

Virtual Preaching Activism In Indonesia: *Social Media, Politic of Piety, New Ulama, and Democracy*

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Abstract:

This paper problematizes the dynamic of contemporary virtual preacher's role in Indonesia and its religious border, cultural, social, and political impact. Indeed, the new media and social networks gave the preacher a pivotal social figure, a cultural broker, and an authoritative interpreter of religion. The current phenomenon of the rise of social media in da'wa participation has a significant impact on Indonesia's socio-political life. The production of religious knowledge through virtual preaching activism is in line with discourse battles, contestation of authority, and politics. This phenomenon also has an impact on the internal relations among Muslims and between religious communities as well. Therefore, by using ethnographical social-media analysis, this paper examines some research questions below: (1) what the social media can tell us regarding the shifting from traditional religious knowledge to electronic spiritual understanding? (2) how the new ulama develop authority in the online society era? (3) how the politic of piety deal with democracy?

Key Words: *Virtual; Politic; Ulama; Democracy*

INTRODUCTION

Digital age has been change the order of public social life in general. In recent years, particularly in Indonesia. Hence, we need to investigated how the virtual preaching forment normative or revivalist Islam in contemporary Muslim societies, and how this institution has been transformed under modernity. This article thought to examine the complex nexus of political and religious power.

The interaction between media and religion is being made more obvious as both media and religion have undergone significant change in recent years. In social media, there have been trends in technology and in economics wich have resulted in an increasingly diverse, decentralized, and multi-channel environment. Religion and media are converging in popular (Hoover, 2008: 3). Social media provide rich symbolism, visual culture, visual religious, and practice of participation and identity, and opportunities to make and remake identities. The social media are, further, the dominant and definative source of what socially and culturally important in modernity. Critiques of this situation tend to assume that there must be some necessary contradiction between religion, which is ancient, time-honored, and unquestionably "authentic", and media, wich are thought to be modern, superficial and inauthentic (Turner, 2015).

The kinds of symbols, ideas, and other resource in social media marketplace of religious supply are commodities, which further undermines their claim to authenticity. But the fact that the social media embedded in market is one of the most important source of their significant to institution like religion and state. Simply put, possess structural independences, fiscal autonomy and cultural authority outside these other center of power, and these qualities are a direct result of their location in the global capitalist marketplace. Also, commodification -commodification is the transformation of goods, services, ideas and persons in goods, or merchandise. According to Arjun Appadurai, the commodity in the most open part is "any thing that can be exchanged," or any item that has economic value, see Arjun Appadurai in Ritzer (2008)- of religious is nothing new. There are long and deep histories of religious and spiritual material cultures across most religious traditions.

DISCUSSION

From Traditional Religious Knowledge to Electronic Religious Knowledge

Since the beginning of the entry and spread of Islam, until centuries later, *ulama'* have almost always been the sole actors in determining and shaping discourse and shades of Islam in the Nusantara (Indonesia). This was reinforced by the fact that, in the pre-colonial period of the Islamic empire, the important role of these *ulama'* was to obtain political legitimacy with the formalization of kadi (qadis) and shaykh al-Islam who are in charge of upholding and supervising the implementation of Islamic rule, deciding cases based on Islamic law, and strengthening Islam in the kingdom. Therefore, *ulama'* live as religious elites and become part of the ruling elite in the kingdom (Burhanuddin, 2012).

Since the colonial era in Nusantara, the *ulama'* have begun to pull over from downtown and coastal areas to rural villages in the interior. Because *ulama'* began to lose political legitimacy, they began to build their own institutional foundations by establishing Islamic teaching institutions such as pesantren, dayah, surau, and others (Burhanuddin, 2012). Pesantren teaching model was the basis for the formation of the role of *ulama'* as an authoritative institution in translating and determining the teachings and practices of religious *umam* of Islam next

Although a *santri* studied the treasures of books by classical scholars, but the oral tradition holds a significant role in pesantren. *Firstly*, because the scholars are regarded as the bearers of religious knowledge derived from previous clerical networks. *Secondly*, this tradition is a guarantee that the knowledge that comes to the *santri* is not the result of the self-taught process (Burhanuddin, 2012). These two causes make oral explanations by the *'ulama'* into an absolute necessity. Authority was established on the basis of the oral transmission of science from their teachers, which, if sorted, will come to the author of the book, the founder of the school, or even the Prophet Muhammad himself. In the tradition of pesantren, this is known as "*sanad al-ilm*".

The use of print technology in the Islamic world, initially, underpins this already established process. In the case of Indonesia, this event began with the establishment of a printing press in Cairo, Egypt, in the 1880s that printed the works of Shaykh Nawawai al-Bantani (a scholar from Banten who settled in Makkah) whose books were widely used in Pesantren in Indonesia. In addition, a printing press in Makkah, founded in 1884, made Malay books (with Arabic script, among pesantren better known as pego or Arab-Malay writing) as an important part of its business (Burhanuddin, 2012). The production process of these Middle Eastern print books contributed greatly to the widespread transmission of

Islamic knowledge in the Nusantara and provided a great opportunity for the archipelago of the Archipelago to multiply readers and increase their authority in the midst of Muslim Nusantara.

However, print technology has a double face. Reformism and the idea of Islamic renewal initiated by triumvirate Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rashid Ridha blew from Cairo at the end of the 19th century. Newspapers became the mouthpiece for the spread of reformist ideas that challenged the ulama's established authority. The idea of reformers was brought to the Nusantara, especially by the students of the Nusantara (ashab al-jawi) in the Middle East (especially Makkah and Cairo) who returned to their area. The spread of this idea was further reinforced by the entry of print media from the Middle East which became the subscriptions to the reading of the students. Some prominent figures, such as K.H. Ahmad Dahlan and the founders of Persatuan Islam (Persis) for example, recorded a subscription to al-Manar magazine initiated by Rashid Ridha, even making it a discussion (Burhanuddin, 2012).

The idea of reform then developed independently by reformist Muslim Nusantara. In addition to the newly established institutions of education (schools adopting the Western system and abandoning the pesantren/surau/ dayah model), this idea was also mainly disseminated through the print media that they hide themselves. This was in line with Abduh's call that Muslims should adopt modernity and exploit the tools of modernity in favor of their own progress and glory. The publication of al-Imam, Islam's first Southeast Asian reformer magazine, first published in 1906, became the first milestone in the spreading of this idea. The magazine was initiated by Thaher Djalaluddin, a Minang student in Mecca who, interested in the ideas of Abduh and Rida, decided to study to Cairo. This publication was followed by the appearance of other newspapers with similar directions (Burhanuddin, 2012).

Printing and print media, thereby, became one of the key features that marked the emergence of Islamic reformism. The use of printed media, along with reform of the education system and other efforts, has resulted in the traditional ulama being no longer regarded as the sole possessor of Islamic authority. New Muslim figures-the reformers-began to be involved in defining Islam in Nusantara (Indonesia). This phenomenon shows this trend for example was the emergence of a special column of religious fatwas in various magazines and Islamic newspapers at that time. Religious questions previously only proposed to the pesantren scholars are now also requested by reformist ulama'who are editors of newspapers /magazines.

Islamic knowledge which was previously only derived from Arabic classic books and studied exclusively in the guidance of pesantren scholars, as well as an orally established oral tradition as a method of knowledge transfer over the centuries, faces serious challenges from the textbook-generated readings. Along with the rampant publication of Malay-language religious books and local languages, a wider audience was increasingly facilitated in accessing religious knowledge, without having to go and settle in pesantren. Nowadays, people can find books, magazines, and newspapers that discuss or address religious matters in bookstores, libraries, and other places that were barely considered and associated with Islamic studies. The reading of hadith and tafseer can be found not only in pesantren accompanied by ulama', but also in homes and schools (Burhanuddin, 2012).

All of this, contributes to the emergence of a public space that allows Muslims from various backgrounds to be involved in formulating Islam. It was noted that

polemics, debates, discussions, and rivalries characterized the development of Islam in the early twentieth century (Burhanuddin, 2012). Furthermore, this public space is becoming increasingly evolving so that the issues being discussed are no longer the religious affairs of an sich, but are also beginning to deal with economic and socio-political issues-even though they are still linked with religion.

In subsequent years, the parties involved in this public space are not only Indonesian students of Middle Eastern education, but also Western-educated intellectuals studying Islam, such as Sukarno or Natsir. Various Islamic movements with diverse tendencies also emerged. From movements focusing on moderate socio-economic improvements such as Muhammadiyah, to the elaboration of the latest political ideologies, such as the Hadji-Misbach Hadji with *"Islam Bergerak"* and the *"Medan Moeslim"* as the medium (Burhanuddin, 2012).

However, the scholars who felt undermined his influence did not keep silent on this fact. Realizing that the tide of change was inevitable, the scholars begin to accommodate new ways to defend the Islamic-traditionalist style they believe in and the religious authority they possess. As the Muhammadiyah adopted the Christian missionary means to counter their influence, the scholars also borrowed the ways in which the reformists confronted and withstand their influence.

The first thing adopted was the formation of modern organizations to facilitate their struggle in other fields. Although quite late, in 1926 stood the organization that accommodate the scholars, especially those in Java, namely Nahdlatul Ulama?. They also began to make other change efforts, such as reforming the education system, by introducing the madrasah system into pesantren,.

Recognizing the print media was a powerful weapon in spreading ideas, the scholars began to form a counter-discourse against reformist groups. Some works that try to defend the ulama's authority and the ideology of ahlus sunnah wal jamaah which they believe, began to be written and published, both in Arabic and Malay. Among other things, the Ahlus Sunnah Walal Jamaah Review written Hadratus Shaykh K.H. Hashim Asy'ari, the supreme leader of NU at that time, or around the Problem of Ijtihad and Taqlid written by Mahfudz Shiddiq.

In this case, printing technology also serves to strengthen the emerging ulama' network. because the printing press was instrumental in the formation of *"imagined community"* in the term Anderson (2008). Not only form the print media, but also play a role in strengthening the authority working in this community. He also helped develop and form the main faction involved in the formulation of Islam for Indonesian Muslims until several decades after that.

At the beginning of the 21st century, we are witnessing the globalization and development of media technology resulting in ulama and its authority facing serious challenges. Perhaps much more serious than at the beginning of the 20th century. Then, how the role of scholars in this century of digital media? However, this study opens space and provides an opportunity for further research. When some people even feel enough to learn the religion of the sites they encounter in cyberspace, the influence of the development of communication technology and the latest information on the authority of today's clergy would need to be studied more deeply

Nowadays, Indonesian society has been move from traditional systems to digital information systems, namely there is a shift from print media to digital media. The presence of digital media is certainly a challenge for print media culture. Through digital

media, modern humans can access a variety of knowledge, including religious knowledge. The most popular digital media used these days is social media. Hence, modern humans in addition to having an actual reality, also have a virtual reality. In this context, virtual reality is the reality which is constructed through social media itself.

This current situation certainly affects the formation of religious knowledge systems, traditions, and cultures. Because, social media era has marked the end of one-way communication. The owners of both print and electronic media are no longer the sole agent of information. Because in social media era, everyone is free to write ideas, opinions, and criticisms. In short, social media has become new public space and arena of discourse and symbols to seize public acceptance and social dominance, and to some extent, social media is such as "hegemonic apparatuses". Any order that becomes an ideological tool can be called an apparatus. The ideology can come from family, education, religion, or the media. Thus, the media through Althusser's thought is seated as an ideological medium, meaning that the media always have and run a certain ideology. All text in the media is based on an ideology. Today, where many media companies are owned by the owners of capital, therefore the ideology of the media company, whether directly or indirectly, must be influenced by the owner. He instilled his ideology by using the media he owned as a disseminator of information.

In the last two years, Indonesian Muslims have been experienced a new trend, namely the virtual da'wa. To be honest, this phenomenon shows how the modernity and religion meet in digital space. Furthermore, the rise of virtual da'wa in Indonesia shows the contestation of various Muslim groups, and their understanding of Islam. In this case, the interpretation of each group about Islam can not be separated from the way of their understanding and interpreting two authoritative sources in Islam; Qur'an and Hadith. Indeed, virtual da'wa activists in creating public discourse network society, they had something in mind beyond the immediate communication between preacher and audience during the preaching event. They envisaged the perpetuation and cultivation of religious ideas, political ideologies, moral dispositions, and the symbolic systems.

Social media also has a significant influence in realm of religious discourse. For example, scriptural messages are conveyed through online information such as through virtual da'wah. Therefore, there was what Bryan S. Turner called "discursive and popular authority" (Turner, 2002). In this sense, construction of Authority within network society is shaped through data that drains broad religious information. This kind of authority and charisma are determined by how much viral religious discourse that is conveyed is able to influence the psychology of the masses in everyday life, in what Max Weber said, called "routinization of charisma" (Turner, 2002).

There are some of virtual da'wah pages that very popular in dominate the digital age; Ustaz Abdul Shomad, Aswaja Yellow Book, Kaffah Islam, Ideological Dakwah, Kaffah Islamic Community, Smart Dakwah, Ngaji Online Aswaja, Fodamara, Akhyar TV, Indonesia Belongs to Allah, Buya Yahya, Habib and Novel Alayidrus, Gus Nur, Felix Shiauw, Hanan Al-Taki, and many more. These of each page followed by more than million facebook users. These page da'wah also routinely deliver live preaching in facebook to do society, and of course it is give some effects to millennial generation literacy.

Lately, virtual da'wah used by millennial generation, and also by society in general as new reference and source of Islamic knowledge. Muslims can ask the preachers all about Islamic issues that they want to know. Then, the virtual preachers will answer all the problem directly. And sometimes the preacher even gives the answer on non-Muslim

theological issues. In my opinion, religious knowledge based virtual da'wah is certainly problematic. Because to understand non-Muslims theological issues it requires an interfaith dialogue. Therefore, religious knowledge based virtual da'wa tends not to be holistic, and to be honest, its biased.

The virtual da'wa activism also challenge the traditional authority (of print-based Islam). The appeal to the religious law ever more urgent, and hence there is sort bidding war in which competing authorities attempt to out-do each other in term of the strictness of their interpretation of legal norm. Based on research conducted by Noorhaidi, young people born in the last 25 years range are very close to digital culture. In addition, these millennial generations, especially students and students, are vulnerable to exposure to radicalism, extremism and terrorism that are not only dispersed through the digital world, but also the literature consumed, both in the context of formal education and popular reading. The ideology of Islamism that is embraced in books and religious reading material is widespread among students and students. Millennial generations are more vulnerable to the ideology of extreme or radical Islamism in the textbook.

the rise of religious content content in social media is also very influential on the direction of the development of Muslim generations, the impact can be seen in the last two years how the Muslim community is involved in issues of political issues that are mostly disseminated through social media. Da'wa on social media also creates a new habitus of the Indonesia muslims, namely the tendency of go beyond boundaries. In a sense, the Muslims (social media users) have autonomous authority in determining their religious tastes and political choices. This new habitus is infecting many within the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, namely NU and Muhammadiyah. To a certain extent, the mass of these two mass organizations dared to cross and out of their cultural-political identity of their authenticity.

New Media, New Ulama' and Construction of Authority

One of the most distinctive facet of premodern ulama culture was articulation of discourse through the medium of commentary. Medieval works of law were "open text" interpretation and commentary (Messick, 2002). In a sense, the discursive form of the commentary was, in fact, one of the principal means through which the law was not only elaborated but also expanded and modified to meet the exigencies of changing times. The commentary was not only major medium through which an evolving juristic thought found expression, but also mean of expounding the the meaning of Isla's foundational sources, the Qur'an and Hadits. It was equally critical to disciplines such as philosophy, with muslim philosophers making some of their most significant contribution in the form of commentaries on ancient greek (Messick, 2002).

First of all, before we going to discuss about *new ulama'* it is very important to define what the meaning of ulama' itself, and who are they. In Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (KBBI), the term ulama' was interpreted as person who are experts in the behavior (piety) and Islamic knowledge (Wahmuji, 2008). From this explanation, at least the scholars must have two competencies, namely the dimension of piety and the dimension of cognition, which has a wide range of religious knowledge. While in Al-Munawwir's Arabic dictionary, word ulama' is a plural form of the word "*alim*", which translates into a learned person, or a knowledgeable person. In short, the ulama' is the opposite of "*al-Jahil*" (Munawir, 2013).

To be honest, defining the concept of *ulama'* holistically is not easy, because we can not measure how deep the knowledge and wisdom of a person until he deserves to be called as an *ulama'*. Nevertheless, looking at the reality of Indonesian socio-political dynamics of recent times, the term *ulama'* seems to be more interesting to be discussed. For example, the socio-political dynamics of Indonesia from 2016 to 2017 continue to be disrupted by the term "criminalization of *ulama'*". This term, then become part of the political and public discourse in Indonesian society. As a result, the term "*ulama'*" was increasingly crowded on social media. Speeches such as "bela *ulama'*", "ulama' mockery", and "criminalization of *ulama'*" have become the dominant discourse in social media.

The polarization that took place since the Jakarta election, followed by controversy of *da'wa* content of virtual preachers, leads the discourse of *ulama'* still very dominant in the public issue. Last year in 2017, for example, the determination of Habib Rizieq as a suspect in case of nasty chat, then the calling of Bachtiar Nasir as witness in the case of alleged money laundering, and the presence of Kiai Ma'ruf Amin as a witness in the alleged trial of gaiety blasphemy by Ahok, made the term "*ulama'*" becomes a trending topic. Most recently, the rejection of Ustad Abdul Shomad (the virtual *da'i*) in Bali also brings back the discourse of the '*ulama'*' becomes expanding. The news became a hot issue for a whole week, social media flooded with this issue, as well as on some national tv such as tv one, Kompas TV and others.

Looking at the phenomenon, it is interesting to consider how the perception and construction of *ulama'*'s authority was formed from time to time. By using the Foucauldian perspective, the concept of the *ulama'* "*shows the general theme of a picture that questions what has been said at the level of its existence, of the function of the pronunciation which moves within it, of the formation of discourse...*" (Foucault, 2017). From these statements, what needs to be considered is how the "discourse" works to support the concept of the *ulama'*" is composed, and how it is perceived and affirmed. In short, what "relation" establishes *ulama'*'s authority.

In traditional societies, the *ulama'* are often perceived as personal figures who are regarded as the representative of the transcendent power on earth. *Ulama'* for them, was not just a religious scholar, but, he was also regarded as "keramat" figure. *Ulama'* for them is not just a religious scholar, but, he is also regarded as a sakti (sacred) figure. In a sense, the '*ulama'*' are figures that have advantages above the average man, and are capable of doing extraordinary things. *Ulama'* in this context occupy the highest locus which is called in populist language, as *wali* (guardian). In this case, "karomah" is discourse that supports one's authority as *ulama'*.

The powerful charisma of the *ulama'* in the socio-religious life of the community, causing this figure is often exploited by the power to the political vortex as the support of the legitimacy of the regime. The political-relationship between *ulama'*" and power has been going on for a long time, both in the history of Middle Eastern Islamic civilization, also in the Islamic context in Indonesia. In the context of Indonesia, this phenomenon was elaborated in detail by Jajat Burhanuddin in his book "*Ulama' and Power: The Muslim Elite Struggle in Indonesian History*". Later, Yudi Latif "*Muslim Intelligence and Power: the genealogy of the 20th century Indonesian Muslim intelligentsia*". Both of them explaining that the strategic position of *ulama'* (scholars) can not be separated from the various processes of socio-political and cultural change.

In the New Order era, for example, the establishment of MUI also can not be separated from political motives. In addition, the establishment of MUI institutions helped

change the standards of ulama' 'in the public mind. The authority of ulama' is then measured by his involvement in the institution (MUI). In fact, the initiation of the formation of MUI can not be separated from the political tactics of the new order (Soeharto) to dampen the power of Islam at that time which is considered to destabilize his power. In doing so, the formation of MUI it was easier to control the strength of Islamic mass organizations at time. As Syafiq Hasyim (2014) states , the traumatic of Communist trauma in Indonesia led to an institution named Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) in 1975. In addition, according to Syafiq, the birth of MUI was also caused by the trauma of a number of rebellions perpetrated by some groups in the name of Islam.

When the new order collapses, freedom of expression and aspiration is wide open again. The occurrence of media liberalization provides momentum for Islam that has been tamed by Soeharto. Muslims use media such as television as the arena of public preaching (Islamic televangelism), and Islamic films, and various other religious events. Lately in line with the information-technology revolution, social media, especially facebook has given birth to the clerics' social media. This phenomenon by Meyer and Moors is called "religion finds technology" (Meyer and Moors, 2001).

Since Post-Soeharto era, Islamic discourse has been increasingly coloring the discourse and power struggle in Indonesia. Ariel Heryanto calls this phenomenon the "Politik Budaya Layar" (Heryanto, 2015). So, in current situation, on the rising of virtual da'wa activism trend, perhaps this phenomenon can be called "the politic of piety in social media". In contrast to the expectation that technological modernization leads to secularization or that the internet presents dramatic challenge to religious communities, but recent trends shows the socia media trough virtual da'wa activims do "spritualize" the internet, everyday Indonesians enjoy viral religious discourse through social media, even this virtual da'wa becomes an Islamic pop culture.

Da'wa is the umberella term under wich the mosque movement, and Islamist movement more generally, have organized many of their disparate activities. Da'wa lierally mean " call, invitation, appeal, or summon". It is Qur'anic concept associated primarily with God's call to the prophets and humanity to beleive in the "true religion", Islam. da'wa did not reciev much doctrinal antention in classical Sunni Islamic scholarship, and it was only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that it was given extensive elaboration (Mahmood, 2005).

In the millennial era, the term ulama' was not only measured from the scientific side only. But the concept of ulama', becomes discursive formation that is discourse in socio-political space. As great as a traditional ulama' who preaches without social media, his authority will not appear in the public. Thus, we are witnessing a new authority that gradually begins to shift traditional authority.

Through the social media the ulama's authoriy quickly reinforced. This phenomenon what the so called of "the power of virtual preaching". All I want to say, virtual precaher today, consider as "new ulama'" by network society. From Pierre Bordieu's perspective, this phenomenon shows the process of dakwah being structured through a hierarchically organized array of social media arenas (media). The arena becomes a structured space with its own functioning rules, and with its own power relations (Bourdeau, 1993). In every arena, interest is always at stake, including in the construction of one's keulama'an. In a changing discourse and a changing arena, perceptions of ulama' also changed. Now, the public's (users) perception of scholars refers to certain figures whose video lectures are viral and dominates the production of millennial religious knowledge.

While traditional form hierarchical power operated through chains of command between people, network society operates through data rather than people. These chains of authority are somewhat different from the chain of authorization in traditional Islam in which the *ulama'* regarded as legitimate where they have a continuous chain of known to verify their legitimacy. Social media bring with it complex questions about intellectual property, in particular, this set questions about the globalization of knowledge converges on problem of authority. In developed and 'glocalized' world of instant and continuous communications, who can speak authoritatively for Islam?

In Weber's theory of authority, it is clear that authority and legitimacy of information cannot be subsumed under traditional or charismatic authority. The networks are not charismatic because they are not legitimized by a single person, and no routinized charisma could significantly influence the web. The new form of authority are not legal-rational, however, because the authority of site, or virtual preachers is not the product of the hierarchical organization. The authority of the virtual preachers is developed, dispersed and dissipated. Further, the religious knowledge produced by virtual preachers will not guarantee the truth or validity of Islamic knowledge, but they establish essential criteria for the democratic conversation of the web. In this sense, they match the criteria of communicative rationality in the theory of communicative action (Habermas, 2007).

What makes social media popular and effective as da'wah media is its interactive element. Users can not only read or watch, but can talk and argue in the comments field. In the world of da'wah, this kind of privilege is obviously not in traditional Islamic education in pesantren, which speeds the santri against the teacher. Therefore Medsos managed to make the users feel related to the source of the message and the message itself. Such capabilities are not owned by previous media such as newspapers, radio, television, even news pages that are passive audience-like users.

The popularity of da'wah content presented in social media by religious leaders is mainly due to an audience (market) that is in need. There are at least three user criteria that listen to da'wah through social media channels. *First*, users who have limited time. Mainly because of work or other activities. Watching da'wah videos on YouTube, for example, can solve this problem. With armed devices, 10 to 20 minutes free time, and internet connection, busy people can listen to da'wah. *Second*, those who are embarrassed come directly to religious leaders. This is mainly due to aging, but without the depth of religious knowledge. Watching da'wah videos on Facebook and YouTube or reading Islamic nuanced uploads on Facebook becomes the best way for them to gain religious knowledge. *Third*, those who want to learn instantly. This phenomenon is common in urban middle-class society.

Between Politics of Piety and Democracy

In the midst of the rise of virtual da'wah and identity politics lately, the narrative on Islamic renewal is becoming less popular. Today, the renewal of Islamic thought is suspected as a source of misguidance. The culture of social media is filled with suspicion, labeling, and apostasy. This is further exacerbated by political polarization after the open democracy era, especially in the last two years 2016 to 2017. Some people's attention, especially network society, is more directed to things that are more "political" -for example, identity politics, Islamophobia, the rise of right narratives in the West, the rise of salafism, the rise of jihadist narratives.

Attempts to critically examine Islamic classical traditions such as the concerns of Muslim intellectuals in the 1980s and 90s have become less popular. Some figures like Harun Nasution, Mukti Ali, Muslim Abdurrahman, Munawir Sadzali, Manshour Faqih, Gus Dur, Cak Nur, Ahmad Wahib, and others mark the golden phase of Islamic reform in Indonesia. The Muslim intellectual atmosphere of the 70s and 80s is characterized by an awareness of the importance of "re-examining" the traditional theological heritage that is supposed to be passive and less rational, and inclined to the political-quo status.

Harun Nasution, for example, reintroduces the various schools of classical theology in a modern context, emphasizing that the rational theology as introduced by the Mu'tazilites is important to be reconsidered. The spirit of "rationalization of theology" is highly relevant to Indonesian social politics in the 70s and 80s: the era when rationalization was seen as a way to save Indonesia from an over-politicized situation in earlier eras. In addition, Harun Nasution also instilled an awareness of a new generation of Muslim scholars on the various approaches to Islam. That Islam can be approached from different points of view. This is intended to break the monolithic point of view of Islam through the study of jurisprudence alone.

Muslim Abdurrahman, Manshor Faqih and friends, for example, have raised criticisms of a top-down and centralized approach to development. These intellectuals want to develop critical Islamic theology. Islam for them must be a source that inspires the transformation and liberation of consciousness. Then, present Gus Dur and Cak Nur try to bring another understanding of Islam. On the one hand, Wahid awakened us that Islam grew in Indonesia through distinctive local institutions, such as pesantren, and with it Gusdur embodied the idea of "indigenization of Islam"

On the other hand, Cak Nur introduces the cosmopolitan aspect of Islamic civilization. Gus Dur brings us down in the Indonesian context, while Cak Nur flies us into the global and cosmopolitan context of Islamic civilization that crosses national geographical boundaries. On the other hand, there is Imaduddin, whose focus is on reinforcing the points of Islamic faith with the new, Islamization of science. Imaduddin's monumental lectures were quite popular in the 80s. His idea of "sunnatullah" which he deals with "natural law" greatly attracted the generation of Islam in the 70s and 80s. He sought to offer the idea that Islam fits into modern science.

Today, the face of Indonesian Islam is more dominated by virtual preachers. The religious insights produced by this generation return to the debate of khilafiyah issues within fiqh, differences in theological issues, and issues of shari'ah and khilafah. Islamic discourse looks increasingly monolithic and exclusive. This situation is plaguing many Islamic masses lately. Virtual preachers such as Abdul Shomad, Felix Shiauw, Gus Nur, Adi Hidayat, Habib Bahar bin Smith, Habib Novel, Ismail Yusanto, and others mastered the production of discourse in the digital world, through virtual da'wa .

Moral preaching is symbolized as an opposition to values that are "considered" distorted. Borrowing the term Saba Mahmood, I would say that this trend is a form of politic of piety. That is the emergence of an awareness of the increasingly secular value of life, and therefore Islamic values must be upheld (Mahmood, 2005). But what should be emphasized, is it true that Indonesia is filled with secularism, liberalism and communism as they imagine, which they vehemently condemned in every lecture, have any dialogue fair and openly related to these issues? When we have not had time to make sure of it all, we have already put the "phobia" between us.

Politics of Piety is then immediately held hostage, co-opted by party elites, and made into social capital, then that's where the problem is no longer simple. At this point, intertwining of moral, power, practical political interests becomes so complicated. Like the complexity of understanding religious movements such as the dawn of the congregation, the dhzikr akbar, the *tabligh akbar* on the political seasons, mixing between the aspects of piety and practical political interest.

It is also important to note that lately the activism of virtual da'wah in Indonesia is more in line with spirit 212 movement. Meetings of virtual da'i, 212 movement icons, presidium 212 and other elements such as HTI, MMI, and some middle class Muslims increasingly clarify the subject. Based on the video in circulation, the meeting was seen talking about moral issues, da'wah road, and jihad medsos. From the video clip, it seems moral struggle to realize the Unity of the Republic of Indonesia bersyari'ah still be the main point (<https://www.facebook.com/KomunitasIslamKaffah/> video accessed at 10 January, 2018).

One of the celebrity da'i said in the meeting: "*Nowadays jihad should not only use muscle, but must use the brain, they make music, opponent with nasyid, they make a film that not better, opponent with religious film, they make the product, opponents with the product, they make cyber to drop our scholars, opponents with cyber, defend our clerics, cheer their goodness, depict, viralkan struggle them, if they make the application, we also make the application, this is the new name jihad*". From the statement it is quite clear that this is a matter of "value combat", or in popular language among da'wah activists called "gozwul fikri".

Verdi Hadis argue, many people, especially young people, are now disillusioned by the promises of modernity and development imparted through educational institutions and other institutions. The increasingly frequently articulated response through the language of religious morality reflects the increasing piety in Indonesian society that allows the growth of the kind of religious solidarity that Mietzner and Muhtadi refer to. In fact, the linkage between socio-economic disappointment and the power of religious sentiments facilitates the emergence of a "market of morality", a space in which Islamic symbols are consumed and reproduced as an expression of disappointment against the unjust status quo (<https://theconversation.com/memasarkan-moralitas-dalam-demokrasi-indonesia-89655>).

The functioning of this market will almost certainly be striking in Indonesian democracy until the 2019 presidential election, and possibly afterwards. Islamic morality has the potential to provide rich cultural resources to be exploited by competing elites, including through 171 regional head elections that will take place throughout Indonesia by 2018. Support by mass mobilization, when necessary, can be shaped by a particular type of narrative of oppression used very well against Ahok in Jakarta. This is a narrative that emphasizes the struggle of the majority of the people who are constantly marginalized and envisioned as a people (Islam). These people are contrasted with the greedy business elite who are labeled as ethnic Chinese minorities, who in turn are also supported by powerful and corrupt political figures.

This political situation remembering us to Gusdur works written around 1990s; "*Intellectuals in the Middle of Exclusivism*" and "*The Mass of Islam in the Life of the Nation and State*" (Wahid, 2000). These two writings are still very relevant to the current social situation of religion and politics. In "*Intellectuals in the Middle of Exclusiveness*", Abdurrahman explained that the intellectuals, especially those who use religious flags show a stagnation, it would be

more if the intellectuals voiced in the struggle for universal values such as human rights, democracy and sovereignty law (Wahid, 2000).

Gus Dur's criticism actually emerged as a response to the formation of ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) which was seen as exclusive by Gusdur. Because ICMI at that time only filled by the NU, Muhammadiyah and HMI. Gus Dur even refused to join ICMI. He criticized the tendency of Islamic scholars who concentrated only on the banner of Islam. According to Gus Dur, the existence of Islamic intellectuals is if he is able to serve the nation as individuals without having to be grouped (Wahid, 2000).

In addition to criticizing ICMI, Abdurrahman has long been concerned about the emergence of groups of Islamic formalism. Because, for Abdurrahman, it might have diminished the relevance of Islam itself. For him, Islam must be placed in the heart and artery, not to be merely accessories-formalistic (Wahid, 2000). Abdurrahman fully believed that in principle, Islam was perfect. Nevertheless, Islam is operationally-functional still requires strategic interpretations in the life of the nation and the state. In another Gus Dur's writing, "The Mass of Islam in the Life of a State and of a People," he quotes Sidney Jones, to explain how narrow and blooming the meaning of the word "ummah" in the historical dynamics of the Islamic movement.

In the beginning, the word "ummah" was used confinedly to certain Muslim communities living in the same area. Then the word "ummah" encounters the expansion of meaning and its use when the arousal of decolonization of the occupied third world countries occurs. Then the word "ummah" experienced a narrowing of meaning again to only fellow Muslims in the context of Indonesian nation. Finally, the word "ummah" tends to be used only for people who belong to the formal Islamic movements (Wahid, 2000). It seems that the last thesis is getting stronger these days, the use of the word "ummah" often belonging to a particular group, which has the same line of struggle. So the tendency of groups who often inventory the word "ummah" and "ulama" "is often accused other groups as a hypocrite, polytheism, thogut, heretical and so on. They always put a "us" situation against "them" (Wahid, 2000).

According to Abdurrahman, offers Islam an alternative to being an integrative force, not an exclusiveness. Islam must be one of the forces that color the history of this nation, not forcing Islam to be the only dye (Wahid, 2000). That's where the awareness of Islamic society should be directed. Gus Dur then mapped out some intellectual models in Indonesia, such as: Intellectual campus between career and activist. Second, the intellectuals of Islamic mass organizations. third, intellectuals in NGOs.

Lately a new variant emerged, the "intellectuals" without the mass organizations, or they networked across mass organizations and formed groups for the same political vision. This group is filled by religious speakers. The strength of this group can not be underestimated, because they have the power to attract the masses of Islam. The Islamic mass receptions at the lower levels are quite absorbed by the presence of these lecturers. As a result, a new trend emerges; ie many Islamic periods that are theologically very "aswaja" but politically oriented, khilafah and or NKRI bersyari'ah.

In my opinion, the future of the Indonesian intellectual movement must ensure intellectual freedom of thought and honesty. The consequences of these two attitudes are; there can be no coercion of uniformity of opinion, because the intelligence scene belongs to the people. As Gus Dur said "it is not good to behave and proclaim Islam's greater contribution to this country than any other group "Abdurrahman knew that Islamic services were great for this nation and country. However, Abdurrahman seemed to give an

example to the Muslim Ummah, he said: "we can not win ourselves and then blame others" (Wahid, 2000). Therefore, for Abdurrahman, one deserves to be said intellectually when he can express his ideas in the same (sense) of humanity.

CONCLUSION

Referring to three main issues in the study of social media and the shifting of traditional religious knowledge to millennial religious knowledge; new ulama in developing religious authority; and the political linkages of piety dealing with democracy. This study can analyze the dynamics of the role of contemporary virtual priests in Indonesia, and their impact on religion, culture, social and politics. Certainly the new media and social networks has been given to the preacher as a povital social figure, a cultural broker, and an authoritative interpreter of religion. The current phenomena of the rise of social media in da'wa participation has a significant impact on the socio-political life in Indonesian society. The production of religious knowledge through the virtual preaching activism is in-line with discourse battles, contestation of authority and politics.

This article confirms the virtual preaching activism that was stretched in Indonesia in the industry 4.0 era. Analysis using ethnographic social-media methods has answered this study. This phenomenon opens up new social changes that have transformed from traditional religious knowledge to electronic religious knowledge. This has created new media, new ulama and construction of authority. This research opens a new discourse about the popularity of scholars who form new scholars with their authority. Of course this phenomenon is interesting, when attached to the democratisation in Indonesia. The shift of the people into the ummah, as a form of logical consequences for the emergence of new scholars who have many followers with their respective interests. The post-truth era really allows this study to be developed more deeply if viewed from other aspects such as political economy, culture, or other aspects.

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