touched by al-Jabiri in *mitulujjiyaa al-imamah* chapter stating that this is the irrational form of weak group in facing the reality (rationality) (al-Jabiri, 2000: 261-297). There are actually still some similar archetypes of *qabilah* and *aqidah*, as mentioned by Haedar Nashir in his research, “Sharia Islam Movement as performed by Majelis Mujahidin, Hizbut Tahrir, KPPI, and the movements of sharia implementation in a number of areas (South Sulawesi, West Java, Aceh, and etc) with “ideological salafiyah” character, sociologically is a reprint or reproduction of similar Islam movements appearing in Islam historical dynamics since the beginning of independence movement in this state (Nashir, 2013: 452). However, the lesson to be taken, in al-Jabiri’s view, is actually that excessive *qabilah*, *ghanimah* and *aqidah* domains indicate that the society has not been able yet to be inclusive and even it is a form of weak group’s irrationality in dealing with reality or rationality. “NKRI bersyariah” and “*khilafah*” ideology and “Great Imam” predicate are the nomenclature of *qabilah*, *ghanimah*, and *aqidah* archetypes, because Indonesia is the state with Muslim majority population (*Badan Pusat Statistik* [Central Bureau of Statistics], 2017: 8-9). It is presented in the table below.

Table 1. Religion Categories Recognized officially in Indonesia

NO	Religion	Number	Percentage (%)
1	Islam	207.2 millions people	87.18
2	Protestant Christian	16. 5 millions	6.96
3	Catholic Christian	6.9 millions	2.91
4	Hindu	4,012,116 people	1.69
5	Buddha	1,703,254 people	0.72
6	Khong Hu Chu	117,100 people	0.05

The influence of Muslim majority in Indonesia affects very significantly the religious perspective. Similarly, Islam-defending action movement during 2016-2019 proves that primordial and religious ideological identity contributes significant portion to political phenomenon in Indonesia (Ahyar, 2019). It is intended to fight for and to realize ideologies (*aqidah*) of “NKRI bersyariah” by *qabilah* of FPI, particularly M. Rizieq Shihab and of “*khilafah*” (transnational) initiated by *qabilah* of ex-HTI.

Zastrow Ngatawi’s study entitled “*Gerakan Islam Simbolik; Politik Kepentingan FPI* (Symbolic Islam Movement; FPI Interest Politics)” (Ngatawi 2013) found that FPI is a capitalist movement trading Islam (*ghanimah*) to interest group by deceiving the community on behalf of religion and Allah, so that FPI movement is not a social one that can change the society’s social construction (Ngatawi, 2013: 138-139). On the other hand, FPI is

considered to be based on practical (economic and political) interest (Ngatawi, 2013: 143). Thus, Zastrou understands that:

“... FPI movement is not only far from justice norm, but also deviates from benefit and honesty norms, as echoed by FPI leaders. What this group has done, theoretically for public goodness and benefit, is not proved at all in objective reality” (Ngatawi, 2013: 148-149).

The agenda of FPI’s struggle seems to have symbiotic relationship with MUI, as suggested by Walson, that:

“Rizyiq has also been championed by the organization as a potential presidential candidate, together with a number of high-profile figures such as Cholil Ridwan, chairman of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia. The FPI’s position that the nation should be lead Islamic Religious scholars rather than politicians is one with obvious appeal to the MUI, with whom the organization has developed a mutually beneficial relationship as the ‘enforcer’ of its often controversial fatwa. Perhaps the most significant of these was the 2005 fatwa declaring liberalism, secularism, and pluralism as haram (sinful or forbidden in Islam)” (Wilson 2015:4).

Another response comes from Denny JA’s essay posted in social media, entitled “NKRI Bersyariah atau Ruang Publik yang Manusiawi? (NKRI Bersyariah or Humane Public Space?)” Response of 21 practitioners to Denny JA’s idea (Arismunandar, 2019). Denny JA explains that 1) in 2017 after *Islamicity* index has been made they look for data in the world with highest *Islamicity* index with the following indicators: clean government, narrow economic gap, and high respect to human rights. At the bottom of ten most Islamic states, those with highest *Islamicity* score in the West are: New Zealand, Netherland, Sweden, Ireland, Swiss, Denmark, Canada, and Australia. Meanwhile, the state with majority Muslim population instead has average *Islamicity* score and lower: Malaysia (43rd rank), United Arab Emirates (47th rank), Indonesia (74th rank), and Saudi Arabia (88th rank). Thus, it can be concluded that people practicing Islamic social values recommended by Quran instead can be found in western countries. 2) PBB developing its own index to test a nation’s advance by creating an institution named *UN Sustainable Development Solution Network (SDNS)*, and developing an index named *World Happiness Index*. The finding indicates that 10 states with highest Happiness Index in 2018 were: Finland, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Swiss, Netherland, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. Meanwhile, the states with majority Muslim populations on middle rank are: United Arab Emirates (20), Malaysia (35), and Indonesia is below the top 50 rank. Thus, Denny JA concluded that basically the best values of Islam, just like other religions when universalized, are similar to various humane values formulated by recent civilization. Islamic values in fact are humanity values. It is this universal public space that can be enjoyed by everyone, regardless his/her religion and creed. All modern states basically try to achieve the humane public space. 3) The issue related to the nation’s foundation has been over. Pancasila is the only foundation of nation, as it has led Indonesia adequately to the achievement of humane public space.

HTI carries on “*kebilafab*”; its struggle, according to Karagianis and McCauley, is as follows:

“...Hizb ut-Tahrir has favored a radical political change through the demolition of the existing state apparatus and the construction of a new Islamic State. Modeled after the three stages that the Prophet Muhammad experienced en route to establishment of the first Islamic state... In brief... recruitment of elite party

members, Islamization of society, and takeover of the state and jihad to spread Islam” (Emmanuel and McCauley 2006:318).

In relation to “*khilafah*” initiated by *qabilah* HTI, Azymardi Azra gives the following explanation:

“Basically, the idea “*khilafah*” they carry on is merely historical romanticism and idealization. If the reference of “*khilafah*” idea is Turkish Ottoman domination, since its establishment during Sulaiman al-Qanuni in 15 AD, the rulers almost have never called their political entity “*khilafah*” or called themselves “*khalifah*”, otherwise they “humbly” called themselves ‘sultan’ the Turkish Ottoman rulers seemed to realize that *khilafah* and *khalifah* position are not trivial; they knew that they were basically *ghazî* or officers who become the rulers due to historical journey only. However, consciously or unconsciously, the rule they construct in modern political science perspective is “military oligarchy” then transforms into *kesultanan* (imperialism)” (Azra, 2016: 252).

Fundamentally, the form of distinction in the sense of competition for rule (field) has occurred formally during BPUPKI period between *qabilah* Islam and *qabilah* nationalist, concerning State’s form, foundation, and constitution and concerning the president that should be Muslim. The history highly impacts on this dynamics remaining to be bequeathed to compete for and to dominate social-political space in Indonesia (Lubis 2020:35–41). Thus, according to Haedar Nashir, it is called teleological and ideological continuation from pre-independence history to post-reform period recently (Nashir, 2013: 452). Al-Jabiri interpreted *ghanimah* at that time as non-productive economy such as war loot property, tax, and etc, but the interpretation developing now instead is not far different from Muslim community’s behavior that has traded their religion for the sake of their personal and group interest or benefit.

Social climbing by means of peeling the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945) and President Soekarno’s Decree in 1959 is conducted only to legitimate NKRI as Islamic State or “NKRI Bersyariah” and by criticizing Indonesia state as “infidel” state so that “*khilafah*” is a solution. It is a form of *ghanimah*, to enable its existence to have bargaining power among political elites in achieving their own objective, e.g. in the case of *Pilkada DKI Jakarta* (DKI Jakarta Local Leader Election) in 2017 (Osman and Waikar 2018).

CONCLUSION

Some points need to be underlined in *Al-‘Aql al-Siyasi al-‘Arabi* work by al-Jabiri: firstly, archetype (*al-muhaddidat*), the one of seeing, understanding, and reading Islamic Arab political history through *qabilah*, *ghanimah*, and *aqidah* effect. Secondly, incarnation (*al-Muhaddidat*), considering the result of al-Jabiri’s observation, Islamic Arab political reasoning is in the form of *daulah* (*mulk al-siyasi*) emphasizing on the explanation about *mitulujiyaa al-imamah*, *harakah tanwiriyyah*, *al-idiulugiyaa al-sulthaniyyah wa fiqhu al-siyasah*.

Al-Jabiri’s critique against Arab politic reasoning and basic values offered in observing history and contemporary time is in fact still relevant to political situation in Indonesia. Thus, it can be summarized that in al-Jabiri’s opinion, actually excessive *qabilah*, *ghanimah* and *aqidah* domains indicate that the society has not been able yet to be inclusive socio-culturally and even it is a form of weak group’s irrationality in dealing with reality or rationality. Similarly, fighting for and realizing ideologies (*aqidah*) of “NKRI bersyariah” by *qabilah* of FPI, particularly M. Rizieq Shihab and of “*khilafah*” (transnational) initiated by

qabilah of ex-HTI are (Islam) religion-trading movement and Social Climbing to enable their existence to have bargaining power (*ghanimah*). Otherwise, this research represents the relevance of a little part of al-Jabiri's work entitled *al-'Aql al-Siyasi al-'Arabi* to Indonesian political phenomenon during 2016-2019. In fact, what al-Jabiri offers is still relevant and actual, so that this study offers the incarnation of al-Jabiri's term into the context of Indonesian political phenomenon discussion.

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